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Abstract:  
Among the most significant changes in the global health system in the last three decades is the 
emergence of global health initiatives (GHIs). Thus, the field of international health looks 
substantially different now as opposed to thirty years ago.  
This thesis investigates the emergence of global health initiatives from the viewpoint of institutional 
theory. Using the lens of institutional logics, this research demonstrates that the institutional change 
occurs through a process of logic evolution. This thesis finds 
that institutional change does not necessarily manifest only by shifts in prevailing logic as the 
current literature indicates, but also by the evolution of existing logics. The process of logic 
evolution can be conceptualised as the reconstitution of sources of legitimacy and identity, 
relational networks, control mechanisms and practices. These reconstituted logic characteristics are 
then blended into the old overarching logic. The blending process is dependent on macro and meso 
level factors.  
The ability to crystallise change and the degree of trust in accepting alternate approaches belong to 
the macro level factors. Meso level factors relate to the legitimacy, and status of proliferation 
agents, the feasibility to create a strategic field nexus, and their ability to create a participatory hub. 
The participatory hub is a key factor as it enables the process of distilling and legitimising the 
identity of the professionals in the field.  
A qualitative case study design was chosen as it allows an in-depth review and explanation of the 
emergence of GHI networks. A qualitative approach is more likely to address questions about the 
emergence of the global health initiative network. This, in essence, promotes a better 
comprehension of the underlying dynamics and allows a contextualised and specific clarification of 
the consequences for the emergence of GHIs in the global health system. In-depth interviews were 
conducted with a purposeful selection of highly networked informants in the field. 
This study offers a series of contributions to institutional theory. Initially, the principle of logic 
evolution is presented and conceptualised. Furthermore, it demonstrates how the characteristics of 
an institutional logic can be reconstituted. Finally, it establishes the key macro and meso factors that 
permit the logic evolution process to take place.  
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CHAPTER 1. Introduction   
1.1 Motivation for the research   
Global Health Initiatives (GHIs) are important institutions in the global health system. The 
changes in GHI networks have been of particular concern and interest to researchers as well 
as professionals around the world. This thesis is inspired by the important recent changes in 
various social contexts pertaining to the global health system (please see Figure 1 on p.15). 
Inspired by the fundamental changes that occurred in the global health system, I started 
researching the emergence of GHI networks. To gain a better understanding of the changes 
in this particular context, I concentrated on exploring the wider socio-cultural background 
that gave rise to complex structures of health. This framework seemed quite pertinent for 
research on GHIs, and particularly informative in explaining the main drivers that 
underscore the evolutionary paths in the global health field (please see Chapter 2).  
  
A close examination of organisational theory highlighted in the early phase of the PhD; a 
source of literature known as neo-institutional theory. This literature offered insights into the 
environmental factors impacting the organisation of a society. The concept of institutions, the 
accepted interpretation of emerging theories, and how they are maintained within a specific 
context, around which human activity is arranged, is essential to this body of research (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Andersson and Gadolin, 2020). By revealing the institutions occurring in a 
particular context, it is possible to explain why social activity is set up in a certain manner in 
a specific scenario.  
  
This thesis explores the evolution of the global health system using the framework of 
institutional theory, with the emphasis on institutional logics. This research notes that 
institutional change does not only occur via a shift in overarching logics as indicated by the 
current literature but may also arise through the evolution of overarching logics present in a 
field. This present study finds that logic evolution is a process of restructuring identities; 
transmitting legitimacy to those restructured identities; developing new relational networks; 
modifying control mechanisms and inculcating new practices by incrementally integrating 
them into the overarching field logic. This research shows that the evolution of an 
institutional logic depends on specific factors at the macro and meso level (please see 
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Chapter 7).  The thesis also finds that the process of logic evolution also depends on the 
blending process by which new elements are added.  
  
In addition, the study reveals that the determinants at the macro level relate to the degree of 
trust in accepting different approaches and the ability to crystallise change in a specific 
context within society. Meso level influences are linked to; the legitimacy of proliferation 
agents within a given field; the presence of a strategic field nexus where these agents can 
mobilise resources and sustain high engagement. Furthermore, the social interaction factor is 
crucial. This social interaction factor legitimises the identity of the professionals that operate 
in the field.  
  
This research also contributes to institutional theory in several ways. In the first place, the 
principle of logic evolution is introduced and developed. Secondly, it extends our 
understanding of logic as a set of characteristics or features. These characteristics (please see 
Figure 6 on p.42) can be reconstituted and combined in a specific field. Furthermore, it 
recognises the macro and meso factors that influence this change towards the evolution of an 
institutional logic (please see Chapter 7).  
  
Many theoretical uncertainties remain unexplored in this body of literature. Specifically, 
scholars from around the world are still investigating the process by which institutions 
change. Emergence of GHI networks provided particularly fertile grounds for exploring 
issues related to institutional change and could help us to further develop our understanding 
of the institutional process. The thesis therefore includes an institutional theory perspective 
for analysing the development of health initiatives, through the evolution of one institutional 
logic namely the professional logic.  
  3  
 1.2 The context of the research  
1.2.1 Key terminologies and their importance  
The emphasis in this thesis is on logic characteristics. Logic characteristics are mostly used 
to refer to the working processes of logic and assigning the social implications of these logics 
to a social context.  
We have inadequate insight into how logics are built, how they develop and how they are 
challenged and ultimately de-institutionalised in the global health system. In focusing on how 
logic shifts, it is equally important not to ignore the essence of logic as paradigms that ensure 
consistency of understanding and practice. This draws attention, however, to the processes of 
social construction that build and incorporate new concepts into logic by the reconstitution of 
the characteristics of institutional logic. 
Institutional researchers have found that organisations vary and evolve over time, while 
retaining certain homogeneous traits. The study of organisations from the lens of institutional 
theory has therefore shifted away from its historical emphasis on understanding alignment 
and uniformity between organisations, and has more recently switched to the analysis of 
change (Dacin, Goodstein and Scott, 2002; Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings, 2002; Seo 
and Creed, 2002; Lenz and Viola, 2017).   
Institutional change is studied as a trend occurring at field level (DiMaggio, 1983; 
Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006;Micelotta,Lounsbury and Greenwood ,2017 ), and as such, it 
investigates communities of individuals and organisations who share similar structures of 
meaning and sometimes communication (Scott, Scott and Meyer, 1994).  
Changes in field level arise not only through adjustments to current relational networks and 
positions of participants, but also through shifts in the overarching logic (Scott, Ruef, 
Mendal, and Caronna, 2000; Reay and Hinings, 2005; Song, 2017). Logics are defined as the 
historically created patterns of behaviours, attitudes, principles, values, and guidelines by 
which people and organisations create and reproduce their material existence, organise time 
and space, and make social reality meaningful (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton and 
Ocasio,2008; Shekhar, Manoharan and Rakshit, 2020). There is, however, no absolute 
clarification about the meaning for institutional logic. The definition of logic is related to that 
of the organisational field (Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2015, 2017) and institutional 
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change at the field level, in so far as logics are concerned, is regarded as collections of 
cultural values and guidelines that organise thinking, direct decision-making and form the 
interactions between participants and activities within a given institutional area (Thornton, 
2002; Lounsbury, 2002, 2007). Based on this concept and on the updating of certain 
characteristics/features (please see Figure 6 on p.42) of an institutional logic, section 3.4 
explains the rationale behind what logics are in this research context. This may give greater 
clarity to the idea of logic in the ongoing debate on institutional theory.  
  
Neo-institutional theory literature conventionally describes change as a shift in the prevailing 
logic in a given field (Rao et al., 2003; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; Lounsbury, 2002, 2007; 
Skålén and Edvardsson, 2016),thus largely overlooking the nature and multitude of 
institutions affecting that field, as well as the wider society (Kraatz and Block, 2008; Dunn 
and Jones, 2010;Greenwood et al., 2010,2011; Grinevich et al., 2019). However, change is 
not automatically synonymous with logic shift. Institutional change has also recently been 
described by institutional academics as a shift in the balance between competing logics in a 
field (Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007; Purdy and Gray, 2009; Pache and Santos, 2013; 
Greenwood et al., 2011; Aalto and Kallio, 2019).  
  
In a field, nevertheless, logics can also coexist without inherently conflicting with one 
another (Dunn and Jones, 2010; Goodrick and Reay, 2011; Sirris, 2019). Given this 
perspective, this thesis argues that institutional change can occur when distinct logic 
characteristics are reconstituted and incorporated into an established framework, through a 
process labeled as logic evolution (please see Figure 10 on p.82).   
 
The use of specific logics provides researchers an opportunity to understand the mechanisms by 
which participants evolve a social context. Hence, a more complex and evolutionary 
conceptualisation of logic will make it easier to better explain the mechanisms of social creation, 
such as logic evolution. 
 
The current study draws on existing institutional change concepts and discusses how 
developments in fields occur in various ways. It challenges the predominant approach to 
institutional theory which is focused on explanations of change about shifts from one 
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dominant logic to another, or due to contradictions between logics. This demonstrates that 
field transformation can occur by an evolution of the prevailing logic in a field. Logic 
evolution is conceptualised as a process of legitimising and socialising identities of 
professionals in the field. It is also concerned with creating new control mechanisms and 
relational networks that will be enacted by professionals via the infiltration of new practices. 
This will lead to the evolution of an overarching institutional logic in a field. 
  
In summary, the research explores how changes in institutional field level arise from changes 
in one of the field's institutional logics. Drawing on the conceptualisation of an institutional 
order, the study explains the idea of logic evolution as a mechanism by which new concepts 
are introduced and incorporated into an overarching logic.  
  
1.2.2 Research background   
The criterion for selecting cases is to maximise the chance to investigate the restructuring of a 
field. The field of global health initiatives (GHIs) is selected in this instance. Macro and 
meso factors that influence the logic evolution process will be explored.   
The restructuring of the field will be studied via the lens of the overarching professional logic 
by looking at the reforms in this field.  
  
The emerging pandemic of the New Coronavirus is an example of the effects that the absence 
of effective drugs can have, resulting in devastating consequences. The World Health 
Organization (WHO) describes antimicrobial resistance as one of the biggest risks to global 
health which if not effectively managed, might escalate leading to a humanitarian disaster. 
Resistance to current groups of antibiotics and increased occurrence of emerging infectious 
diseases entails faster production of new and successful drugs (World Health Organization, 
2018; Pereira et al., 2020)  
  
The field of the global health system has been overcrowded (please see 2.1.4) in recent years 
with international organisations; the WHO is no longer alone or even at the heart of global 
health governance. More funding was applied to the global health sector from particular 
concerns — such as HIV/AIDS and infant mortality. But these supplementary funds are also 
channelled into new organisations expressly established to fulfil certain needs (both to 
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resolve such health issues and to administer funds in certain different fields). New attempts 
are being made, some outside the World Health Organization. Unlike the broad centralised 
mandate of the WHO, most of the new organisations concentrate vertically by targeting 
specific diseases (such as HIV/AIDS) (please see 5.1- 5.3 for more details on vertical and 
horizontal approaches in global health).  
  
Within that perspective, GHI networks are deemed important in meeting the problems for 
developing new medical products, especially for neglected diseases (please see 3.7.1.4) and 
emerging infectious diseases (Varda, Shoup and Miller, 2012; Vecchi and Hellowell, 2018; 
Vecchi et al., 2020). While GHIs are not a new concept (see Watts, 2016), these 
arrangements gained traction in the area of the Global Health System in 1993 (please see 
Figure 2 on p.17). This was made possible following a request from the World Health 
Assembly to the WHO to mobilise and promote support in the Global Health System from 
multiple stakeholders. As a result, the term 'partnership' has been included by the WHO as a 
key feature to deal with Global Health problems (Widdus, 2001; Buse and Waxman, 2001)  
  
1.2.3 Research focus   
Against this backdrop, this thesis aims at explaining the factors behind this evolution and in 
more general terms, to shed light on institutional change mechanisms in this particular 
context. To do so, the research centred on one of the logics, namely professional logic (please 
see 3.7), and studied the actions of key actors during the proliferation period (please see 2.1.5 
and 2.1.6). These actors are termed in this thesis as “proliferation agents” (please see 2.1.6). 
The decision to rely on this institutional logic was based on the fact that the professional 
logic was in effect at the start of the proliferation, and still plays a fundamental role in the 
field. The decision to focus on the professional logic also stems from the significance that 
informants and secondary data attach to the global health professional’s way of thinking and 
behaving in their roles.  
  
This thesis aims at illustrating this transition at the field level by examining modifications in 
the internal characteristics (please see Figure 5 on p.34) of the professional logic. 
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Specifically, it seeks to explain how during the proliferation period new ideas and concepts 
were added and applied to the field, and how they were mixed with those already present.  
The emphasis here is on building new elements which are linked to a more comprehensive 
view of GHIs and their integration into the existing professional collaboration framework. 
The research examines how the identity of global health professionals is legitimised, and 
their translation into tangible changes through relational networks, control mechanisms and 
practices (please see Chapter 6). It stresses the role played by proliferation agents and the 
effect of macro and meso factors (please see Chapter 7) on the change process.  
  
Current research on institutional theory has discussed changes which occur from one 
dominant logic to another (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; Shekhar, Manoharan and Rakshit, 
2020), or how differences between competing logics lead to institutional change (Purdy and 
Gray, 2009; Pache and Santos, 2013; Golyagina, 2020). Previous research has, nonetheless, 
typically concentrated on changes between logics derived from different institutional orders. 
For example, Scott and his colleagues (2000) describe the transformation of the field of 
healthcare as a change from professional logic to state logic, and finally, to market logic.  
   
The uniqueness of this work on the other hand, is its emphasis on logics originating within 
the same institutional order (field of GHI networks) to explore how the evolution of a 
professional logic can also contribute to institutional change processes. In addition, the 
analysis examines key social (macro) and field-level (meso) factors affecting this process in 
this context. This will reveal how the institutional climate affects logic evolution, thus 
illustrating the change.  
   
This dissertation follows an inductive approach (Lincoln, 2007; Denzin and Lincoln, 
2000,2011; Yin, 2017) to produce a theoretical account of field-level change mechanisms and 
employs abduction theory techniques for data collection, coding, and interpretation 
(Charmaz, 2006; Glaser and Strauss, 2017). The aim is to discover unexplored social 
structures within a particular stream of study, in this case institutional theory, and not to 
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produce a stand-alone theory that is entirely disconnected from previous research (Lawrence 
and Suddaby, 2006).  
  
1.3 Contributions of the study   
To build on existing research on field-level change in institutional theory, this study aims to 
investigate how processes of institutional change occur in a specific context. It studies the 
evolution of GHI networks (please see Chapter 2) and focuses on the creation of a field-based 
central logic to illustrate how macro and meso factors affect the process of logic evolution 
and change at field level. Logic evolution is a process of assigning new identities and 
conferring legitimacy to those identities. It is also concerned with developing new relational 
networks, which are regulated by control mechanisms (formal and informal) that will permit 
the incremental integration of practices into the overarching logic (in this case the 
professional logic). Based on factors at the social and field level, logic evolution occurs as a 
blending process.  
  
 Macro factors include: 1) the degree of trust in embracing alternate approaches; 2) the ability to 
crystallise change. Meso factors include: 1) the legitimacy of proliferating agents in the field and 
community;2) the feasibility of identifying a strategic field nexus, where the agents of proliferation 
can manage resources, and sustain a high degree of engagement; and 3) the creation of a 
participatory hub for professionals, to socialise and interact (please see Figure 10 on p.82). This 
dissertation offers several insights to the literature of institutional theory. It improves our current 
understanding of processes of institutional change. This is through researching logics that come 
from the same institutional order; the professional logic in GHI networks.  
  
Previous research has concentrated on understanding how logics from various institutional 
orders alter or become incorporated into a field (Lounsbury, 2007; Ashraf, Ahmadsimab and 
Pinkse, 2017). The findings of this study suggest that logic evolution can also lead to changes 
at field level. It extends previous work while indicating that GHIs can be viewed in various 
ways, such as logics originating from the same order (Reay and Hinings, 2009; Andersson 
and Liff, 2018). This thesis demonstrates that logics can coexist in the same field and 
describes the process (please see Figure 10 on p.82) by which they evolve.  
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Even though a field is perceived to be stable, field-level logics can change over time. To date, 
however, logic has been seen as somewhat monolithic and static (Thornton, 2002; Townley, 
2002; Yoshikawa, Witt and Yamada, 2020). This work supports the need to adopt a more 
dynamic and evolutionary logic conceptualisation to consider how field-level logics evolve in 
a specific context. Logics tend to be tool sets comprising features/characteristics (Swidler, 
1986; Richey and Ravishankar, 2019) which when analysed empirically, the characteristics 
(please see Figures 5 and 6) of which can be reconstituted and combined in a field. This 
conceptualisation of logics helps to expose the mechanism by which logics change internally 
(i.e., are evolved) and adds a versatility dimension and possible complementarity.  
  
This thesis shows that the evolution of logic is a process of change which is unique to the 
setting. Both societal and field-level variables lead to the unfolding of this process. The 
degree of trust in accepting alternative approaches differs across settings. The legitimation 
and proliferation of non-state actors in a field, as well as professionals’ cognitive 
development of new concepts differ across fields. These variables affect how various 
concepts are integrated, thereby transforming the field structure.  
  
As a result of the explanation of logic, fields and the collective social groups within them 
pose different levels of internal diversity. Subfields tend to be embedded in fields where 
actors have unique traits that can fluctuate from one prevailing field-level logic to another. 
The logic evolution process generates concepts and behaviours that are adopted by different 
groups of people, who use them to transform a particular field or sections of it that arise due 
to the "normative fragmentation of professional logic" (Goodrick and Reay, 2011). This 
explanation goes some way to explaining how players in the field perceived their identities 
and created relationships (Hoffman, 2016; Greenwood et al., 2017).  
  
Study shows that socialisation processes, in line with observations from old-institutionalism, 
are central in evidencing field-level shifts in professional fields. Authors have claimed its 
importance in framing, explaining, validating and dispersing novel structures, as opposed to 
relying solely on interpersonal networks (Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence, 2004; Greenwood, 
et al., 2017).   
  10  
 
1.4 Thesis structure   
The analysis is set out as follows. Chapter 2 describes the evolution of the global health 
system and Chapter 3 presents the theoretical structure for this study and discusses prior work 
on the thesis-relevant institutional theory, focusing on logic. This recognises study areas for 
the possible expansion of current literature and ends with the introduction of the research 
problem for this analysis, namely the process of field-level change through changes within a 
logic in a specific context.  
 
Chapter 3 also describes the features of the field of the global health system and development 
of GHIs before and after the proliferation period and explains the old and the current 
professional logic. It further explains the evolution of GHI networks and shows the effects of 
that process on the overarching professional logic  
 
Chapter 4 defines the study's methodological choices and outlines the methodology of 
analysis. It also explains the study design and methodology and demonstrates the data 
analysis mechanism leading to the theoretical model (please see Figure 10 on p.82) being 
developed. Finally, this chapter discusses how some of the concerns and issues resulting from 
methodological decisions have been solved and how trustworthiness is gained.  
 
Chapters 5,6 and 7 analyse the change as a logic evolution mechanism. Chapter 5 begins with 
chronological analysis of the key events. Chapter 6 highlights the change triggers that initiate 
the process of logic evolution. The phases of the logic evolution process are also presented in 
Chapter 6. Specifically, the progressive changes in the characteristics of the logic, are also 
analysed. Chapter 7 pertains to the macro/meso factors affecting the process. It outlines the 
key conceptual principles that emerge from the data and concludes with the conceptual model 
presentation (Figure 10 on p.82).   
 
Chapter 8 addresses the study's results in relation to the relevant literature on field level 
change and institutional logics. This also clarifies the thesis theoretical contributions and the 
ramifications for future study.  
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Chapter 9 summarises the thesis contributions. It explains some of the study's shortcomings 
and presents alternate explications of the mechanism being studied. Considering the results of 



















CHAPTER 2. The Evolution of the Global Health System 
2.1.1 Introduction- Emergence and growth of GHI networks 
Even if there is a rich history of philanthropy and civil society participation in health (Birn, 
2014), the role of non-governmental organisations, including private philanthropy, 
organisations and civil society actors has escalated and grown since the late 1990s (please see 
Figure 2 on p.17).   
Among the most significant changes in global health system (please see Figure 1 on p.15) in 
the last three decades, is the emergence of GHIs. The field of international health looked 
substantially different thirty years ago (Buse and Mays, 2006). Diverse networks of groups 
and organisations have been developed to treat a variety of conditions such as; malaria, 
onchocerciasis, dracunculiasis, polio, and many other childhood diseases that can be 
avoided via the provision of vaccinations. However, in certain cases, if there was any global 
health initiative, it worked mainly through a transnational body, that of the World Health 
Organization (WHO), collaborating bilaterally with member states rather than through an 
international platform.  
  
However, amid their growth, despite a few exceptions (Buse and Tanaka, 2011), health 
policy scholars have paid scant attention to GHI networks. Consequently, there is limited 
knowledge pertaining to when and how they have arisen, what their consequences are, and 
what functions they perform in the sphere of the global health system. Addressing this 
awareness gap is critical, because the performance of the GHI networks, including those 
delivered by new initiatives, allows for the solving of urgent health issues (Schiffman, et al., 
2016).  
  
Over the last few decades, the global health system has undergone substantial growth, 
including a steady rise in the number and variety of players within it (Moon, et al., 2010; 
Williams and Rushton, 2011). There is increasing awareness that greater collaboration of 
these players is required if a successful response to the most urgent contemporary public 
health challenges is to be ensured. However, there is no consensus in research literature on 
the meanings of these key concepts of collaboration and their concrete uses (Bettcher and 
Lee, 2002). An integral understanding of what the global health system currently entails is 
needed. This includes its elements and how effectively they function, as well as how well 
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they do (Hoffman and Cole, 2018). Without this understanding, these collaborations would 
be inefficient.    
  
In fact, there is insufficient knowledge as to which actors can really be viewed as part of the 
global health system. The range of players involved is often quoted as "more than 40 bilateral 
donors, 26 UN agencies, 20 global and regional funds and 90 global health programmes" 
(Hoffman and Cole, 2018). However, with the continuing growth of the network, this figure 
for 2007 is out of date, and there is still a lack of detail about how it was extracted and which 
actors it covers. In order to build an up-to-date account of global health players, Hoffman and 
Cole, in a 2018 study, found a practical way to map them, recognising not just their presence, 
but also how they communicate with each other. Using Internet networks – made up of 
realworld players in the global health system- they addressed two questions. First of all, they 
asked; what is the ‘global health system?' And second; who is populating this system?’  
  
Although several answers are available, the study restricted concepts that can be applied with 
inclusion/exclusion parameters and mapping approaches that are comprehensive, transparent 
and replicable. In this way, they generated analysis that could be factually verified, and can 
be used for possible investigations while accounting for bias.    
In addressing these two questions, they provided an organisational description of the global 
health system that sets specific limits and can actually be extended to maps of global health 
actors and their relationships. The second is the use of internet networking to create and 
define a list of 203 global health players; to enhance their knowledge of the global health 
environment through the internet network of global health players (Hoffman, Cole and 
Pearcey, 2015).  
  
2.1.2 Definition of global health initiative network 
Hoffman and Cole (2018), henceforth suggested the following definition for the global health 
initiative network:  
“The global health initiative network involves transnational entities mainly dedicated to 
improving the health innovation technologies, and enhances the coordination and collaboration 
of the multi-stakeholders in terms of control, funding and implementation”  
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Within that overarching logic, field professionals, internal structures, and external players 
from other significant global policy areas, influence the relationship among global health 
actors.   
  
2.1.3 Conceptualisation of the global health professional in this thesis  
The term “professional” relates to an individual operating in global health. As per Hoffman 
and Cole (2018), the term “professional” in this thesis is conceptualised as:  
“A global health professional is defined as a transnational person or organisation whose 
primary objective is to improve health.”   
Since the creation of these GHIs is more holistic ( explanation on this holistic nature is 
provided in 4.2) in nature, a more integrated and global perspective of the term  
“professional” is taken. The focus therefore is put on individuals engaging in topics such as 
the provision of health goods, supporting human rights, reacting to humanitarian crises, and 
fostering international growth through lobbying and socialisation. The concept of  
“professionals” in this thesis extends to the multiple professionals in the network. It includes 
persons and actors who work to improve health and it is not restricted only to those actors 
who play a strong or significant role in the global health system. The concept also takes into 
account the interactions of the actors, structures that control the roles of the actors, as well as 
the relationship of the actors with internal and external influences. This conceptualisation is 
thus essential and helps us to improve our realistic understanding of the “global health 
professional”.   
  
2.1.4 The plurality of the global health network  
Network visualisation of the global health network of development reveals emerging health 
players in more prominent field roles, and older organisations on the fringe of the network, 
suggesting that the most powerful actors may not actually be the most traditional ones. Figure 
1(see p.15) shows the composition of the current global health system. Table 1 (see p.16) 
provides a clearer picture of the global health system. An important observation that 
emanates from Table 1 is the amount of non-state actors present in the system. The term used 
in this thesis is “proliferation” of non-state actors in the global health system. This 
proliferation of non-state actors is made even more evident, when viewed through the prism 
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of Development Assistance for Health (DAH). Appendix B shows how funding from these 
non-state actors has increased since the 1990s.  
 





















Figure 1 The Global Health System (Source: Hoffman and Cole, 2018) 
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Table 1 Global Health System Composition (Hoffman and Cole, 2018)  
 
Civil society and non-governmental 
groups  
138  
Public-private collaborations  18  
Technical bodies  16  
UN bodies and Intergovernmental 
organisations  
11  
National Government    7  
Private Sector    6  
Table 1 Global Health System Composition (Hoffman and Cole, 2018) 
 
2.1.5 Initial proliferation of global health players 
The establishment over time of new global health players reveals three distinct stages of 
accelerated growth. Until 1945, the rate of proliferation of global health players remained 
very low. However as of 1945, an era of accelerated growth began and continued until 1952 
(please see Figure 2 on p.17). The subsequent rise coincides with the creation of the UN 
frameworks (Hoffman and Cole, 2018). As part of the evolving UN framework itself and 
combined with its creation and that of other relevant multilateral organisations, new global 
health actors started to “proliferate” the network. A second expansion process began in 1970 
and continued on through the decade (Hoffman and Cole, 2018; Hoffman, Cole and Pearcey, 
2015). This growth could at that time represent a growing interest in socio-economic growth. 
In 1973, for instance, the World Bank declared its contribution by increasing development 
financing by 40 per cent over the next five years. Finally, there was a rise in the proliferation 
of actors from 1986 to 2006, which coincides with a five-fold increase in global health 
finance (see figure 2) (IHME,2013).   
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Figure 2 Rate of proliferation of global health players (Source: Hoffman and Cole, 2018)  
 
Figure 2 Rate of proliferation of global health players (Source: Hoffman and Cole,2018) 
 
2.1.6 Proliferation of non-state actors  
The Millennium Development Goals (MDG) accelerated the proliferation of non-state actors. 
The global health system has undergone very substantial modifications. While the previous 
focus was on the WHO, a variety of international organisations, especially UN agencies such 
as UNICEF and UNFPA, as well as the World Bank and major donors, the global health 
environment has since grown to include a much more varied group of players (please see 
Figure 3 on p.18). Since the turn of the millennium, more than 100 GHIs have arisen in the 
field, with many deliberately established to speed up progress towards the MDGs (Samb et 
al., 2009). The new global health network is now composed of institutions who focus on 
funding, assisting and implementing (please see Figure 3 on p.18).  
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Figure 3 The new global health network (Source Institute for Health Metric and Evaluation, 
2020)  
 
Figure 3 The new global health network (Source Institute for Health Metric and Evaluation, 2020) 
 
 
2.1.7 The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation as the key proliferation agent  
Many of the latest sustainable health programmes have embraced creative integrated 
frameworks for public-private collaborations that operate for the purpose of improvement of 
global health. Some even wield important implications for global health, a notable example 
being the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF). The BMGF has allowed the industry 
to reinvigorate itself and has generated a significant financial boost as the second largest 
provider (please see Appendix C) of DAH in 2019 (Dieleman et al., 2014; IHME, 2019). In 
this thesis, the BMGF are termed as one of the major “proliferation agents” in the GHI 
network. They have been termed as the key proliferation agent based on the sheer amount of 
funds (please see Appendix C) to the global health system, and from the data emanating from 
the interviews. Interviewees have constantly referred to the BMGF as the driving force 
behind GHIs.   
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In the post-2000 era, with BMGF acting as a key proliferation agent, rapid increases in global 
funding for health were observed. Since the turn of the millennium, development assistance 
to health (DAH) has almost tripled, from $12.4 billion in 2000 to $40.6 billion in 2019 
(Schäferhoff et al., 2015; Institute for Health Metric and Evaluation, 2020). Although figures 
suggest that DAH hit an all-time peak of $31.3 billion in 2013, its growth rate has been 
declining in recent years. It must also be pointed out that in 2019 alone BMGF contributed 
$3.9 billion in DAH (please see Appendix C). Crucially it must be highlighted that this 2019 
funding in DAH by the BMGF is higher than that of the UK Government (please see 
Appendix C). This emphasises the key role of the BMGF in the current global health system.  
  
Within this theme of funding in global health, there is the need to highlight the number of 
critical financial mechanisms (please see Figure 3 on p.18), that have been developed 
specifically to speed up progress towards achieving health related MDGs (please see 2.1.1). 
These include those who provide ‘Channels of Assistance’ (please see Figure 3 on p.18) such 
as Global Fund and the US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Other 
projects, including GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance, were initiated only prior to implementing 
the MDGs, with which pointed to the MDGs as having an important structure for their 
missions. United Nations initiatives to organise funding by streamlining financing have been 
attempted by the Health 4 + Group (including WHO,UNAIDS, UNFPA, UNICEF, UN 
Women and the World  
Bank). These continued to develop significant health resources and creative funding systems, 
such as the UNITAID Airlines Levy and the IFFIm. A variety of programmes have focused 
on providing technical assistance (please see Figure 3 on p.18) to nations, including the Roll 
Back Malaria Partnership (launched in 1998, i.e. before the MDGs were adopted). 
Established in 1996, UNAIDS (please see Figure 3 on p.18) is a core source of strategic 
resources, global leadership and management in the fight against HIV/AIDS (Schäferhoff et 
al., 2015).  
  
2.1.8 Emergence of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs)  
Building on 2.1.7 and keeping in mind Figure 3 (see p.18), it can be ascertained that the 
creation of strategic partnerships is vital, particularly in the global health domain. These 
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strategic partnerships are a key part of the modern GHIs. A form of these partnerships is the 
emerging relationship between the public and private (PPP). These put together public and 
private researchers and align them with civil society leaders. This allows the optimal 
combination of complementary expertise and tools geared towards a shared challenge to 
address global health issues. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) were never properly 
established in global health until the 1990s (Widdus, 2005). PPPs have since spread (Cohen, 
2006), and thus have their purposes and priorities. In order to address issues emerging in 
disease endemic countries, the vast majority of PPPs rely on product development or similar 
approaches to facilitate access for diagnostic, preventive or therapeutic solutions (Widdus, 
2005).  
  
PPPs collaboration (please see Figure 4 on p.21) between academic researchers and 
businesses, and public sector researchers have recently been outlined as being of key 
importance to "encourage academic entrepreneurship and promote the implementation of 
promising new treatments" (Gehr and Garner 2016).These collaborations are significant, 
particularly for the perspective of drug discovery, and for recovering any medicinal products 
that have not been taken to the latter stages of clinical trials. However, they alone are not 
sufficient to introduce transformational improvements to the global health research agenda in 
order to prevent, manage and track non-communicable diseases (NCDs) in a significantly 
sustainable way (Mensah, 2016). Furthermore, it is doubtful that old forms of biomedical 
assistance and collaborations which focused solely on the health sector would perform well 
(Chilber, 2016). New collaboration structures would be required to bridge the global health 
system with other sectors (please see Figure 4 on p.21). PPPs ongoing focus is on mobilising 
local resources and personnel for research and health management (Torchia, Calabrò and 
Morner, 2015) (please see Figure 4 on p.21).  
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Figure 4 The PPP environment (Munoz et al., 2015)  
 
Figure 4 The PPP environment (Munoz et al., 2015) 
  
In typical PPPs, at least two out of three sectors have increasing participation. The three 
sectors are defined as public, private and civil society. Partners in the public sector include 
bodies that collectively are part of local, provincial, state, national, regional or international 
government entities or bodies, that are solely responsible for the procurement of public health 
goods or services (Torchia, Calabrò and Morner, 2015). The private sector includes 
distributors of medical products and health innovation technologies, as well as other public 
health goods (please see Figure 4). These partners comprise both for-profit and non-profit 
organisations. On the other hand, the stakeholders from the civil society include mainly 
NGOs and entities that are engaged mostly in advocacy (Munoz et al., 2015).  
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2.1.9 Key roles of PPPs  
 Nishtar (2004) has defined six key roles usually performed by these PPPs: product creation, 
enhancement of access to healthcare, global coordination systems, strengthening of health 
facilities, public advocacy and education, and quality assurance and regulation. As Nishtar 
(2004) puts it, the primary reason for the establishment of these collaborations is the 
"incapacity of the public sector to provide public health goods completely on its own in an 
efficient, reliable and fair way, due to lack of capital and management problems”. However, 
the productivity and resource benefits leveraged by the public sector, from the non-state 
donors, must be seen in the light of the critique of the actual or alleged conflicts of interest 
that these PPPs might face.  
  
2.1.10 Challenges of PPPs  
Notwithstanding the part that these partnerships are meant to play, the PPPs continue to face 
numerous unique challenges, especially in countries and regions with low and medium 
incomes. Examples of these include different governance systems in subSaharan Africa; 
misalignment of collaboration goals with strategic goals and objectives of the recipient 
country; selective, longitudinal, disease-specific attention rather than patient-centred 
attention; multimorbidity approaches; lack of synchronisation of initiatives across PPPs; 
inadequate emphasis on local capacity development; and the lack of a skilled workforce, 
continues to be relevant (Mwisongo and Nabyonga-Orem, 2016). In many of these fields, 
despite the progress that has been made, much remains to be achieved and there are more 
problems that compromise the utility and efficacy of these PPPs (Rudan and Sridhar, 2016).  
  
2.1.11 Conclusion-Importance of integrating partnerships in GHIs  
In the light of its development, following a decade of funding increases, Rudan and Sridhar 
(2016), analysed the function of the global health system and recommended a paradigm of 
five fundamental needs to ensure optimal results. Five specific needs were established 
including the need to: 1) organise donor funding; 2) prioritisation aspect among multiple 
research ideas; 3) identify good research; 4) ensure fast and agile availability to research 
results; and 5) determine returns on research expenditure (Rudan and Sridhar, 2016).  
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In order to advance global health, PPPs need to go beyond the five fundamental needs of  
Rudan and Sridhar’s (2016) system to cope with the rising challenges. First, these 
multistakeholder collaborations should integrate "the financial sector, civil society, the 
research community, academics, philanthropy and private foundations, legislative bodies, 
relevant authorities, volunteer organisations and other stakeholders," as stated in the global 
context of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (Chhibber, 2016). "In other words, a relationship 
focused entirely on the health sector is not optimal." It is ideal to integrate all related 
government sectors outside health such as finance, trade, education, transport, agriculture, or 
the legislature (as appropriate) (please see Figure 4). This is particularly pertinent to PPPs 
who seek to address the complexities of NCD research and medical product supply chains, as 
well as health systems strengthening in disease endemic countries (National Academies of 
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2016).  
  
Secondly, it is important to integrate civil society, particularly with patients and their 
families, patient advocacy organisations and community stakeholders (Thacker et al., 2013). 
The conventional, single disease-focused and therapeutic approach is deemed to be less 
efficient than collaborations that put the patient at the forefront of clinical and public health 
studies. A more horizontal based approach to health systems will entail the discussion of 
biological and social, environmental, fiscal, and environmental determinants of NCDs. 
Thirdly, the optimal PPP also tackles the mobilisation of local research capacity as well as 
research development and job creation in disease endemic countries. This challenge is 
constantly being faced by more and more PPPs (Mensah, 2016). A more in-depth analysis of 
the horizontal versus vertical debate is provided in Chapter 5.  
   
For the advancement of global health development and research, strategic alliances such as  
PPPs remain vital. Regardless of the form of role that these alliances are meant to provide, 
PPPs have come to face major difficulties, particularly in countries with low and medium 
incomes (Kostyak et al., 2017). These issues include diverse governance systems, 
misalignment of objectives, lack of integration of efforts across PPPs, and insufficient 
attention on local research capability and workforce growth. PPPs thus strive to involve and 
integrate all related government sectors outside the ministries of health and aggressively 
pursue the involvement of patients, populations and other civil society partners. This allows 
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them to effectively and sustainably overcome the challenges of research relating to NCDs in 
order to advance global health (Buse and Tanaka, 2011).  
  
Investing in research capability creation, research preparation and job creation is also crucial 
for PPPs. In combating neglected diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 
communicable diseases, more and more PPPs are gradually meeting this challenge. Similarly, 
the development of global health studies for non-communicable diseases will mean more 
requirements of new and creative PPPs (Ruckert and Labonté, 2014).  
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CHAPTER 3: Literature Review 
 3.1 Introduction   
This work is rooted in the literature of neo-institutional theory. In particular, it discusses how 
field-level change occurs through the process of logic evolution in a specific context.   
  
Institutional theory has shifted away from its conventional emphasis on understanding 
alignment and diversity within organisations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983 ;Suchman,1995), 
and has recently switched to analysis of change (Dacin et al., 2002; Seo and Creed, 2002; 
Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence, 2004; Furnari, 2016; Greenwood et al., 2017). Change 
processes are found primarily at field level and include shifts in governance systems, 
institutional actors and overarching logics (Scott et al., 2000).  
  
Thus, the idea of logic has become important in institutional studies (Friedland and Alford,  
1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999,2008). Logics allow and restrict awareness and behaviour 
(DiMaggio, 1997). Those are the concrete and conceptual frameworks from which the 
collective truth is perceived by groups and individuals.   
Studies have concluded that institutional change occurs as predominant logics shift (Thornton 
and Ocasio, 1999,2008; Kyratsis et al., 2017). More recently, in answer to the complexities of 
institutional environments (Kraatz and Block, 2008; Seo and Creed, 2002; Greenwood et al., 
2010), academics have begun to explore the existence of multiple and contradictory logics in 
an institutional arena (Reay and Hinings, 2009; Purdy and Gray, 2009; Pache and Santos, 
2013; Shields and Watermeyer, 2020). This research argues that equilibrium in the field is 
achieved by temporary resolution of differences between logics (Purdy and Gray, 2009). 
Nevertheless, different logics can coexist in the field without actually being in conflict, even 
for long periods of time (Lounsbury and Boxenbaum, 2013; Aparicio, et al., 2017). In line 
with that theory, some interesting strands of research have emerged. How does the 
coexistence of different logics lead to institutional change? Could institutional change be 
caused by evolution within a logic?  
  
This work investigates how institutional change at the field level occurs through the evolution 
of an institutional logic in the context of GHIs. This focuses on a fundamental logic in a field 
namely the professional logic and explores how this logic evolves over time as internal 
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characteristics are reconstituted and nestled within the field, thus generating a cycle of logic 
evolution that induces institutional change. Based on primary and secondary data, Figure 7 
(on p.50) shows which characteristics of the professional logic have been reconstituted in the 
field of GHIs. By analysing these processes in the field of GHIs, the analysis also uncovers 
the macro and meso factors underlying the logic evolution process (please see Chapter 7).   
The theoretical structure for research is given in this chapter. It ends with defining the 
research problem and possible contributing areas.  
 
3.2 Institutional theory: Transitioning from conformity and homogeneity to plurality and 
change   
3.2.1 Neo-institutional theory: conformity and homogeneity  
Initial research which adopted neo-institutional theory sought to clarify conformity and 
homogeneity in organisational processes (Zucker, 1977; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995). It is believed that organisations are implementing similar 
characteristics because their context requires them to take on different frameworks. In other 
words, within the contextualised assumptions of their environment, organisational entities are 
isomorphic. Since organisations are supposed to act rationally, they do so to suit their 
institutional background. However, the reasons behind this conformism might vary. Some 
organisations might do so either with a clear purpose or to simply follow a certain ritual.  
This helps them to gain credibility in their audience's eyes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Suchman, 1995), and improve their chances of sustainability. Organisational structures and 
activities are thus influenced by the perceived values, norms and rules of the society in which 
they are located, i.e. the institutions.   
This method has been critiqued for seeing people and entities as passive beneficiaries of 
institutions and not taking into account diversity, agency and change (Fligstein, 1997; 
DiMaggio, 1988). Studies have thus gradually switched to those topics of diversity, agency 
and change.  
New ideas — either arising within a field or being imported from other settings — can 
question and alter the ways of thinking and acting as well as practices that are taken for 
granted, thereby triggering institutional change.  
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3.2.2 Moving towards heterogeneity in the face of institutional pressures  
Environmental upheavals (Haveman, Russo and Meyer, 2001; Hiatt, Sine and Tolbert, 2009) 
can cause operational, political, or societal pressures on existing power structures (please see 
5.2 and 5.3). This can induce players to activate joint action to reformulate the existing 
narratives (Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings, 2002; Seo and Creed, 2002; Tumbas, Berente 
and Brocke, 2018), especially when actors become frustrated with the established order 
because of a mismatch between their needs and interests, and the existing social structures 
(Reay and Hinings, 2005; Hardy and Maguire, 2017).  
Such players rely on different environments, treaties, traditions and logics to learn, interpret 
and edit new concepts in order to suit particular contexts (Sevón, 1996; Sahlin and Wedlin, 
2008; Zilber, 2008), and to theorise new structures (Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings, 
2002). Newcomers (Zilber, 2008) or emerging-market agents (Maguire and Hardy,2009), 
may be (or may become) less entrenched in the system and are more likely to encourage 
change.   
Within the sector, however, change can also be brought on by actors who could either be 
marginal (Hardy and Maguire,2008,2017) or be central to the field (Battilana, Leca and 
Boxenbaum, 2009; Bakir and Jarvis, 2017).  
Because fields have the engine for transformation inside itself, endogenous processes may 
also cause this. The theory of institutions as embedded networks (Lok and Willmott, 2019) 
discusses the question of how organisations can trigger processes to undermine the very 
institutions that limit their choices and behaviours. Conceptualising institutions as a structure 
for and as outcomes of practice enactment, grants validity to the assumption that institutions 
enable social actions to be sustained. Furthermore, it also implies that actors can influence 
institutions. Agent embeddedness has increasingly been perceived as a framework for 
intervention and for legitimising a new organization as opposed to restricting social 
interaction (Burns and Nielsen, 2006; Totin et al., 2018). The theory derives from the belief 
that the institutional context defines, but never fully decides social behaviour (Seo and Creed, 
2002; Tracey, et al., 2017).  
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Academics have started to understand the heterogeneity of organisational strategic reactions 
to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991; Pache and Santos,2013; Dahlmann and Grosvold,  
2017). Furthermore, academics have also started to examine social actors’ institutional work 
to establish, sustain and change institutions (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; Mena and 
Suddaby, 2016). It can be suggested that replication and adherence are only a couple of the 
strategies that should be implemented by organisations. Several potential methods by which 
organisations can respond to institutional requirements, including agreement, concessions, 
resistance and exploitation (Pache and Santos, 2010) have been previously described. 
Because of the pluralistic existence (please see 2.1.4) in the institutional environment, 
organisations encounter inconsistent institutionalised theories (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio, 1991; Radoynovska, Ocasio and Laasch, 2020), and therefore adhere to one of 
many institutional paradigms that already exist. In this way, entities are still being 
isomorphic, albeit with a specific concept, therefore, they become completely valid in the 
sense in which that concept exists (Cherrier, Goswami and Ray, 2018). This involves moving 
away from the quest for complete homogeneity when faced with institutional pressures. 
There is an increasing flow of study towards evaluating organisational responses that allows 
the acceptance of the presence of numerous and even overlapping pressures within fields.  
Thus, the cohabitation of a number of organisational systems is compatible with a dynamic 
institutional environment (Greenwood et al., 2010; Jancsary, et al., 2017). From this point of 
view, institutional logics provide a platform to study paradigms that frequently conflict with 
each other (DiMaggio, 1997; Alveus, 2018) and coexist in the same sense.   
3.2.3 Institutional fields as social spaces  
The institutional change trend is examined mainly at the field level, which is the favoured 
level of research in institutional change studies (Leblebici et al., 1991; Greenwood, Suddaby, 
and Hinings, 2002; Furnari, 2016).  
There are various ways to describe institutional fields (Wooten and Hoffman, 2008; Kluttz 
and Fligstein, 2016). From a very formal viewpoint, categories of people and organisations 
— such as resource providers and consumers/clients, goods and services, market rivals, 
regulatory bodies, and public entities — that form an environment of organisational existence 
are typically considered (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Fields are also seen as social spaces, 
where players share similar concepts of meaning and communicate with each other more 
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regularly and dramatically than with actors outside the field (Scott, 1994; Kluttz and 
Fligstein, 2016).   
  
All stakeholders participate in discussions and political disputes over the nature and 
understanding of the core problem that the field centres around (Hoffman, 1999; Conran and 
Thelen, 2016). Actors slowly form common knowledge regarding their role in this discussion 
(Tolbert and Zucker, 2019).   
According to this approach, this study considers fields to be defined by features such as 
unique structure, logic and connections between actors who are aware of these linkages 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; DiMaggio, 1983). All these features describe field parameters 
and their underlying principles. Changes at field level thus require changing all of these 
features together.  
Fields are influenced by institutional pluralism (please see 2.1.4), and the nature of the 
institutional environment (Greenwood et al., 2010; Jancsary, et al., 2017). In a field, 
numerous syllogisms intermingle and their partnerships (please see Figure 4 on p.21) are 
continuously rebalanced. Studies have begun to account for these complexities by 
recognising developments in the field emerging through disagreements between various 
viewpoints (Reay and Hinings, 2009; Dahlmann and Grosvold, 2017). The institutional 
framework consists of numerous logics, structures of meaning and activities, which are 
strongly or loosely connected. The links between them are continuously redefined by social 
interaction processes (Tracey, et al., 2017) (please see 7.4.2 and 7.6). These social interaction 
processes modify the field's outer parameters and reform the existing relations inside the field 
among players (please see Figure 4 on p.21).  
  
3.2.4 Field-level change through the lens of institutional logics  
Field-level institutional change comes about by reconstitution of relational network systems,  
actor’s identity and overarching logics (Scott et al., 2000; Townley, 2002; Yoshikawa, Witt 
and Yamada, 2020). Logics are typically defined as the system of material processes and 
symbolic constructions which govern collective action (Friedland and Alford, 1991; 
Greenwood at al., 2010; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999, 2008; Durand and Thornton, 2018). 
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They define and attribute significance and importance to terms, occurrences, and symbols 
underlying social relationships and behaviours. Accordingly, they empower and restrict 
people and organisations (Zilber, 2016) in their thoughts and actions. Logic also impacts the 
change process and the daily activities in a particular field. When these shared beliefs and 
norms are challenged or contrasted with new beliefs and values, contradictions among 
existing and/or nascent logics can arise.  
  
3.3 Emphasis on the characteristics of institutional logics  
The emphasis in this thesis is on logic characteristics. Logic characteristics are mostly used to 
define the working processes of logic, assigning the social implications of these logics to a 
social context. In the study of logic characteristics, this seems to be a general trend: an 
elaborate description of the "how" of logics (Johansen and Waldorff, 2017). The results 
concentrate on how performers identify within specific logics through characteristics that are 
recognisable. It strengthens the claims as to how and what logics we should observe 
(Johansen and Waldorff, 2017). The minute discussions on blending and collaboration of 
logic appear to be considered. Institutional logics are typically utilized as a generalised 
framework; however, this research uses ideal-type constructs to dissect the internal 
characteristics of a specific institutional logic, specifically the professional logic.  
   
Some researchers propose constructs that base their ideal-type system on Thornton et al., 
(2012): a set of sub-characteristics that can be evaluated throughout each logic. "We also 
detect studies in which the characteristics of specific logics often function as a toolbox in 
championing the interests and ideologies of actors (McPherson & Sauder, 2013). Many 
studies concentrates on the formulation and composition of logics in symbolic and material 
activities and others point to ideal-type structures for exploring particular logic 
characteristics.  
  
3.3.1 Initial development of institutional logic  
Firstly, Friedland and Alford (1991) developed the idea of institutional logic to explain the 
often-conflicting values and practices of contemporary Western societies. Their central 
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institutional orders – capitalist economy, bureaucratic state, monarchy, nuclear family, and 
Christian religion which were later updated to include businesses and occupations (Thornton 
and Ocasio, 1999; Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2015). Henceforth these institutional 
orders allow the formation of personal and organisational priorities and preferences. Each 
institutional order is related to particular logics (please see Figure 5 on p.34). Since societies 
are composed of all orders and their logics, there are possible conflicts that can emerge.  
Institutional Logics "steer" and "are steered" by institutional orders. Key scholars of this 
viewpoint have so far designated these orders as professions, market, state, community, 
family and religion (please see Figure 5 on p.34). Multiple research concentrate on how 
logics are formulated and composed through symbolic and material practises and others 
point to ideal-type constructs for exploring specific logic characteristics.  
  
3.3.2 Unclear definition of institutional logic  
Notwithstanding a productive line of study on logics, consensus among academics on the 
meaning of the term is still not a clear-cut issue.  
Logics are the collectively created historical trends of material activities, theories, principles, 
beliefs, and rules by which individuals and organisations create and replicate their material 
existence, organise time and space and give meaning to social reality (Friedland and Alford, 
1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2015). They are 
"symbolically rooted, organised, politically guarded and technologically and physically 
bound" (Friedland and Alford, 1991: 248).  
Logics can also be defined as the abstract structures by which people and organisations 
classify, offer significance and interpret action and patterns of behaviour on which actors 
operate their material life in a specific time and space. They give a collection of assumptions 
about what constitutes fact and how to perceive it; they derive the explicit and implicit rules 
and behavioural patterns that characterise behaviours and experiences.  
These two conceptualisations show that there is a lack of agreement among scholars on what 
is the definition of institutional logic. This vagueness is detailed in section 3.4.1 and it is used 
as a rationale to explain why the researcher has used the characteristics of institutional logic 
in an attempt to provide a better conceptualisation of logics.  
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3.3.3 Logics as roots of institutional change  
Logics restrict social action and provide means and ends which ensure continuity; however, 
they also contain roots for intervention and change. The inconsistencies inherent in these sets 
of belief systems provide cultural tools for actors to transform social, and personal 
perceptions, and reshape organisations and culture (Friedland and Alford, 1991; DiMaggio, 
1997; Jacobs and Hanrahan, 2016). Logics also operate at three separate levels of social 
activity, such as "competitive and negotiating people, dispute and cooperation organisations, 
and conflicting and interdependent structures" (Friedland and Alford, 1991: 240).   
Logics at the institutional level draw attention to different power sources within organisations 
and operate across three levels through these layers of research (Thornton, Ocasio and 
Lounsbury, 2015). Logics are viewed at the macro level as super-symbolic organisational and 
material patterns of meanings and order. At the level of industry (field), they are embodied in 
the players identity (Kyratsis, et al., 2017) — while position ties may also be central (Rao et 
al., 2003; Glynn, 2017). Logics guide decision-making mechanisms at the organisational 
level and direct individual and collective attention to issues (Thornton, Ocasio and 
Lounsbury, 2015). Section 3.7 emphasises this idea of collective attention in terms of 
partnerships in GHIs. Logics mitigate the impact of economic and social factors that 
influence organisations in their decision-making within institutions. Logics control power as 
they define the significance and validity of power sources and decide which strategic issues 
or concerns become relevant in the participants’ internal political struggle (Thornton and 
Ocasio, 1999; Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2015).   
Finally, they demonstrate the correct and accessible responses and strategies for managing 
and rewarding organisational political behaviour. Those clustered layers are therefore all 
important for the theoretical construction of logics. However, this study makes the case that 
changes in one layer will bring about changes in the other layers to the degree that they are 
"translated" into those other layers (Holm 1995; Siltaloppi and Wieland, 2018).  
This leaves room for partial, temporal or spatial misalignment at these three levels between 
the institutions and may therefore mean that opposing paradigms can coexist at each level to 
various degrees. This notion of coexistence is of relevance in this thesis and it is discussed 
extensively in section 8.3.2.  
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3.4 Rationale behind the use of logic characteristics   
Studies have explained that by interpreting the internal characteristics of logics, a more 
complete definition of logic can be provided. Such characteristics or features (please see 
Figure 5 on p.34), include the sources of identity, sources of legitimacy, informal/formal 
control mechanisms, symbolic analogy, source of authority, attention basis, strategy basis, 
investment logic and governance structures (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999, 2008; Thornton, 
Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2015).There is a growing inclination to examine what we would term 
the internal "vertical relations" of Institutional Logics and their intrinsic features. Research of 
this kind base itself on the analytical basis of the Weberian "ideal form" method in which 
chosen characteristics of cultural meanings are classified "in their logically pure components" 
(Thornton et al., 2012). One such illustration of the internal vertical relationship of logic is 
the Tracey, Philips & Jarvis (2011) structure of the "bridging job" of institutional 
entrepreneurs in which activities are situated at various levels, in which the interaction of 
logic takes place. Popular to these illustrations is the comprehensive insights they offer in 
what makes logic and how actors navigate logic.  
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Figure 5 Characteristics (features) of logics ((Source: Thornton, Jones and Kury, 2005)  
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3.4.1 Initial rationale for considering logic characteristics  
The initial reason is that logic work "is still not reliable with regards to what point logics are 
institutionalised, or whether they can be considered formal logics at all" (Thornton, Ocasio 
and Lounsbury, 2015). Moreover, prior work has generally believed a change in practice will 
show a change in the underlying belief system. However, even if changes in practices are 
visible, this cannot be construed that the logic behind the practice has also changed; actors 
may have retained their original identity (Lok, 2010; Glynn, 2017), or may have adopted 
methods for decoupling (Pache and Santos, 2013; Tashman, Marano and Kostova, 2019). 
Section 6.6 covers this key topic of changes in practices.  
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The definition of logic is thus still rather vague given these efforts and as such, the current 
research perceives logics in various ways. Some researchers look at the underlying logics that 
are present at the societal level and relate explicitly to particular fields, such as tertiary 
education publishing (Thornton, 2002, 2004; Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2015), health 
care (Andersson and Liff, 2018), symphony orchestra (Glynn and Lounsbury, 2005), or 
manufacturing (Greenwood et al., 2010). Others analyse the paradigms that emerge in the 
relationships between field-based organisations (Haveman and Rao, 1997; Adams, et al., 
2016; Haveman, 2016)   
  
Finally, some scholars have also considered organisational microprocesses. They discover 
how the logics within organisations can be transformed by in person and group repetitive 
behaviour and practices which will eventually redefine logics at the field level (Smets, Morris 
and Greenwood, 2002; Gray, Purdy and Ansari, 2015). Generally speaking, the higher the 
level of analysis, the more rigid the idea of logic becomes. This prevalent static 
representation of logic has historically been reported to contribute to changes in the field, as 
induced by shifts between dominant logics (Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2015)). The 
dynamic interaction between different forms of logic, co-existence and co-evolution in the 
field has only recently been recognised as a driving force for field change (Reay and Hinings, 
2009; Dunn and Jones, 2010; Jancsary, et al., 2017).  
 
3.4.2 Second rationale for considering logic characteristics  
Several scholars have proposed that institutional change in a specific field results from a 
transition from one overarching logic to another (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; Scott et al., 
2000; Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2015). Findings in the field of health offer an 
example of these narratives. Analysing the three-dimensional shifts, i.e. logic, participants, 
and regulatory framework, and basing their empirical work on the healthcare system in the 
San Francisco Bay Area, Scott and colleagues (2000) identified three periods of fundamental 
change in the field.  
  
Such periods are called professional domination, federal participation, management 
regulation and business processes. Consistent with this approach, several studies have 
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examined organisational responses to shifts in logic as a result of the transition from 
professional and state logic to more corporate and business logic in healthcare (Ruef and 
Scott, 1998; Kitchener, 2002; Reay and Hinings, 2005; Shekhar, Manoharan and Rakshit, 
2020). This transition has its antecedents in a shift in rhetoric that promotes health as an 
economic good, rather than a public good, and that facilitates business-like systems and 
management practices.  
  
This was facilitated by the intervention of influential actors such as the mainstream business 
press, the boards of directors of healthcare organisations and the management consulting 
firms (Kitchener, 2002 also see Kitchener and Mertz, 2012) Those who have researched the 
history of the healthcare sector in Scandinavian countries suggest that a fourth and more 
recent age should be applied to the three periods listed above (Levay, 2016). It is referred to 
as the search for accountability. Contemporary society is dominated by an increasing demand 
for additional and more elaborated accounts of healthcare performance, a growing awareness 
of patient rights and a rising attention to knowledge transfer, quality and management 
development among key actors.   
In instances of institutional change, the emerging logic slowly discards and replaces the 
former (Haveman and Rao, 2006), a phenomenon also known as deinstitutionalisation (Rao 
et al., 2003; Scott, 2001), especially if the former logic had previously been the prevailing 
one. Nevertheless, old myths never vanish completely; in truth, secondary logics can enact a 
key role in the field for a significant period of time (Scott et al., 2000; Reay, Goodrick and 
Hinings, 2016). Greater attention to competing logic may help understand organisational 
deviations and (non) adoption of different organisational forms and practices (Rao and 
Hirsch, 2003), and thus provide insight on the mechanism of resistance to change (Marquis 
and Lounsbury, 2007; Doldor, Sealy and Vinnicombe, 2016).  
  
New logic institutions can be loosely related to long standing structures of the old logic that 
are still present (Brock, et al.,1999; Kitchener, 2002; Lok, 2010;). Nevertheless, only recently 
have institutional scholars drawn attention to the dynamics by which dominant and latent 
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logics connect, endorse, or question one another and to how much they have been embedded 
in specific organisational models or routines and not the other ones (McDonald et al., 2013)  
 In general, studies focused more on identifying how change occurs along the defined 
dimensions (for example, logics, actors and systems of governance) than on understanding 
the conflicts which occur and the foundations of the change. This body of literature, however, 
does not research how changes in logic influence the internal structures of organisations, or 
why organisations comply with or oppose domineering or secondary logics.  
Furthermore, players may react to institutional change in a number of ways. Their reactions 
are based on the control they possess and the degree to which their priorities, meanings and 
obligations are represented by a particular institutional logic (Reay and Hinings, 2005; 
Kitchener and Mertz, 2012), their hierarchical positions (Chaffin, et al., 2016), internal power 
dynamics and unique organisational features (Greenwood, 1997; Rennkamp, 2019). The 
particularity of the historical background such as the global health system in which the 
organisations are located is also essential to understanding why some organisations react in a 
certain manner to particular logics (Bertels and Lawrence, 2016). These points are left 
available to more evidence based and conceptual study.  
   
 3.4.3 Third rationale for considering logic characteristics  
The importance of considering numerous and competing logics to justify the change in field 
level have only recently been discussed by researchers (Hoffman, 1999; Reay and Hinings, 
2009; Townley, 2002; Conran and Thelen, 2016). If behaviour is influenced by logic and its 
meaning and expression are historically based then, conflicting institutional logics have 
diverse implications for organisational decision making at a specific time (Greenwood et al., 
2010; Kraatz and Block, 2008; Grinevich, et al., 2019). Therefore, organisational responses 
can differ from subservience to agreement, resistance, defiance to exploitation (Oliver, 1991; 
Dahlmann and Grosvold, 2017). An organisation's actual reaction is dependent on the nature 
of the requirements and forces for change in the sector — the dispute can include resources 
or objectives and the internal representation of these logics —  the disagreement may or may 
not be translated into the organisation; and internal interest groups may support one or more 
of the claims (Pache and Santos, 2013).  
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Collaborations on policy initiatives at the field level are formed to overcome the complexity 
of institutional logic (Reay and Hinings, 2009; Jancsary et al., 2017).Contextualised 
collaborations allow participants to preserve their own identities, and collaborate towards a 
common purpose. Such collaborations also enable participants to accomplish their objectives. 
This method is also seen as more efficient than first seeking to build a label for collaborative 
efforts (see also Pratt and Corley, 2007). Section 7.6.5 outlines this key aspect of 
collaboration on policy initiatives based on the data gathered in the interviews.  
 
When a field is growing, the participants may seek to adjust the field by various methods. 
The adjustment process may stem from outside, by replenishing existing practises, by 
blending from within the field, a combination of old and new practices, a combination of 
both fields, separation of explicit and implicit organisational processes, or reorganisation into 
a different field (Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007;Purdy and Grey, 2009; Aalto and Kallio, 
2019). Sections 8.2 and 8.3 discuss extensively these adjustment processes, albeit the ones 
which are relevant to this study. Finally, the same argument may contain contradictory logics 
(Glynn and Lounsbury, 2005; Glynn, 2017). This approach can be very incremental in nature 
since participants might strictly adhere to old norms. This adherence to old norms is also 
present, in some contexts, in the GHI field.  
 
Organisations depend on a variety of logics to fulfil a common function. There can thus 
coexist multiple activities endorsed by contrary reasoning (Purdy and Gray, 2009; Dunn and 
Jones, 2010; Bossy, et al., 2016). However, following these steps, the path in which existing 
logics are altered remains largely unknown. We do not grasp the root causes of this logic 
alteration and how it influences the existing mixture of logics (Greenwood et al., 2010,11; 
Grinevich, et al., 2019).  
 
Consequently, a deeper embodiment of the gradual construction, and/or rejection of logics in 
a particular field is required. The links between logics should be provided when there is logic 
pluralism. It will allow us to see if logic supports, tolerates or opposes one another and to 
what degree. This may help to understand the internal characteristics and the ability of logics 
to respond to changes or acceptance to opposing concepts. It may also illustrate the 
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mechanisms that emerge in the field and the involvement in institutional dynamics of other 
actors that have historically been dismissed (for example non-state actors in global health 
field).  
   
3.5 Explaining field level change through the reconstitution of logic characteristics  
Because the conceptual focus of this study is on the disclosure of field-level processes, this 
thesis adopts a view of logic established in previous studies that explored changes to the 
belief systems in a particular field (Lounsbury, 2002, 2007; Skålén and Edvardsson, 2016). 
Logics are known to be a collection of cultural values and rules structuring thought. They 
direct decision taking and influence the behaviours and relationships of actors in an 
institutional field. In short, logic is a collection of ideas and practices in which social action is 
guided and organised in a specific environment.  
  
3.5.1 The reconstituted characteristics of logics in this thesis  
As the work focuses on field-level logics, internal characteristics (please see Figures 5 and 6) 
such as, sources that legitimise identity, and relational networks that impact professionals 
become an important element in the assessment; the reconstitution of sources of legitimacy 
and identity seems fundamental to the evolution of logic. This represents findings from 
previous research that analyses that reconstitution of sources of legitimacy and identity can 
lead to the legitimising of new identities (Stalder, 2006). Legitimising of identity is 
interpreted as one of the main factors in driving a new narrative. Sources of legitimacy and 
identity (Thornton, 2002; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; 2008; Thornton, Ocasio and 
Lounsbury, 2015) have long been included in the presentation of ideal forms as a 
characteristic feature of logic (please see figures 5 and 6).  As such, based on primary and 
secondary data, the characteristics of logics that have been reconstituted are displayed in 
Figure 6 (see p.42). In the following sections (3.5.1.1 to 3.5.1.4), the characteristics presented 
in Figure 6 are elaborated on.  
  
3.5.1.1 Sources of legitimacy and identity  
This dissertation argues that it would be more relevant to the study of logics to establish a 
more systematic definition by examining the reconstitution of sources that legitimise identity.  
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The term “identity” incorporates both the self-definition of a person as a group member 
(identity) and the relationship arrangement in a given context (role). It thereby helps to define 
self-categorisation and to explain the nature of relations around a particular actor 
(professional) (Chreim et al., 2020 and Thelisson and Meier, 2020). Section 6.3 covers this 
reconstitution of the  sources of legitimacy and identity with regards to the context of study in 
this thesis.  
  
3.5.1.2 Formal and informal control mechanisms  
The framework of the authority (e.g. Thornton and Ocasio 2008), is another aspect that is 
commonly considered to be a characteristic of logic. Authority derives from a specific 
function of an individual in an organisation, its rank and prestige, the existing social ties, the 
actor's ability to maintain such relationships, as well as the ability to use the tools available 
(Lounsbury, 2002; Thornton and Ocasio 1999; Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2015). 
Some scholars argue that players in key roles in a sector are stronger and more likely to 
implement reform (Greenwood et al., 2002; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Zamperini and 
Lurati, 2017).  
Others suggest that institutional entrepreneurs, instead (Leblebici et al., 1991; Maguire et al., 
2004; Furnari, 2016) hold marginal roles, allowing them to retain authority, but also to link 
stakeholders and to monitor key resources. In the two examples, actors with dominant logic 
will have a specific standing in a field and will therefore establish other systems of authority 
(formal and informal control mechanism) to preserve legitimacy of their identity (Stalder, 
2006) and defend their logic. Systems of authority are not necessarily placed on other actors 
in this field by influential players but are accepted, (at least temporarily to some degree). This 
thesis thus maintains that, formal and informal control mechanisms in GHI networks, should 
be viewed as an important characteristic of logic. Section 6.5 provides an in-depth analysis of 
the reconstitution of the formal and informal control mechanisms in the field of GHIs.  
3.5.1.3 Relational networks  
Logics are more than abstract thoughts and beliefs; they include concrete things, including 
particular modes of organisation (Haveman and Rao, 1997; Rao et al., 2003; Adams, et al., 
2016; Haveman, 2016). Different organisational forms resulting from theories and beliefs 
occurring at the societal and field level, will lead to changes in relational networks through 
which field professionals enact their practices (please refer to Figure 6; professions as 
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relational networks). Changes at the institutional level are followed by changes at the 
organisational level; change at the same time ultimately causes changes in the organisational 
structure of the underlying institutions (Haverman and Rao, 1997; Adams, et al., 2016; 
Haveman, 2016). Institutional theorists still cannot grasp the mechanism by which new 
modes of organisation are produced (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Tracey, Phillips and Jarvis, 
2011; Roundy, 2017; Ren and Jackson, 2020), but it is evident that the duality of institutional 
structures and organisational structures is essential to the study of change over time. The 
formation or surrender of different modes of organisation (please see Table 1 on p.16), means 
that a shift in the relational networks that exist in the field will occur. Vice versa, in the 
presence or absence of particular organisational types, the evolution or deterioration of logics 
can be seen. Section 6.4 provides the in-depth analysis of the reconstitution of the relational 
networks in the field of GHIs.  
 
3.5.1.4 Microprocesses in form of practices.   
As can be seen in Figure 7 (see p.50), the next feature of logics that has been reconstituted as 
per the findings of this study is practices. Logics are sometimes referred to as symbolic 
means and the material behaviours associated with these (for example, Friedland and Alford, 
1991; Greenwood et al., 2010; Durand and Thornton, 2018). Literature recently began to 
emerge with attention to these micro-bases of logic and attempts to understand how changes 
in practice could cause wider shifts in meaning systems (McPherson and Sauder, 2013; Reay 
et al., 2006; Townley, 2002; Conran and Thelen, 2016). Practices are characterised as 
patterns of behaviour that have particular significance, and thus provides an understanding on 
how tasks should be performed (Burgelman et al., 2018). Practices are different from one 
another. The sense of practices has to do with wider social understanding and frameworks: 
actors follow reasoning through actions (Wedlin and Sahlin, 2017), 2017). Section 6.6 details 
the effects of the reconsitution of practices in the field of GHIs.   
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Figure 6- Characteristics of the professional logic (author’s own diagram)  
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3.6 Moving away from logic shifts and logic conflicts towards logic evolution  
Section 3.5.1 above, provided the outline of the reconstituted logic characteristics. This thesis 
explains that the reconstitution of these characteristics of logic will lead to logic evolution. 
The logic evolution process, as detailed in Chapter 6, will lead to institutional change. This 
process is dependent on macro and meso level factors (please see Chapter 7).  
  
Notwithstanding the developments in our knowledge of institutional change, we have 
insufficient awareness of the mechanisms by which fields are restructured by logic-driven 
processes as opposed to the mechanisms caused by logic conflicts. This study demonstrates 
that institutional field-level change does not occur solely through a shift from one 
predominant logic to another, or as a shift in the balance between conflicting logics; change 
may also occur through logic evolution. Furthermore, the work shows how, due to particular 
macro and meso factors, the process of logic evolution occurs in a historical and highly 
institutionalised field.  
  43  
  
Current literature has documented the effects and outcomes of institutional pressures. There 
is, however, a lack of data on the mechanisms that cause these effects (Barley and Tolbert, 
1997; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2009; Auschra, Schmidt and Sydow, 2019).   
Logics have, until now, been viewed mainly as rigid and monolithic collections of principles 
and behaviours that permeate the entire society and spread through fields, or refer specifically 
to specific fields (Lok, 2010; Thornton and Ocasio,1999; Thornton 2002). This conceptual 
framework led researchers to focus more on the impact of shifts from one dominant paradigm 
to another, in order to understand changes at the field level rather than on the social structures 
that lead to such shifts (Thornton and Ocasio,2008).  
  
Recognising these weaknesses, recent institutional scholars have interpreted change as a shift 
in the balance between competing logics in the field (Purdy and Gray, 2009; Pache and 
Santos, 2010; Reay and Hinings, 2009). However, some scholars assume that logic can 
potentially coexist in a field without automatically interfering (Dunn and Jones, 2010). There 
could therefore be other variables, maybe linked to logic changes that cause field-level 
change and requires more exploration.   
3.7 Characteristics of the professional logic in GHI networks  
3.7.1 Professional logic of assistance – The “old” professional logic  
In order to adhere to regulations of international law and practices, the duty of a country or 
state is to ensure that the health needs of its population are achieved. This responsibility 
ranges from financing the health sector in terms of practices, that entail employing 
appropriate qualified professionals in every department, as well as the provision of approved 
drugs and medicines to treat the symptoms of prevailing diseases (Gostin and Wiley, 2016). 
It is also agreed and understood in the spheres of international law that those member states 
that are considered to be better equipped in terms of resources and wealth, need to provide 
support in terms of financial or other types of assistance. However, this particular duty can 
give rise to problems related to mechanisms of control, and legitimisation of identities 
(Stalder, 2006). When there is the participation of non-state donors such as private 
foundations, there exists the issue of regulating the professionals operating in the new 
relational networks. Agreements made between two parties can already complicate the 
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situation. However, when these same agreements exist between multiple parties due to new 
relational networks, the issue become even more complicated. This can give rise to conflicts 
related to control mechanisms, identity, legitimacy and regulatory matters (Gostin and Wiley, 
2016).  
  
Initially, the World Health Organization (WHO) was given the responsibility of taking care 
of global health issues; to assist member states who found the responsibility of providing 
adequate health services as being a burden, due to inadequacy in terms of funding and 
training (Brown, Cueto and Fee, 2006). The professional logic here was fundamentally 
geared towards that of providing assistance. The member states who were part of this “old” 
relational network retained their power in the matter by their ability to vote on policies and 
strategies at the World Health Assembly (Godlee, 1995). That meant that the WHO needed to 
ascertain its identity by making sure that it was adhering to predisposed guidelines and rules. 
WHO needed to maintain its role as the body in charge of setting control mechanisms.  
In essence, WHO’s main role and practice was centred around providing cohesion and 
assistance to each of its member states, in the global health system, to which it answered and 
was accountable to (Saracci, 1997).  
 
Upon its creation, the World Health Organization was allocated more power and capability 
than its predecessors. Their identity was legitimised based on the fact that the relational 
network of professionals in the field was based around them and as such, they set out the 
control mechanisms (Brown, Cueto and Fee, 2006). The modus operandi and central 
practices of the WHO was to assist by giving every member state a vote at the World  
Health Assembly. This was crucial, as it ensured that participating member states would 
engage in policy-making practices that would benefit the global population by resolving 
current and future health issues. Pertinently, this related to a professional logic of assistance 
present at the time in the field (Godlee, 1994).  
  
The “old” relational network consisted of the WHO and national health ministries. They were 
identified as the predominant legitimate body for the improvement of health in the global 
health system. The World Health Assembly has supreme budgetary control over the WHO, 
and as such approves and endorses the WHO Secretariat’s budget and other budgetary 
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guidelines (Vaughan et al., 1996). Considering the intergovernmental role of the WHO and 
the one-state, one-vote system of the World Health Assembly, it is understandable that they 
were seen as the most legitimate body for global health agreements (Clift and Røttingen, 
2018). WHO's legislative body, the World Health Assembly, consists of countries with one 
vote each; some decisions require a clear majority; some need two-thirds of those present and 
participating. WHO strategies, suggestions to member countries, adoption of a general job 
schedule and directives and advice to the WHO Executive Board and to the Director General, 
are the key duties of the World Health Assembly (Sridhar and Clinton, 2017).  
  
In developing economies, over a billion suffer from diseases which, in the developed 
countries, involve little to no strain (World Health Organization, 2016). Traditionally, these 
poverty-related diseases have been neglected due to mostly the failure of government health 
care programmes and of the pharmaceutical companies. These reflected a professional logic 
of assistance in the field as opposed to that of providing a more comprehensive view to 
tackling such problems.   
  
Very few new medicinal devices were thus developed for their diagnosis and intervention 
(drugs, vaccines and other biopharmaceuticals, diagnostic tools, and mosquito control 
devices). Pharmaceutical companies are unwilling to engage indefinitely in these practices 
without market incentives to stimulate their business interests (Trouiller, et al., 2002). As a 
result, they have been passing on innovations that are of value to society. This ushered the 
introduction of GHI networks (Mrazek and Mossialos, 2003).  
  
3.7.1.2 Change towards professional logic of integration  
Tellingly, the historical change towards GHIs (who represent the logic of integration) could 
paradoxically be mapped back to the establishment in 1975 of the United Nations 
Development Programme/ World Bank/WHO Special Programme for Tropical Disease 
Research and Training (WHO-TDR) (Godal, 1989). WHO-TDR was an attempt to promote a 
partnership-oriented approach to drug production by having private and profit-driven 
businesses onboard (Lang and Greenwood, 2003). At the time, while some public sector 
organisations in different countries were interested in developing solutions for various 
disease categories, only a few, including the Walter Reed US Army Institute for Research 
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(WRAIR) and the Central Drug Research Institute (CDRI) in India, actively engaged in 
designing and creating their own drug development network (see e.g. Nwaka and Ridley, 
2003; Aerts et al., 2017 ). This initiated the evolution of the overarching professional logic of 
assistance towards that of the professional logic of integration.   
  
It is also important to point out that by the end of the 1980s, most pharmaceutical firms had 
steadily withdrawn from the practice of creating new medicines, mostly owing to limited 
insurance schemes and decreased profit potential from the consumers in low- and 
middleincome countries (Aerts et al., 2017). Lang and Greenwood (2003) also indicates 
that there was growing friction between the WHO and pharmaceutical companies to make 
drugs available at affordable prices. This also resulted in pharmaceutical companies' lack 
of willingness to pursue R&D for neglected diseases (see also Patnaik, 2011; Patnaik et al.,  
2020). From 1975 to 1999, only 13 new drugs for neglected disease were created, and almost 
all of the new drugs were either combinations or expansions (Troullier et al., 2002; Pereira et 
al., 2020).   
  
This practice of the overuse of current medicines, particularly without new alternatives, led to 
a situation in which existing medicines became resistant and ineffectual, and generated 
conditions for the epidemic of malaria and HIV/AIDS (Pereira et al., 2020). The 1993 World 
Health Assembly paved the way for the development of a professional logic of integration, 
by providing legitimacy to public private efforts in the global health system to address the 
increasing epidemics and the lack of access to new medicines and public indignation in the 
developing countries, against disengaged pharmaceutical corporations and Global Health 
Institutions (World Health Organization, 1994).  
  
3.7.1.3 Professional logic of integration and proliferation agents 
The GHI networks started expanding at a greater pace (please see Figure 2 on p.17) in the late 
1990s, with funding from the Rockefeller Foundation and the WHO Special Programme for 
Tropical Disease Research and Training (WHO/TDR) and help from the UNDP and the 
World Bank  
(Birn, 2014). These were the international AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI) and the Malaria  
Venture Medicines. A number of organisations such as the Global Alliance for Drug  
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Development Tuberculosis (TB Alliance), the International Partnership for  
Microbicides (IPM) and the Paediatric Dengue Vaccine Initiative (PDVI) were created with 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) and the Rockefeller Foundation playing the 
role of proliferation agents in setting these up (Sridhar et al., 2013; Aerts et al., 2017). 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) received the Nobel Peace Award in 1999, and this award 
further legitimised the identity of MSF. This prompted MSF to initiate the integration of an 
innovation and access working group in 2003, that culminated into the establishment of the 
Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative (DNDi ),bringing together with five public sector 
organisations from endemic countries, including India, Brazil, Malaysia, Kenya and the 
special programmes of the UNDP/World Bank/WHO, for research and training in endemic 
countries (Hayden and GENEVA, 2015).This was another clear example of the professional 
logic of integration emerging in the field.  
  
3.7.1.4 The key problem of neglected diseases and erosion of WHO legitimacy 
The term 'neglected disease' focuses on the problem of inadequate new medicines that have 
been produced to address diseases that generate massive burdens in developing countries but 
have few or no effect in the developed world (World Health Organization, 2017). A 
'neglected disease' cannot be described. The World Health Organization (WHO), describes 
the word "neglected diseases" to include 17 diseases affecting a global community of more 
than one billion people that live in poverty, and are almost exclusively clustered in the poor 
areas of developing countries (WHO, 2016).  
  
In fact, every year, 10 million deaths occur due to infectious diseases, more than 90% of 
which happen in developing countries (WHO, 2016). These diseases are common in 
developing countries and often exist side by side with many other neglected diseases. 
Unlike other 'neglected' diseases, however, because they often also occur in developed 
economies, TB and HIV/AIDS, are typically more financially backed in terms of practices 
related to R&D and distribution (World Health Organization, 2017).  
  
The term associated with funding in the global health system is that of Development 
Assistance for Health (DAH). DAH has specifically been designed to address the need for 
funding to health systems, with the targets being low- and middle-income countries 
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(Dieleman et al., 2016). DAH was born at the onset of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) to tackle epidemics such as HIV, malaria and tuberculosis. DAH in 2019 was 
attributed to be $40.6bn (see Appendix B); six times greater than in its inception in 1990 
(Dieleman et al,2016; Institute for Health Metric and Evaluation, 2020).  
  
In the studies (considered by Graves, Haakenstad and Dieleman, 2015; Dieleman and 
Haakenstad, 2017), the terms low and middle income were taken further to include 
fragile and stable countries among those low- and middle-income states. Fragile 
countries were identified as those that were undergoing political and economic turmoil. 
The papers identify that DAH allocated to fragile states grew constantly from 2005 to 
2011. On first view, it was observed that funding streams towards low- and middle 
income countries’ fragile states were being granted adequate funding when the figures 
were examined per capita. However, upon closer examination it was observed that in 
fact in low income fragile states, DAH allocation was lesser per capita (Graves, 
Haakenstad and Dieleman, 2015; Dieleman and Haakenstad, 2017). In numerical terms, 
more specifically, DAH received by a person in a fragile low-income state was $3.93 
less than DAH received by a person in a low-income stable state (Graves, Haakenstad 
and Dieleman, 2015). Hence, it can be ascertained that the assistance provided to 
countries under unstable conditions needed to be addressed.  
  
Graves et al., (2015) go further into its investigation by revealing that funding streams gave 
priority to those member states in a state of conflict. Those countries with refugees, 
individuals fleeing war-torn zones, were given preferential treatment in terms of DAH 
provision. In comparison, the funding was less favourable to those states where the 
government did not engage in creating proper infrastructure. These countries were 
associated with poor provision of governmental services and inadequate economic growth, 
as well as enormous gaps between the poor and the wealthy. While the WHO had the main 
purview on addressing these gaps in the past, the proliferation of actors has somewhat 
eroded their legitimacy in this regard.  
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3.7.1.5 Acceleration of proliferation of actors in the new relational network  
Henceforth, it can be observed that the relational network for professionals in the field has, 
however, undergone changes in terms of practices in the field since the beginning of the 
millennium due to the increasing proliferation of non-state actors comprising of a wide 
variety of civil society and NGOs, private companies and private philanthropists (Hoffman 
and Cole, 2018). New relational networks have given rise to partnership models known as 
Global Health Initiatives (GHIs), like the Roll Back Malaria Partnership (RBM). Established 
in 1998 as partnership between United Nations’ agencies and PPPs such as Stop TB, the  
GAVI, the Global Fund to Combat AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) and Malaria  
Ventures (MMV)medicines and DNDi have become established (please see Figure 7 on p.50) 
(Pereira et al., 2020). These models pertaining to the new relational networks could be found 
alongside conventional intergovernmental partnerships between the sovereign countries and 
the United Nations’ bodies, leading them to have an identity as being somewhat autonomous.  
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Figure 7 PPPs (Source: Munoz et al., 2015) 
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3.7.1.6 Professional logic of Integration and partnerships in GHIs  
Before the emergence of the GHIs, one of the first health initiatives in the “old” relational 
network was the Special Programme of Research and Training in Tropical Diseases (TDR) 
in 1974. The key partners in that relational network were UNDP, UNICEF and World 
Bank, and the WHO. That started as an initiative to only assist the research in drug 
development and distribution. Thus, the professional logic in the field in that period was 
principally geared towards that of assistance.   
  
This has evolved into an integration platform of practices-related to research, strategy 
implementation, product development and distribution to address health concerns in regions 
consisting of low to middle income countries. The professional logic here is that of 
integration.  
  
Not only are practices related to drug development and distribution a major objective, but so 
also is the integration of practices such as on the field intervention in these areas. As such, a 
shift towards ongoing investment in researching strategies to integrate product development 
and intervention has become the focus (WHO,2018; Certain, Terry and Zicker, 2015)  
  
The key practice that needs to be considered in the case of TDR, is how to relate with the 
ever-changing actors gaining entry in the new GHIs. As a result, TDR needed to re-evaluate 
its practices and strategies to align itself with that of the emerging GHIs. The picture 
evolving here is that for organisations such as the WHO, the landscape of the global health 
system is evolving at such a pace that their identity as the central body has eroded down to 
merely a cog in the machine (Dodgson, Lee and Drager, 2017). In this new relational network 
built around the professional logic of integration and strategic partnerships, the WHO seems 
to be lost among the multitude of players in the field (please see Table 1 on p.16) (Harman, 
2016).  
  
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are partnerships that exist in the evolving GHI networks. 
They involve a wide variety of players and stakeholders, including government agencies and 
intra-governmental organisations (as public actors), as well as research institutes, private 
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pharmaceutical firms and practitioners (as private actors) (Ruckert and Labonté, 2014). This 
characterises this new relational network.  
 Patnaik et al. (2020), describe two distinct PPP styles in GHI networks. Initially, there are 
Product Development Partnerships (PPPs)which are developed to produce pharmaceutical 
products for low- and middle-income countries. The second form of PPPs known as 
'precompetitive PPPs’, is generated towards practices focused on the production of new 
research ideas (e.g. targets for diseases), and resources (e.g. databases), by integrating 
complementary skills and information and exchanging incentives (also see Pereira et 
al.,2020). This idea of embracing such a comprehensive view of producing medical products 
is central to the emerging professional logic of integration.  
  
This comprehensive view of producing medical products also includes another type of PPP in 
the form of 'access partnerships' which are established to focus solely on implementing 
emerging technology or providing health services (Muñoz, et al., 2015).   
  
The road towards these new relational networks in GHI networks began when a substantial 
number of PPPs arose at the end of the 1990s (Nwaka and Ridley, 2003; Munoz et al., 2015; 
Aerts, et al., 2017), in response to increasing concerns about the lack of new medicines for 
socalled neglected diseases or diseases in tropical countries. Furthermore, there was public 
outrage at the practices of major pharmaceutical companies due to their  
minimal involvement in designing and finding new solutions to these diseases, as they 
affected mostly low- and middle-income population, meaning that the return on investment 
for the big-pharmaceutical companies would be quite low.    
  
 Dependence on market-controlled mechanisms can contribute to underfunding in developing 
innovation in social programmes. A good example is the shortage of new medical products in the 
field of neglected diseases (Trouiller, et al., 2002). The creation of new relational networks has 
brought about new funding and alliances predominantly occurring through Product Development 
Partnerships (PPPs) in the GHI networks. Research and Development (R&D) for neglected diseases 
has thus improved, and hence provided a distinct legitimacy to the identity of PPPs. PPPs are 
entities of self-government, private sector owned non-profit R&D. Unlike economic practices 
related to push and pull aimed at countering underfunding in R&D in the private sector, PPPs have 
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evolved actively to tackle this public health challenge (Le, 2014). In the next section, we explore 
how non-profit R&D partnership and integration occurring through PPPs has legitimised the 
identity for this form of PPPs.  
  
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are partnerships that exist in the evolving GHI networks 
(Aerts, et al., 2017). Among the two distinct styles of PPPs in GHI networks, PPPs is one that 
requires close attention. Through analysis, it can be interpreted that the development of the 
professional logic of integration is related to a range of different and interrelated causes, 
including a common cultural change towards legitimising the private sector (Ruckert and 
Labonté, 2014) rather than invalidating them, in order to bring down the reduction of 
business failures. Frustration with the UN’s ongoing budget deficits for health goals, as well 
as inadequate financing practices over time through existing bilateral and multilateral 
assistance mechanisms and universal awareness that health problems such as HIV/AIDS, are 
beyond the ability of any one principle stakeholder and this has led to the creation of 
relational networks (Kostyak et al., 2017).  
  
In the past, very little research and development has been done in the pharmaceutical industry 
with regards to new medicinal products for neglected diseases. This must be expected, given 
that, notwithstanding the large unaddressed care demand, the neglected disease market does 
not provide businesses such as pharmaceutical industries many profitable opportunities 
(Trouiller, et al., 2002).  
  
Therefore, pharmaceutical companies may describe economic barriers in R&D in the case of 
neglected diseases as follows (Webber and Kremer, 2001; see also (Siagian and Osorio, 
2018):  
  
• Trade markets are small   
  
• The purchasing power of individuals is minimal, although there can be large numbers 
of people   
  
  54  
• Profit does not offset the associated danger to R&D (approximated to be the same as 
new medical products for other diseases).  
  
In order to promote practices in R&D for neglected diseases at a business level, economists 
suggested a number of economic tools. Lawmakers started to extensively use push 
mechanisms aimed at reducing R&D costs for companies, such as grants, tax credits and 
loans (Le, 2014). Pull mechanisms, however, such as milestones or final prizes, aim at 
increasing market appeal by minimising the burden of research and development and 
ensuring revenue for outputs. However, these tools have deficiencies and thus PPPs were 
deemed a better model (Le, 2014).  
  
Major global health group leaders (such as the World Health Organization, civil society 
organisations and doctors), thus introduced PPPs as a realistic means of growing R&D for 
neglected diseases (Pereira, et al., 2020). Nevertheless, it is not obvious how in the context of 
current organisational structures in global public health governance, a new organisational 
concept in the form of PPPs is placed. They include professionals in public research 
organisations, businesses (biotechnology and major pharmaceutical companies), government 
departments, international organisations such as the WHO, the World Bank, UNDP, 
UNESCO, UNICEF and UNITAID, civil society groups and current scientific sharing 
relational networks (Torchia, Calabrò and Morner, 2015).  
  
PPPs are identified and legitimised as operating in the specific context of systems for health 
innovation and integration (Weng, Chen and Wang, 2018), that stretch beyond national 
borders. When it pertains to the relational network, the wider society is considered (instead of 
just market), which therefore encompasses professionals in the whole organisational 
community (i.e. services and knowledge bases), institutions and people (i.e. administrators 
and policymakers in countries that are vulnerable to diseases and patients) who are affected 
by PPPs (Buse and Tanaka, 2011). The network is made up of many professionals interested 
in drugs, vaccines and diagnostics for untreated diseases. Practices are also related to 
economic policy, funding, legislation, intellectual property and human capital, as well as 
technology and economies (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 
2016).  
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The identity of the PPP model is clearly distinguished from the joint bilateral or multilateral 
R&D networks for neglected diseases, public institutions and R&D-capable pharmaceutical 
firms (Munoz et al.,2015; Pereira et al., 2020). The key features are as follows:  
  
• They are founded as non-profit organisations that promise autonomy, no revenue and 
growth maximisation aspirations from the part of shareholders  
  
• Their goal is to create practices related to innovative consumer technologies that will 
have an impact on public health (specialised, access core)   
  
• They seek to build 'programme management' expertise to integrate and utilise 
different R&D stakeholder tools and capacities  
  
• They will handle a number of R&D activities in-house  
  
• External partners also invest in R&D, though some have R&D capability in-house.  
  
Their identity is legitimised by the production of modern, effective, high-quality medical 
products accessible to the target market at a competitive price. This belongs to the 
professional logic of integration and demonstrates how the evolution of professional logic in 
the field of GHI networks is occurring. As such, a number of PPPs agreed on a specific 
'access' concept that refers to a structured collection of practices that are necessary to ensure 
that the goods that are produced ultimately have a fair impact on public health (Borrás, 
2017).   
  
Although all PPPs in the GHI network are non-profit organisations which follow a 
professional logic of integration, the nature of their control mechanisms varies. PPPs have 
been formed as autonomous organisations, but a few belong to a larger organisation (i.e. 
MVP, MVI, PATH, the Sabin PPP). Many PPPs, as well as international bodies (i.e. DNDi, 
FIND and MTV in Switzerland), are classified as non-governmental organisations (i.e. IAVI 
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and TB Alliance) (please see Figure 7 on p.50). PPPs are usually created as permanent 
entities, but some PPPs, particularly those with a larger organisation project, may be transient 
in terms of identity, in that they seek to engage in a specific objective (i.e. produce a medical 
product to fulfil the specific disease objective), and are terminated (Munoz , 2015)  
3.7.1.7 Professional logic and control mechanisms in PPPs 
PPPs in the GHI network, differ in terms of professional practices related to disease mapping, 
and includes practices such as: the nature of its epidemic coverage; the specific regions at 
which its medical products are intended; the form of medical product (medicine, vaccination 
or diagnostic); and the PPPs extent of involvement in the process of implementation (Pereira 
et al., 2020). The most popular PPPs are centred on specific diseases, whereas other PPPs 
cover up to six diseases. It can be reported that there are 15 PPPs for vaccines, four new PPPs 
for new drugs, four for microbicides, and two for diagnostics. Malaria is the disease which 
receives the most coverage (Munoz et al., 2015; Patnaik et al., 2020)   
  
For medical drug development, the profile of each disease poses unique difficulties in terms 
of control mechanisms across the PPP model. As a case in point, certain diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB have wider geographical scope in terms of disease burden, 
whereas most neglected diseases impact specific geographical areas or nations. This 
provides a degree of business encouragement for private investors, i.e. citizens in the 
developed world moving to endemic-ridden regions as tourists or military operations of 
developing countries (Torchia, Calabrò and Morner, 2015). The profiles of diseases differ 
even in rates and impacts of their mortality. In fact, the problems for practices related to 
research and technology differ across diseases (i.e. whether or not drugs are commercially 
accessible for prevention, diagnosis or cure) (Trouiller et al., 2002).  
  
Partnerships such as PPPs in GHI networks often differ in terms of practices related to the 
degree of participation in the phase of final stages of development. Although all PPPs have a 
similar identity in terms of operating from discovery to product development, some PPPs 
stop at the point of output while others carry out practices such as delivery operations, like 
support for WHO in product pre-qualification, domestic certification, uptake and distribution 
in endemic countries(Muñoz et al., 2015). The span of control involving the number of key 
PPP workers ranges widely in view of the magnitude of the R&D portfolios and incidence of 
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disease. In certain nations or regions, some PPPs run with a broad portfolio. There are also 
several variations in the different positions and relationships between employees, boards and 
advisory councils, and others participating with R&D ventures (Pereira et al., 2020).  
  
There is, however, evidence that PPPs strive for improved cooperation and collaboration. The 
TB Alliance, for example, provided DNDi with a royalty-free licence to produce anti-TB 
formulations for the use of DNDi’s R&D portfolio to fight other neglected diseases. In 
addition, knowledge sharing between PPPs can help create negotiating power for better 
packages and for strengthening subsequent bargaining with partners, particularly 
pharmaceutical companies (Munoz, 2015).  
 
In 2004, Moran (2010) described some 65 neglected disease projects and credits the evolution 
of GHI networks for this spike in R&D operation. Munoz et al. (2015), also emphasises the 
growing integration in the practices production of medicinal products for neglected diseases, 
and states that more than 300 private and public organisations (academic/ research 
institutions, biotechnological and other medium-sized and small businesses, such as contract 
research organisations, and major pharmaceutical corporations), form part of this new 
relational network. They are committed to practices which will enhance a portfolio of 374 
drugs and vaccines for 23 neglected diseases (BioVentures for Global Health 2012; see also 
Ferreira and Andricopulo, 2019; Pedrique et al., 2013).  
  
  
3.7.1.8 Tension in new relational networks 
The complexity of the emerging relationships due to these new relational networks deserves 
special attention. The WHO needs to strike a balance by establishing a working and 
sustainable relationship with non-state donors and continue to assert its legitimacy in the field 
as an interstate body. WHO needs to assert this legitimacy and retain its identity as a key 
coordinating body with its member states to help relieve health concerns.   
  
This complex balance caused conflict in 2007; in that particular instance, the Indonesian 
Health Minister did not agree to collaborate with the WHO in developing a vaccine to help 
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deal with the outbreak of avian flu (Gostin and Wiley, 2016). The reason for the reticence of 
the Indonesian Minister in this instance was due to his argument that releasing the viral 
samples to derive the vaccines were not going to be used to treat those affected in 
developing countries. The Minister agreed to release the samples only when a fairer system 
of distribution of the vaccines was made available to the population of those developing 
countries that were affected by the avian flu. In 2011, a Pandemic Influenza Preparedness 
Framework was eventually agreed by relevant member states in order to grant equitable 
access to those countries to vaccines of such diseases. The example in this case described 
the complexity for the WHO to maintain its control and legitimacy. They need to maintain 
their identity in the field by satisfying those actors who provide a substantial amount of 
funding in the operations of the WHO and less powerful players who need to be reassured 
that their interests are being taken into consideration. This is of importance since those 
actors need to be convinced that their support and participation in the practices of health 
provision is valued (Gostin, 2010).  
  
3.7.1.9 Professional logic of integration- the “new” professional logic  
The reality in terms of actual practice of the rules and regulations was, that when it came to the final 
implementation of strategies and distribution of funds, the identity of the professionals in those 
member states had little legitimacy in the relational network; this was mainly due to the emerging 
structure of the global health field governance with the increasing presence of multilateral 
agreements and collaborations which created new relational networks and hence convoluted the 
control mechanisms present in the field (Lee,2009). This pertains to the field evolving towards a 
professional logic of integration. 
 
  
3.8 Introducing logic evolution  
It is, in fact, somewhat impractical to believe that field logics will remain consistent over 
time; it is much more likely that logics would be expanded upon diffusion (Shipilov, Greve, 
and Rowley, 2010).  
Also, early conceptions of logic regard them as historically dependent and geographically 
positioned (Friedland and Alford, 1991). To my understanding, work has so far largely 
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overlooked the changing complexity of field logic, perhaps underestimating its capacity to 
evolve.   
We lack insights into how logics are built, how they develop and how they are challenged 
and ultimately de-institutionalised in the global health system. Focusing on how logic shifts 
should not ignore the essence of logic as paradigms that ensure consistency of understanding 
and practice. This draws attention, however, to the processes of social construction that build 
and incorporate new concepts into logic by the reconstitution of the characteristics of 
institutional logic. Chapters 6 analyses the phases of the logic evolution process, i.e., the 
reconstitution of the characteristics of an institutional logic. Chapter 7 analyses the macro and 
meso factors that affect this process of logic evolution.  
 
3.9 Framing the research questions   
3.9.1 Purpose- Explaining institutional change via the evolution of one single logic  
The purpose of this study is to explain how institutional change at the field level is taking 
place in the context of the global health system. The thesis explores the field of GHI 
networks. In particular, it studies how one of the institutional logics within it, i.e. the 
professional logic, has undergone a change and has gradually evolved. The study identifies 
the macro/meso factors that affected the change process and eventually contributed to 
outcomes in the field. The thesis thus aims to study how one of the institutional logics, 
specifically the professional logic, in the field of GHI networks has evolved.   
  
3.9.2 Background- Proliferation of actors in global health networks  
Empirical literature on changes in GHI networks indicates that healthcare services were 
incorporated into vertical programmes before the 1990s. Following the proliferation of non-
state donors (please see 2.1.6), the sector underwent a change process that, among other 
things, aimed at improving vertical efforts and creating an innovative approach in the field by 
fostering a more comprehensive view of the profession (please see 2.1.3). Structures have 
evolved in various ways in the field of GHIs under the overarching professional logic. This 
professional logic was prevalent in the early vertical approaches to tackling diseases. 
Following the proliferation of non-state donors, the professional logic has evolved.  
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3.9.3 Research questions  
This has prompted the researcher to gain insight on:  
1. How does the emergence of the new GHI networks demonstrate the reconstitution of 
the characteristics of logic in the field of global health networks?   
  
2. What are the macro and meso factors that allow the field of GHI networks to be 
restructured?  
  
Further elaborating on these issues, taking into account a wider theoretical purpose, this 
thesis examines how the existing logic evolves as new concepts are added and incorporated 
in it. Concisely, it uncovers:   
  
3. How is the evolution of logic over time representative of field-level institutional change 
processes?  
  
3.9.4 Summary of the results  
The results of this research indicate that developments in the field level will arise through a 
logic evolution process. This is accomplished through proliferation agents who collectively 
set up new systems, often imported from other settings, and then embed themselves within 
the new institutional environment. Actors expand on existing paradigms on the basis of 
societal and field level factors that enable the logic evolution to take place.  Evolving the 
logic will lead to a: reconstruction of the sources of legitimacy and identity; novel controlling 
mechanisms; new relational networks; and novel practices. In doing so the main objective of 
the field is modified. As a consequence of collective activity of professionals, logics and 
fields arise as emerging processes that increasingly segregate the previous constructs as new 




  61  
3.10 Conclusion- Uniqueness of the study  
 3.10.1 Examining the complexity of change using one logic  
This thesis broadens current understanding of field-level change processes by discussing the 
evolution of a specific institutional logic. This phenomenon is analysed by means of a 
comparative study of the same field before and after the cycle of proliferation in order to 
discover the macro and meso factors that affect the evolution of logic in the field.  
The uniqueness of this work lies in the attempt to examine the complexities of transition that 
take place within an institutional logic rather than between logics. This work offers a range of 
perspectives that can help to extend our existing knowledge of institutional field-level 
change.   
In view of the complexity of all fields, we must presume that some wider, societal-level 
logics come into play in some fields while it might not in others (at least not to the same 
extent). However, if we follow a linear logic conceptualisation (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; 
Thornton, 2002; Lok, 2010; Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2015), this diversity cannot be 
taken into account.  
This work emphasises the importance of a more dynamic and evolutionary conceptualisation 
of logic in order to explain how logic develops and interacts in a particular context.   
This research explores the proliferation agents in the institutional field and examines their 
role in the cycle of change. However, the study considers their action in the context of a 
wider perspective on the process in particular, focusing on the interplay of concepts and 
processes by which professionals come to share and endorse the same values (Hardy and 
Maguire, 2017; Ren and Jackson, 2020).  
It explores how social agents engage in the logic evolution process, highlighting the agency 
in the sense of radical institutional change that is spatially and temporally situated 
(Langley,2009; Reay et al., 2019).   
The work explains how reconstitutions of internal characteristics of one logic transforms the 
field and changes the relationships between groups within a social context. Usually, social 
actors in a context follow a common logic. However, in logic evolution processes, 
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subcategories of social actors might conform only partially to the evolving system of belief. 
Thus, not only can actors react differently to institutional demands (e.g. Pache and Santos, 
2013; Golyagina, 2020), but sub-groups within the same context might follow only certain 
elements of a particular logic.  
3.10.2 Relevance of the setting in a COVID-19 world  
Ultimately, this work expands the examination of social mechanisms to areas which have not 
historically been included in prior studies. Until now, the bulk of institutional theory research 
has centred on state health care, especially in the United States and Canada, and has looked at 
improvements in mature fields (e.g. Reay and Hinings, 2005, 2009; Greenwood and 
Suddaby, 2006; Hardy and Maguire, 2017; Zamperini and Lurati, 2017). Very few studies 
have focused on other environments such as issues that affect developing countries 
(Lawrence and Phillips, 2019) and fields that are emerging or facing problems (Maguire et 
al., 2004; Purdy and Gray, 2009; Bossy et al., 2016). Using this as a motive, we have only 
partial awareness of field-level developments in emerging GHI networks. We lack answers 
on the circumstances in which these institutional orders are contested. In this respect, the 
field of GHI networks is a fascinating setting for the study of fundamental change processes. 
In this sense, since the financial crisis of the 1980s, even sectors historically known as 
established and deeply institutionalized such as the global health system (Thornton and 
Ocasio, 1999; Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2015), have undergone major reforms. As a 
result, this thesis is situated in a specific environment, the network of GHIs, which are still 
comparatively inadequately researched, but nonetheless provide a favourable environment for 
investigating significant change processes considering the ongoing COVID-19 crisis.   
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CHAPTER 4. Methodology   
4.1 Introduction  
In order to extend the current theory on institutional change at the field level, this inductive 
case-study analysis is carried out by investigating the evolution of an institutional logic in the 
field (the professional logic). The structured, theoretically based model derived from the 
study's results (Glaser and Strauss, 2017), builds on the review of advances in the context of 
global health systems and more specifically that of the field GHI networks. The research 
setting is known as a case study and it provides the opportunity to analyse processes of 
change at field level due to the reconstitution of the internal characteristics of one 
institutional logic (the professional logic) in this setting.  
The review of current research and the study of preliminary evidence reveal that, prior to the 
change, health programmes were identified with unique institutional characteristics and field 
arrangements. Over time, some basic principles for the improvement of the field of GHIs 
have been enhanced through the adoption of new tenets within the same overarching 
institutional logic (the professional logic).  
4.1.1 Organisation of the chapter  
A comprehensive description of the methodological choices and their impact is given in this 
chapter. Section 4.2 explains the context of the study and justifies the choice of context 
whilst sections 4.3 summarises the background to change and the implications of the 
evolution of the professional logic in the domain of GHI networks. Section 4.4 explains the 
strategy and design of the research. Section 4.5 outlines collection, coding and analysis of 
data. This chapter will end with some reflections on the ramifications of the research 
methodologies (see section 4.6).  
  
4.2 Research Setting- Selecting the case   
4.2.1 Rationale for the choice of case study design  
The guideline applied in choosing this case is to optimise the ability to explore the global 
health system as a result of the evolution of the professional logic in the setting of GHI 
networks. After a preliminary review of the academic literature on GHIs, a field that had an 
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overarching field logic (professional logic) prior to the transition seems to have changed 
following the proliferation period (please see 2.1.5 and 2.1.6). This field seems therefore to 
have a certain diversity in the nature of processes. Explicitly, it shows changes in field level 
processes.  
  
In view of an interest in researching cases per se and as distinct expressions of occurrences 
that are encoded in their context, a case-study research design is selected. The importance of 
the case is integral to the interpretation of the change processes that have occurred through 
the evolution of professional logic and their study is essential to illustrate the macro and 
meso factors impacting this phenomenon at field level. The new relational networks, novel 
control mechanisms and new practices impacting the professionals suggest distinct trends in 
the process contributing to the emergence of GHI networks.  
Therefore, the choice of the case is driven not by selectivity, but by the capacity and ability to 
learn about processes of institutional change at field level in spatial contexts. The case 
reflects origins of characteristics, mechanisms and concepts that can be applied to investigate 
the phenomena of interest (Luck, Jackson and Usher, 2006; Yin, 2018).  
  
In addition, this thesis is placed in a current relevant context; that of Global Health Initiatives 
which is inadequately researched, and this can provide fertile grounds for investigating 
mechanisms of transformative change that is relevant in the current societal context.  
The GHI networks demonstrate how the historically mature and heavily institutionalised 
global health field has undergone a dramatic change (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; Thornton, 
Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2015). This transition was motivated by proliferation agents both 
within and outside the field who played an important part in the overall transformation of the 
field.  
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4.3 Summary of the major changes leading to professional logic of integration  
So, to summarise, since the start of the millennium the global health system has experienced 
major changes in its relational networks, mainly to integrate practices related to research, 
development and delivery of healthcare services. These belong to a professional logic of 
integration which has come about as a result of the evolution of the professional logic. 
Conventional players, such as the WHO, dominated the Global Health System prior to the 
proliferation period. Alongside the WHO, the transnational health organization was also 
present national health ministries of major developed and developing nations. Prior to the 
proliferation period (please see 2.1.5 and 2.1.6), a professional logic of assistance prevailed.  
The old relational network has thus been modified by the joining of non-governmental 
organisations, private organisations, philanthropists and, in some cases, civil society 
representatives. As a matter of fact, the characteristic and backdrop of legitimacy and identity 
between the old and the new actors have also shifted, and this is reflected by the advent of 
new practices and networks. In terms of the relationship and operation, there are also new 
standards and practices. The WHO defines public-private health collaborations in GHI 
networks as "public sector initiatives with private sector involvement" (WHO, 2016). This is 
a broad description that allows for several forms, shapes and PPP sizes. The definition of a 
modern PPP in GHI networks would be one where a government organisation/partner sets the 
control mechanisms for goals and guidelines for private entities to work under (WHO, 
2015c).  
  
The key partnerships in the GHI networks include PPPs such as Stop TB, TB Alliance, the  
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), and the Medicines for Malaria Vaccines (MMV) (Aerts, 
et al., 2017). These new institutions have now gained a certain identity that has been 
legitimised in their specific disease categories. This is due to them being considered the most 
effective way of overcoming the systematic and quite often long-standing problems in the 
global health system (Towse et al., 2012). It is important to highlight that increased foreign 
support for these newer institutions has contributed to a considerable and, in some cases, 
complete decline in conventional actors' financial and institutional significance. This is quite 
symbolic as it embraces the shift towards a professional logic of integration (Harman, 2016).  
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The advent of new multi-stakeholder control mechanisms in GHI networks, including the 
Global Fund and GAVI, has seen a significant shift in international cooperation, representing 
a logic evolution process. With a pledge from $852 million in 2001 (its establishment) to 
$3.2 billion in 2013, the Global Fund soon became the biggest multi-stakeholder health donor 
(Beres and Soussan, 2013; Clinton, Sridhar and Sridhar, 2017). GAVI has risen to $1.4 
billion in 2014 from the peak of its initial phase of $164.7 million in 1999 (Clinton, Sridhar 
and Sridhar, 2017). In addition to managing large capital, the comparatively recent relational 
networks are distinguished by a governance system that is markedly different from 
conventional multilateral organisations.   
  
4.4 Research strategy and design   
The key goal is to research the impact that historical and social-cultural influences have in 
affecting the manner in which the identities, legitimacy and relationships of actors shift and 
establish new field structures.  
To this end, the study relies on a naturalist method of inquiry (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011; 
Pope and May 2020), employing an inductive approach. To evaluate the data and produce 
theoretical suggestions about the phenomenon of interest (Glaser and Strauss, 2017), which is 
the field-level institutional shift in a particular temporal and spatial sense through the 
evolution of one professional logic, it uses abduction theory techniques. It does not, however, 
test a hypothesis that is logically derived from a priori assumptions, but instead discovers a 
theory that arises from the selected research scenarios.  
Harrington (2005), detailed the importance of research philosophy in the creation of a strong 
framework for developing and creating ideas. Consequently, a strong framework helps in the 
collection and analysis of data. This in turn aids in finding suitable answers to research 
questions or hypothesis testing. This ensures that the data collected has validity when it 
comes to interpretation and analysis.    
Positivism has long been one of the most important and influential philosophical approaches 
in natural science. Positivism is a position which encourages the use of natural science 
methods to research social reality and beyond. The French sociologist Auguste Comte 
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introduced it in the 19th century (Honderich, 2005), a trend close to empiricism and 
naturalism. This was the dominant ideology in the 1960s and 1970s, when it pertained to 
research in business and management. Yet questions regarding the limitations of quantitative 
approaches frequently associated with positivism have been posed in the 1970s and 1980s.  
For example, the prevalence of quantitative positivist research over the qualitative method 
has been described as one of the weaknesses of previous studies in management research 
(Teece, 2007).  
The positivist premise that scientific methods can more or less reflect and quantify the 
observable reality was questioned. The critique was related to the fact that positivist 
approaches remove context from sense making in the course of creating quantified 
measurements of (social) phenomena (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). The positivistic hegemony 
was criticised and questioned by proponents of two alternative philosophies; constructivism 
and postmodernism. Notably, the critique was made due to the omission of social and 
political context in positivistic approaches to research (Creswell and Poth, 2016).   
As such interpretivism presented an alternative to the positivism paradigm. Interpretivism 
diverged from the use of the scientific framework in the research of social orders and systems 
(Prasad and Prasad, 2002). The interpretivist point of view provided a different logic that 
quantifies the characteristics of human beings in the study of social systems (Baert, 2000). 
Such a perspective places the emphasis on interpretive study of social behaviour in order to 
achieve a rational account of the phenomena.  
This study employs an inductive approach. Hirst and Humphreys (2015), chose an inductive 
exploratory case study of the creation of a new SSC, 'FirstService".  Using this design, they 
explored how the implementation of technology in professional service work expanded the 
potential for organisational versatility. Their review of developments in FirstService is part of 
a larger investigation of efforts to modernise a UK local authority, the Western County 
Council (WCC) by incorporating new interconnected innovations in their work environments   
  
The design implemented is a case-study design (Yin, 2018). Ayikoru (2015),followed a case 
study design since it allows choices regarding the possibilities of choosing avenues of study 
as opposed to providing a methodological preference. Pertinently, a qualitative case study, 
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focusing on a particular case, is implemented since there is no effort to generalise beyond a 
specific case, but instead there is an interest in highlighting what can be gained from using a 
qualitative approach (Stake, 2013; Ayikoru, 2015). Nevertheless, there is recognition of the 
various ways in which the word "case study" is interpreted and used in multiple academic 
contexts (Welch et al., 2011; Ayikoru, 2015) but also in contexts where there are questions 
regarding traditional narratives on authenticity, replication and relevance (Hammersley, 
1990). The pervasive impact of such discourses, which in itself represent positive and 
contradictory views on what is labelled empirical, is often expressed when choosing between 
quantitative or qualitative.  
  
A qualitative case study design is thus deemed to be more fitting in this research as it allows 
an in-depth review and explanation of the emergence of GHI networks.  In this way, it is 
more likely to address questions about why and how there has been an emergence of the GHI 
network.  This, in essence, promotes a better comprehension of the underlying dynamics and 
also allows a contextualised and specific clarification of the consequences for the  emergence 
of GHIs in the global health system (Ayikoru, 2015)  
  
Emergence of GHI networks are examined in context of the evolution of the global health 
system. This attempts to identify reinterpretations of the internal characteristics of one 
institutional logic (the professional logic), which have contributed to the growth and 
advancement of the GHI networks in terms of new relational networks, reconstituted control 
mechanisms and new practices as well as legitimising the identity of the professionals in the 
field.   
  
This research largely consists of a single level of examination; the GHI network which is a 
subfield of the wider field of global health systems. The organisation of GHI network is 
described as a field which comprises a multitude of actors, including organisations, patients, 
regulators and funders (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1994). These actors collaborate to 
accomplish the shared aim of ensuring the welfare of the citizens in geographical areas. This 
field consists of all professionals that collaborate together in organising, funding, delivering, 
tracking or accessing medical products that are especially vital to communities in low- and 
middle-income countries.  
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Although the field of GHI networks is the core level of research, some ideas are obtained 
from a micro level of analysis of practices. These are the agencies who are active participants 
in the field. This preference is in compliance with the study issue and the approach of 
previous institutional field-level change studies. The field is the working environment for 
perceiving the complexities of logic evolution (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; Durand and 
Thornton, 2018) and for documenting linkages between professionals, institutions and 
organisations (Lounsbury, 2007; Zhao and Lounsbury, 2016)  
 
4.5 Research methods   
4.5.1 Data collection   
Research techniques in this study consist solely of qualitative components. It was important 
to analyse the process of change by examining developed structures of common values and 
meanings that represent cultural and context-specific social dynamics. Numerous sources of 
information have been used to gather data, including face-to-face in-depth interviews, field 
notes, current global health literature, reported reports and studies, and records. The 
triangulation of data from the sources listed above was mainly used to bring knowledge into 
context, and to better understand the emergence of new ideas.  
Interviews were used as the primary data source to expose the field-level change mechanism. 
The interviews included both the remembrance of past events and the examination of current 
topics (retrospective and current interviews). The sampling approach was primarily 
theoretical in order to further explore the new concepts in the field. The objective was also to 
record the full variations of the observed occurrence — institutional field-level shift through 
evolution of the professional logic (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; McInnes et al., 2017).  
The snowball technique was used to extend the sample and gain expression of opposing 
opinions on reform concepts, results and main actors (relative and variational sampling and 
selective sampling), until consensus was achieved (Draucker et al., 2007).  
During the initial phase of collection of data, an exploration of issues to be investigated was 
executed. These were later explored and analysed during the second, explanatory process. In 
the original compilation of data, we needed to explain how the network of Global Health 
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Initiatives (GHI network) was configured in ahead of the time of the proliferation, what the 
key proposals were and what the change effects were, and how the global health system was 
reconfigured after the change. The aim of this stage was to analyse the key ideas and 
outcomes of the change in order to detect the potential for the comparative analysis into the 
change mechanism through the framework of institutional logic.  
To this end, an extensive literature review was undertaken to collect applicable research on 
the emergence of GHIs in the Global Health System since the beginning of the 1990s.This is 
a key period in the proliferation phase (please see 2.1.5 and 2.1.6). This included publications 
from the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Bank and the European Union, 
documents accessible on official websites of individual ministry departments, educational 
tools from universities and professional associations and scholarly literature and papers 
written in English peer-reviewed journals. The information gathered was used to explain the 
general features and patterns of the change and to discern relevant details on the 
circumstances in which the proliferation occurred.  
Consequently, this helped define possible trends to be potentially established later in this 
report. These subjects were addressed in advance with some colleagues at the Business 
School and the initial contacts in GHIs to help prepare for the interview process. This 
analytical description of concepts relating to the previous relational networks and the current 
one, is primarily based on archival and documentary details, including observations from 
interview evidence (see Appendix E-G for the Summary of Codes and corresponding quotes 
can be found in Appendix D)   
The next phase was the exploratory process of the study. In the exploratory phase, interviews 
were conducted with a purposeful selection of highly networked informants, based on 
theoretical significance (Glaser and Strauss, 2017; Seidel and Urquhart, 2016) and flexibility 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985; McInnes, et al., 2017) as selection criteria. The objective was to 
identify a multi-level sample of key players engaged in policy formulation and 
implementation, and to collect divergent viewpoints in order to enrich the analysis with 
pluralistic insights on the process of changes in the field (McNulty and Ferlie,  
2002;Pettigrew, 1995; Pettigrew, McKee, and Ferlie, 1992; Ferlie, 2019). The overall aim 
was to explore attitudes and awareness of the goals and aims of the GHIs, consequent 
improvements in systems and procedures, discussions of legitimising identity with respect to 
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new relational networks, stimulating influences and barriers, significant accomplishments 
and fundamental failures, important key performance variables and knowledge gained (open 
sampling). By that point, both interviews and document analysis verified the existence of a 
specific structure of the health system, and the specific fundamental values of the old system. 
They all referred to the concepts of the vertical approaches. Those concepts were adopted in 
the field during the proliferation period. However, archival records and interviewees 
demonstrated the involvement of various practices in the emergence of GHIs. These were the 
support of individual institutions, the credibility of the current professional position and the 
various forms of entities that have been permitted to deliver services through the new GHI 
networks. Additional collection of data and review rounds have shown that the patterns of 
transition are due to macro and meso factors in the field (for further specifics on the coding 
mechanism, see Appendix D; for further context information on GHI, see Appendix B).  
A more explanatory process followed during which new evidence was gathered and the study 
developed. This was meant to clarify the mechanism of logical evolution in the field and to 
disassemble the particular variables that influenced the transition. After tentative 
consultations with GHI’s initial contacts, the first series of interviews was held in March 
2019, with 10 participants from various stakeholders. The second series of interviews was 
completed in April 2019, with 10 participants from various stakeholders.  
 
4.5.1.1 Selection of Participants 
The participants varied from the different organisations in the GHI networks (see Appendix 
H), and they included the key personnel from: major Private Foundations United Nations 
agencies, major partnerships in the GHI network, specialist organisations, administrators of 
private foundations, independent research institutions and researchers from historical 
academic institutions. Figures 1 and 3 (see p.15 and 18) were utilised as a key diagram in the 
selection process. They were contacted via the professional networking platform LinkedIn to 
access the initial participants and then using the snowball technique further interviewees were 
selected and contacted. 
 Data gathering continued through interviews with three new informants from academic 
institutions, private foundations and technical societies until May 2019. The identity of the 
informants shall not be revealed to comply with the request for them to remain confidential.  
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Participants were notified in advance that the discussions would yield the data to be used for 
this research study. In addition, they have already received a short description of the research 
proposal, as well as a wide overview of the purpose and methodology of the analysis. Based 
on the knowledge and skills of the interviewee and the volumes of material collected, the 
interviews were either mainly unstructured (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) or semi-structured 
(Pope and Mays, 2000). A schedule of the interview was utilised and continuously updated to 
resolve previously established and theoretically important problems, and/or to further 
examine frameworks arising from the study (please see Appendix A).  
  
The interviews took place in English via Skype. All participants were able to articulate and 
speak the language. The interviews lasted about one hour each, but the duration of the 
interviews varied from one hour to two and a half hours. They were all thoroughly recorded 
and transcribed, paying attention to maintaining confidentiality and anonymity of the 
interviewees.  
 
4.5.1.2 Abductive Analysis 
Abductive analysis used in this thesis is a qualitative data analysis method that uses a mix of refined 
theoretical awareness and methodological assumptions to generate innovative and novel theoretical 
models. Instead of putting all pre-existing theoretical constructs away during a research study, 
abductive analysis emphasises that scholars should immerse themselves in the field with the richest 
and deepest theoretical background which is feasible and expand their theoretical vocabularies 
during the whole research (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012). 
Using abductive thinking has indirectly shown parallels between different types of qualitative 
research. This suggests, at least to me that this technique has the potential for extra benefits. The 
ability to draw from a wide range of disciplines, fields of research and theoretical viewpoints may 
be a significant benefit to abductive analysis (Earl Rinehart, 2021). Benefits may be identified 
across scholastic divides instead of maintaining (fabricated) geographical limits to research. 
Something that Denzin (2008) referred to as a "bigger tent" of qualitative inquiry (p. 321) might 
allow for more widespread (and visible) deployment of abductive analysis.  
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Giulio Pacius proposed the abductive argument in 1597 to interpret Aristotle's idea of apagoge, but 
it remained mostly ignored for over three centuries. Peirce (1971/1974) first used the term to denote 
the sole inference that new information may generate; reasoning that is fundamentally different 
from other forms of logical reasoning such as deduction and induction. As a type of reasoning, 
abduction is reasonable and scientific, yet it deals with the realm of profound insight and fresh 
knowledge. Abduction is designed to aid social research, or more specifically, social researchers in 
making new findings in a logical and methodologically orderly manner (Bruscaglioni, 2016). 
New ideas are generated to account for perplexing empirical materials rather than hypotheses 
originating from facts. The tenets of the grounded theory methodology can encourage abductive 
thinking by reviewing, defamiliarizing and alternative re-packaging in light of theoretical 
information. The surprise, dilemma, or abnormality that could spark a fresh theory is then 
methodologically revealed through rigorous data analysis against a backdrop of acquired theoretical 
acumen. Abductive analysis is appealing because it accurately extracts theoretical breakthroughs 
through a twofold interaction with current theory and meticulous methodological procedures. The 
focus on abduction and its link to current literature and techniques of analysis implies that theory 
creation is a technique that can be learned via sensitization to and close interaction with data and 
associated theory development.   
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4.5.2 Data coding and analysis   
In order to guarantee the confidentiality of the source and transcripts, data collected via 
interview transcripts and field notes were ordered in colour coded folders and downloaded 
into data coding software (ATLAS.ti version 6.0). The data encoding was used to identify 
categories and constructs immediately on the data and establish theory suggestions for their 
relationships, in order to understand the process of institutional change (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985). 
This work focused on the present set of institutional change theories (please see Chapter 3). It 
extends institutional change theories with the interpretation of emerging field mechanisms 
that contribute to new ideas. These new ideas are validated through the consultation of extant 
literature. An abduction theory methodology has therefore been employed, rather than a new 
theoretical perspective isolated from previous literature, to discover yet unexplained 
processes in a certain field of study (Suddaby, 2006; Sato, 2019). Abduction theory is 
important for the study of behaviour that impacts social processes. The goal is to establish 
theories that take into consideration the interaction between personal and social constructs in 
a key context.  
It allows for a systematic guide to the behavioural dimensions of culture, the meaning and the 
context (Goulding, 2017). It is concerned primarily with the simple reasoning, the concepts 
and procedures involved in the production of the results, and with their implementation and 
explicit interpretation.   
 
Finally, in naturalistic environments, the approach blends into analysing social actions. The 
primary methods for data labelling and interpretation were continuous comparative 
approaches and analytical sampling. The operations were carried out somewhat at the same 
moment, as they consulted one another continuously (Glaser and Strauss, 2017; Strauss and 
Corbin, 1997; Goulding, 2017). The researcher went back and forth from the emergent ideas 
and consulted literary research and evidence in order to slowly re-finish the list of codes 
(Miles and Huberman, 1984; Hashimov, 2015). The preliminary study of literature and 
accessible archival data was a key starting point for the researcher.  
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An important goal for the researcher was to consider the point of proliferation of actors in the 
global health system. Also, key was to learn about the fundamental principles behind the 
implementation of new GHI networks in the global health system field (Part A of Appendix 
D).  
 
It helped define the scope for investigating internal improvements in the theory and prompted 
me to gather and evaluate evidence during the subsequent processes. During this process, 
new problems were addressed, and evolving ideas and topics slowly developed until 
saturation point occurred (Glaser and Strauss 2017).  
  
Distinctly, the goal was to validate whether or not the logic evolution process resulted in clear 
results in the global health system, as was apparent from the earlier phases of the 
investigation. And thereafter, it identified particular phases of the evolution process during 
which reconstitutions of particular logic characteristics could be observed (Part B of 
Appendix D).  
Eventually, it defined qualitative influences that affected the logic evolution process and led 
to the evolution in the field. (Part C of Appendix D).    
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4.5.2.1 Data Coding Stages 
Figure 8 Coding diagram (Author’s own diagram) 
 
 
Figure 8 Coding diagram (Author’s own diagram) 
 
 
The coding consisted of three stages, normally carried out in parallel (Corbin and Strauss, 
1997; Charmaz and Thornberg, 2020).Figure 8 above, illustrates the stages in the coding 
process. In the first round, the decision was to explore and create a detailed set of usable 
codes for each interview, in order to categorise details and knowledge. Such concise codes 
helped to assign the key incidents, explain the proliferation phase and classify concepts 
emerging due to the proliferation of actors. In order to maintain authenticity and accuracy, 
these were consistently checked against the archival evidence and extant literature. The 
extent of applicability of each evaluated code has been developed slowly. First groups and 
potential links between them have been defined by distinguishing the types, properties and 
descriptions provisionally from their subcategories. A cumulative number of codes arose 
from this first level of coding. Out of these, 85 refined codes or first-order categories were 
extracted. These codes have isolated unique and functional concepts which have been 
changed through the proliferation period and which seem to suggest an evolution in the 
institutional logic (the professional logic).  
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The second phase went through interviews, using the textual data to further underpin 
temporal, spatial and causal effects across categories. First-order categories were compared 
and systematically contrasted; those exhibiting identical properties and/or referring to 
different definitions were combined and those containing contrasting dimensions or 
properties of the same category were untangled. This evaluation approach resulted in the 
identification of interim spatial, temporal connections between the processed codes and to the 
discovery of specific conceptual frameworks. They were related to the characteristics of logic 
and appeared at various stages of the process. In the end, this step produced 34 second order 
categories.  
  
The third round of coding achieved maximum levels of complexity as they sought to validate 
the links between the codes. The emerging categories were integrated into 17 theoretical 
categories. Such categories identified the logic characteristics detected from the data, which 
changed during the process at different times and the societal and field-level variables which 
induced the change. This has been used to describe the phenomena of interest — institutional 
change at the field level by logic evolution — and the reasons for their various manifestations 
in the field.  
  
Operational codes and empirical memos and logic diagrams assisted the study at all times and 
guided the creation of the theoretical framework. The data structure resulting from the coding 
and analysis is illustrated in Appendix E- G.   
For the reasoning of the theoretical model, samples of illustrative quotations and 
corresponding first-order categories are given in Appendix D. The results and the 
interpretation of the findings are provided in Chapters 5,6 and 7. The ties between the 
categories and the justification for the coding are seen in Figure 9.  
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Figure 9 Coding reasoning and links for theoretical categories (author’s own diagram)  
 
Figure 9 Coding reasoning and links for theoretical categories (author’s own diagram)  
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4.6 Limitations of methodological choices   
The criteria used to determine the efficacy of naturalistic investigations vary from those used 
to evaluate logico-deductive, positivistic inquiry (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2018). Issues concerning the internal and external validity, reliability and 
generalisability of the results that emerge in relation to a conventional research report; have 
parallels in interpretive, naturalistic research in which questions about trustworthiness, 
integrity, confirmability and transferability are more relevant for an inductive case study. As 
its goal, the method of analysis has to address these issues at all times. The declaration of 
methodological choices and procedures serves the function of a scientific rigour seeking 
(Langley, 2009).  
  
The credibility judgement is based on evaluating how conclusions are reached (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967). To maximise the chances of creating a more coherent and consistent 
hypothesis, memos were produced to keep track of concepts as they were formed during the 
coding process and to log interpretation choices. These helped to classify homogeneous 
concepts and to create categories.  
  
Those categories which were considered more representative of the phenomenon of interest 
were chosen as the main categories. Input from co-researchers were sought to verify 
understandings while reviewing the information and developing a theoretical model and 
proposals (Langley, 2009; Miles and Huberman, 1984; Hashimov, 2015). For the abstraction 
of categories at a theoretical level, discussions with colleagues on the initial and further 
model formulation were especially illuminating. The theoretical structure was thoroughly 
clarified in detail and comments were made in some sections of the text from the data (Glazer 
and Strauss, 2017).  
  
In the final version, significant volumes of initial textual data were used in order to "give 
corroborative information for the suggested conceptualization" (Langley, 2009), and to 
provide "analysis as proof for inference, thereby showing" how the hypothesis was extracted 
from the analysis (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 228). In various sections of the text (Chapters 5, 
6 and 7) and in supplementary tables (Appendix D), data coding procedures as well as 
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quotations supporting the theoretical arguments were recorded. The sources of knowledge 
were documented as accurately as possible with the aim of finding verifiability in a manner 
that did not interfere with previously established confidentiality agreements.  
Sections of texts and data sources have been triangulated in order to reduce the chances of 
misinterpretation, addressing accuracy, clarity and validity, assessing and ensuring basic data 
quality (Miles and Huberman, 1984). Multiple opinions of the same phenomenon were taken 
into consideration in order to explain the significance of such a concept by recognising 
various ways it might have been interpreted, and to verify the accuracy of an observation/ 
interpretation as much as possible (Stake, 2013). The interview results were the primary 
source of evidence, but these were verified against through respondent validation. The latter  
was the process of sharing my interpretation of the respondent’s responses with them.  
  
Many sources of data included papers and records from major health organisations, journal 
articles, preliminary interviews, field observations and personal notes of the interviewees.  
This expanded the vibrancy and variance of the codes while also enabling the change process 
to account for a precise temporal evolution. This helped to address the retrospective bias, 
memory limitations and rationalisation that interviewees may have had in reconstructing and 
understanding events.  
  
This helps to preserve useful individual experiences and to at least understand certain 
common definitions at the same time (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2009; Auschra, Schmidt and 
Sydow, 2019). To obtain the required degree of abstraction, the evolving codes and concepts 
were continuously triangulated with current literature in order to produce a theory that would 
match both the theoretical and contextual body of literature. The theoretical method 
developed a hypothesis that would be comprehensible and generalisable beyond the instances 
upon which it was based (Glaser and Strauss 1967).  
  
All methodological choices regarding the adequacy of the research mechanism by which 
theory was produced have been proclaimed expressly (Strauss and Corbin, 1997). The criteria 
for choosing the case and the selection of informants inside the case was clearly defined. It 
defined the main groups and the theoretical formulations. It presented proof of the 
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occurrences, instances and decisions that led to such instances. The study established 
connections between codes that emerged on the basis of both analytical and theoretical 
criteria. Connections were further built on by clear associations between the principles 
created by the interviewees, as well as from personal observations and the researcher’s 
intuition (Glaser and Strauss, 2017).  
   
Such connections were "checked" by re-evaluating the data already collected and gathering 
additional data where necessary. The emerging findings were thoroughly monitored by 
comparisons between the categories and the observed phenomena's evolution. The theoretical 
propositions were sought to confer breadth and depth on the significance of outliers (Miles 
and Huberman, 1984; Strauss and Corbin, 1997). Although working to uncover and validate 
the relationships and eventually build up the theoretical model, results from the case study 
were viewed through a critical lens.  
 
The study searched for potential competing interpretations of new ideas and connections. 
This helped empirically ground the results, increase group conceptual density and incorporate 
variance into the theoretical model. Both the macro and meso factors affecting the 
phenomena of study, and the temporal dynamics of the process were taken into consideration. 
This gave the theorisation a processual significance, i.e. deriving temporally ordered 
explanations (Langley, 2009). In comparison, the theoretical model's visual representation 
demonstrated a more simplified and straightforward depiction of the phenomena. This 
enabled the reader to gain faith in the results and create reliability in the overall study 
process.  
  
The investigator had little impact on the research sites (Miles and Huberman, 1984). This has 
the advantage of less interference with the workflow of the informants, and of not deviating 
from the ongoing occurrence of events, which is likely to result in less bias in the accuracy of 
the evidence. However, it had the downside of not getting to experience the informants 
immersing themselves more deeply in the daily life of the field. This was resolved by quickly 
gaining access to the field and by continuous communication with key informants in order to 
establish reciprocal confidence.  
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CHAPTER 5. Findings and analysis: chronology of events  
5.1 Introduction to findings and analysis  
Figure 10: Phases and factors of logic evolution process (author’s own diagram) 
 
Figure 10 Phases and factors of logic evolution process (author’s own diagram) 
 
 
Chapters 5-7 analyse the change process in GHIs by demonstrating how logic evolution took 
place through the reconstitution of characteristics inside one institutional logic, namely the 
professional logic and the linkages between Chapters 5-7 are illustrated in Figure 10 provided 
above. Chapter 5 explains the mechanism of change in the network of GHIs by providing a 
  
  
  83  
timeline of the events. Chapter 6 analyses how the logic evolution process is developed by 
demonstrating how the characteristics of the professional logic that were updated at various 
points of the process. Chapter 7 analyses the macro and meso factors that influenced the 
evolution of the professional logic.  
  
Chapter 7 reveals the macro and meso factors encompassing this transition. By incorporating 
new concepts in the GHI field, there are modifications to: the sources that legitimise 
identities; mechanisms of control; relational networks; and practices relevant to GHIs. This 
causes the prior professional logic of assistance to evolve during the change process. The 
evolution pertains to another professional logic, that of integration. Due to the proliferation of 
actors, new control mechanisms (formal and informal), revised relational networks and 
practices, the updated overarching professional logic is expounded upon.  
 
Concepts of the professional logic of integration are blended with the concepts of the 
professional logic of assistance. The permeation of non-state donors in the network of GHIs 
and their role in the field complements that of the more traditional actors in the global health 
system. Through extending the professional logic of assistance to include modern concepts of 
a more systematic and innovation-centred understanding of the field, the resulting 
overarching professional logic is expanded upon. Therefore, this results in a revision of the 
overarching professional logic.  
  
The concepts of the professional logic of integration are blended into that of the professional 
logic of assistance. In the networks of GHIs, non-state actors are considered legitimate and 
governments actually coexist in the field with those non-state entities. The blending of the 
professional logic of assistance, and the latest concepts of a more systematic and 
revolutionary understanding of the global health system constitutes the revised overarching 
professional logic. This refers to a revised and updated overarching professional logic. This 
logic evolution process produces a global health system with complex configurations.  
  
Non-state actors are relatively well-integrated in some countries and hence, the networks of 
GHIs are more stable. In other countries, these non-state entities are isolated and thus the 
field of GHIs is rather heterogeneous.   
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 Variables at the social and field level profoundly affect the mechanism of logic evolution, 
giving rise to certain findings. Typically, these include the ability to crystallise change, the 
degree of trust in accepting alternative approaches, legitimacy, and status of proliferation 
agents, feasibility of identifying a strategic field hub and the ability to create a participatory 
hub.  
It is also necessary to focus on the proliferation agents in the field and their capacity to 
express resources; it is also crucial to consider the mechanism of social interaction which 
legitimises the identity of the global health professional. This is an important factor since it is 
the global health professional that is expected to enact practices.   
   
5.1.1 Horizontal v vertical debate  
Centred on primary and secondary data and following a “temporal bracketing” approach 
(Clark and Vealé, 2018), the analysis describes the stages of the change process.  
Under the leadership of WHO, the world had almost accomplished the unrealistic target of 
the decade; in 1979, an expert WHO committee reported that the world had actually 
conquered smallpox (Kirby, 2020).WHO was also dealing with an internal controversy 
regarding its basic identity during the so-called golden age of smallpox eradication.  
  
There was a persistent gap between the “vertical” solution to tackle individual (mainly 
infectious) diseases, and the “horizontal” solution that aimed to reinforce whole health 
systems and promote universal care programmes that will, over time, bring in wider 
integrative and long-term developments in public health (Cairncross, Periès and Cutts, 1997).  
  
However, vertical approaches were favoured by bilateral donors’ right from the start because 
it was simpler to calculate outcomes over a shorter period of time, for instance by quantifying 
the amount of bed nets distributed or vaccinations provided. These programmes, since they 
usually had different funding, distribution and control mechanisms, implementation 
structures and budgets within the WHO, are often easier for donors to track and control 
(Kim, Farmer and Porter, 2013).  
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However, primary care advocates argued that the WHO being the centralised institution at 
that period in time should commit money and energies to a horizontal approach, claiming 
with similar fervour that short-term developments in such diseases or provision in vaccines 
threatened the breakdown in general health services (Mills, 1983).This risked undermining 
the government’s position as the principal guardians of national health systems.   
While these claims were made in the 1970s, they are still deemed relevant in today’s complex 
global health architecture. These vertical approaches have been criticised for not paying full 
consideration to country specific factors such as cultural context, corruption, or lack of 
decentralisation policies. These factors are pertinent to the recipient countries. The lack of 
attention to these country specific factors when designing top-down global solutions that are 
being designed in Washington and Geneva, are ultimately piling more debt onto recipient 
countries:  
  
“Obviously, there is a massive responsibility for domestic resource mobilisation for countries 
to organise their own resources…… like tax systems, how do you make fiscal space to collect 
funding? …….. the World Bank and the IMF pushing for liberalisation, privatisation of 
services, and huge amount of new initiatives, innovative ways of financing health, which are 
putting countries into even more debt and pushing top-down global solutions ……. absolutely 
are disaster at the local level. Because they’re totally not thought through within the cultural 
context……. “(Philanthropic Organisation W)  
  
  
In 1978, the International Conference on Primary Health Care was hosted by the WHO and 
UNICEF in Alma-Ata, the Soviet Union (present-day Kazakhstan). Representatives from all 
member states attended this meeting, and for the first time, health care issues in poor 
countries were critically discussed and related to growth opportunities (World Health 
Organization, 1978).The resulting Alma-Ata Declaration emphasised health as a fundamental 
human right, the role of governments in the universal provision of health care and citizen 
engagement as a base for efficient health care (World Health Organization, 1978).  
The declaration recognised the value of the integration of community-oriented, universal 
primary health care for all countries, and recognised the requisite improvements needed in 
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fiscal, social and political systems at the national level to allow equal access to services and it 
is still a core idea in today’s global health configuration:   
“And recognising that you’ve got to have some system strengthening investments to happen if 
you’re going to be able to respond to epidemics like that when they emerge. Now you’re 
seeing things like the Africa CDC build up its capacity and footprint across the continent be 
able to respond to this. We’ve seen the same thing with the Nigerian CDC. The role of the US 
CDC, as part of the PEPFAR programme has really increased, I would say, over the last 10 
years, which helps to respond to this.” (Non-Profit PPP R)  
Examples of system strengthening investments in the current global health system include the 
African CDC actively building their capacity and footprint across the African continent; the 
role of US CDC as part of the PEPFAR programme has also been more prominent.  
  
5.2 Financial crisis of the 1980s leads to vertical approach push  
Shortly after Alma-Ata’s declaration, the financial crisis at the beginning of the 1980s and 
the need for more donor influence in the aid budgets (particularly for the US donors) led to a 
decrease in healthcare Official Development Assistance (ODA). The ambiguous 
implementing policies, enormous costs and the need for a large skilled workforce to execute 
were criticised for much of the proposed horizontal plan, codified in the Alma-Ata 
Declaration. It introduced vertical methods that centred on medical procedures, such as 
vaccines, to produce more immediate results (Dunavan and Rosenthal, 2017). This 
introduction would address the need for funding and skilled workforce.  
  
One impact of this tension was WHO’s decision to encourage targeted primary treatment, a 
cost-effective strategy known as GOBIs (Growth control, Oral rehydration, Breastfeeding 
and Immunisation) (Wisner, 1988). The intention was to allow a country to accomplish a 
specific and observable target for public health effectively, by implementing such a policy 
with a combination of both horizontal and vertical thinking (an early “diagonal” strategy) 
(Knaul et al., 2015). This concept and strategy of merely allowing, encouraging and assisting 
is linked to the professional logic of assistance which was prevalent in that period of 
financial crisis at the beginning of the 1980s.  
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5.3 Paradigm shift further towards vertical   
In the late 1980s, WHO's “Health for All by the Year 2000” programme (World Health 
Organization, 1985), struggled to catalyse the introduction of essential access through 
universal primary global healthcare.  
This regression caused a significant paradigm shift from horizontal to vertical financing. 
Further funding for vertical health finance saw both success and failure: progress in 
concerted attempts to eliminate smallpox; failure in the 1980s HIV/AIDS outbreak and the 
strong perception that the global response was horribly insufficient. HIV/AIDS would not be 
limited geographically or demographically, as had been shown by previous epidemics 
(Sridhar and Clinton,2017).   
  
5.4 Proliferation of new actors  
But new approaches or major financial sources in the late 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s have not materialised for the fight against HIV/AIDS or the solution to other "vertical" 
problems (Ooms et al., 2008). The World Bank’s ‘World Development Report 1993: 
Investing in health’ (WDR), which centred on Disability-Adjusted Life-Years (DALYs), was 
set out to further raise interest in vertical-compared-horizontal health financing owing to 
specific vertical disease involvement (Reidpath et al., 2003). While the DALY definition has 
been subject to critiques comparable to those that have traditionally been placed on vertical 
schemes, it has recently been included in the public health lexicon (Chen et al., 2015). In the 
transition to the new millennium, existing donors such as the USA and other G7 nations, and 
emerging donors such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF), looked favourably 
and invested heavily in vertical initiatives. This stage can be termed as that of ‘the 
proliferation of actors”. It signified a clear shift towards a professional logic of integration in 
the field.   
 
However, there are also claims that an unbalance in the distribution of power might be 
created due to the enormous amount of funding from one single donor such as the BMGF 
(please see 2.1.6). Huge foundations such as the BMGF might start dictating global health 
priorities and consequently might lead to a lack of needs driven research. This means that 
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diseases that actually need funding might become de-prioritise in favour of diseases that are 
considered to be “sexy” and easier to address:  
  
" The problem for me is the unbalance between the distribution of power…meaning…if you 
have now, like WHO being so dependent on funding from the Gates Foundation,…. I think 
that's when the problem starts to  happen, because these big foundations will start dictating 
what the global health priorities should be…And …because they have the pile of money, what 
would inevitably end up happening is that all of the smaller players and the organisations 
that could be doing research that's very, let's say needs driven, end up changing their focus  
to a more funding driven kind of research, and then they deprioritise patient needs. " 
(NonProfit Research Institution A)  
 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of the United Nations in 2000 also set eight 
targets with a range of basic, often vertical metrics. The raised global health funds are 
targeted primarily at combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB. A 2008 review of the four main 
donors in global health observed that in 2005, financing per death varied significantly by 
disease area, ranging from US $1029.10 for HIV/AIDS to $3.21 for NCDs (Sridhar and 
Clinton,2017). This result indicates that donors do not focus their decision-making decisions 
on morbidity or mortality data alone. The study also found it hard to determine how all those 
funding resources fluctuate vertically versus horizontally in the health sector, since donors 
describe their assistance in a very fragmented way, and this incidentally represents the lack of 
coordination in the network (Clinton, Sridhar and Sridhar, 2017). As an example in countries 
such as Burkina Faso or Uganda, there are a multitude of donors (EU Member State 
representatives, banks, UN agencies) who each fund their own projects. A lack of 
coordination between the different donors, had led to country officials spending precious 
time monitoring and reporting to all the different donor agencies:  
  
"…go to any country in Africa, there are 30 donors, I'd say in Burkina Faso, or in Uganda, 
there's 30 different donors or bank, EU Member States, the UN agencies who each fund the  
multitude of little things in health. And then they have those donor coordination platforms … 
it's just such a mess. And then they spend their time doing monitoring and reporting to all of 
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the different donor agencies. And every three years, the same circus, with new project 
coming in, and donors, not coordinating their approaches.” (Philanthropic Organisation W)   
 
In the late 20th and 21st centuries, new organisations were created, and with it new relational 
networks, representing both the vertical aspirations of member states and the dissatisfaction 
of the WHO leadership. The UN Joint AIDS Initiative, for example, was founded in 1994 as 
the principal proponent of global HIV/AIDS action. It is an organised association that 
integrates together eleven UN organisations that co-sponsor the extended response to HIV / 
AIDS; the aim was to help and improve the response to HIV/AIDS (Knight, Cleves and 
Davies, 2008).  
  
The very first objective audit of UNAIDS outlined three reasons why it was created: firstly, 
the frustration of donors with the management process of the WHO, which included, in part, 
concern that the WHO could not handle the position of collaboration of rival UN HIV/AIDS 
agencies; secondly, the interest of donors in getting more significant influence over the use of 
their donated funds. WHO’s lack of resources has been linked to their deficiencies in 
decision making and management processes (Seckinelgin, 2017). However, WHO is still 
considered by many field professionals to be the main authority on normative guidance:  
  
"WHO, in a way is considered the authority on normative guidance. And their contribution, 
potential contribution, I think is always respected. But their practices are in normative 
guidance at headquarters. They definitely are the authority… at a country level and the input 
that they could potentially provide, I think their skills are strongly recognised, but they're 
often restricted because of their resources." (Independent Consulting Firm K)     
 
Thirdly, the broader drive towards UNAIDS reform has been seen as a way to show the 
capacity of the UN as a whole to work more effectively on a joint work plan, and a shared 
budget between UNAIDS sponsoring agencies (Knight, Cleves and Davies, 2008). 
Researchers have also linked the roots of UNAIDS to WHO’s weaknesses and the lack of 
confidence donors have in WHO's efficiency. These weaknesses and lack of efficiency can be 
attributed to excessive duplication of effort that has in turn led to fragmentation. This 
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fragmentation is due to the lack of communication between the multitude of specific teams 
that deal with diseases, health systems and economics.  
  
"Well, as I say they operate in a very fragmented way. There’s not always coordination 
between country offices or even within the Geneva office. They have disease specific teams, 
health systems specific teams, economic specific teams, these teams I've found in the past 
don't communicate very well with each other. So, there's a lot of duplication of effort. And 
that fragmentation causes huge problems for beneficiaries of WHO assistance, as well as 
international experts that are trying to work out a coherent strategy from one organisation 
where there are many different threads coming out of WHO." (Historic Academic Research 
Institution F)  
  
Probably, at least part of the Global Fund history is also explained by the same logic. As 
already noted, the creation of the GAVI and the Global Fund shows that donors and others 
are strongly committed to vertical approaches that can integrate more funds than horizontal 
approaches by itself (it must be noted that horizontal approaches have been funded by both 
GAVI and the Global Fund; these programmes of health systems strengthening enhances 
their fundamental vertical work) (Sridhar and Tamashiro, 2009). The Global Fund and GAVI 
are the two main examples of the growing public-private partnership models to tackle major 
health challenges. More than two hundred important global health players, including 18 
structured government-private collaborations, with several heavy vertical emphasis were 
listed in a research in 2015 (Sridhar and Clinton, 2017).   
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5.5 Relevance of partnerships in the network of GHIs  
5.5.1 Partnerships within the GHI network  
Beginning at the end of the 20th century, professionals in the GHI field were increasingly 
faced with new relational networks. States, NGOs, wealthy corporations and other non-state 
players have been widely regarded as critical frameworks for solving significant global 
governance challenges.   
  
The first realm of global health to try significant 'experiments' has probably been in this field, 
particularly with regard to infectious diseases (the Global Fund), child vaccines (GAVI) and 
food security (GAIN). These collaborations form the new relational networks. They include 
guidance about how best to solve other health issues, such as NCDs, are also called 
"publicprivate partnerships" (Aerts et al., 2017). 
  
Professionals in these new relational networks of GHIs have, as a main objective, the 
development of a better approach to health issues such as NCDs, and they are sometimes 
referred to as 'Public Private Partnerships' (PPPs) (Buse and Tanaka, 2011). The rise in 
PPPs also provides insight into how conventional organisations, such as the WHO, will have 
to respond to the complexities of the 21st century in order to maintain their legitimacy. This 
could range from adopting practices such as planning for whatever disease or pandemic will 
arise next, to collaborating with emerging countries on improving functional health services 
and implementing health insurance policies (Ruckert and Labonté, 2014).  
  
The scope of these new relational networks with respect to professionals working in global 
health involves multilateral organisations, described as including two or more governments 
(e.g., WHO), bilateral organisations, usually defined as one country providing directly to 
another government (e.g., the UK Department of International Development [DFID]), 
regional agencies (e.g., [PAHO]), financial structures (e.g., the Global Fund) and cooperative 
bodies (e.g.UNAIDS) (Ruckert and Labonté, 2014; Sridhar and Clinton, 2017)  
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5.5.2 Conceptualisation of partnerships in the GHI network  
 There are also combinations that offer funding channels as well as direct programmatic assistance 
(e.g. GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance, formerly the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization). 
PPPs are the newest and potentially the most innovative method of relational network related in the 
field of GHIs (Reich, 2018).  
There's no single definition of what constitutes a PPP. Such a collaboration, generally 
speaking, entails financial and/or in-kind contributions by non-state entities such as 
companies or foundations to develop public programmes (Rushton and Williams, 2011). 
Ideally, the collaborators have mutual goals and a joint integrated approach to attaining 
those priorities. Sonja Bartsch,2016, for example, describes PPPs as output-oriented 
integration between local, national, transnational and foreign players in the public, private 
and NGO sectors. This alludes to a professional logic of integration which represents an 
evolution of the overarching professional logic.  
  
Wolfgang Reinicke and his associates, use the term "Global Public Policy Networks," which 
refers to links developed between the public sector and two other societal fields; business and 
civil society (Nayak, 2019).  
  
These so-called tri sectorial networks integrate highly diverse communities together to 
discuss problems that no industry in itself can overcome. The Gates Foundation refers to 
"Global Health Alliances" rather than PPPs, which are programmes involving two or more 
organisations distinguished by common priorities and decision-making, collaboration or 
resource mix, as well as some mutual responsibility (Harman, 2016). This indicates the 
growing trend of more private sector involvement in global health issues:  
  
"It does seem that the trend is to actually have more private sector involved in in the sort of 
more global health issues which comes with interesting points, both positive and negatives. 
I've always worked more on the third sector, which is not even public or private. So, they 
have the governmental, even inter government being public, then you have …private sector 
profit commercial and they have like the third sector with NGOs and sort of philanthropies." 
(Philanthropic Organisation O)   
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Using Kent Buse and Gill Walt’s (2000) description, it can be perceived that global public-
private partnerships in health are that of joint alliances that cross national borders and 
integrate at least three types of actors, including a business (and/or sector association) and an 
intergovernmental body, in order to accomplish a common purpose based on a mutually 
negotiated division of labour.   
  
Roy Widdus (2001), continues that all relationships must be result-oriented, with 
characteristics of the joint venture, such as mutual interests, mutual risk-taking, shared 
decision-making, commitments from each participant and advantages for each participant 
along with clear control mechanisms to achieve desired outcome. The increasing 
participation of the private sector has paved the way for control mechanisms such as KPIs, 
timelines, and budgets to be implemented in the management of health programmes. The aim 
of these mechanisms is to maximise impact and efficiency:  
  
"It does seem that we are progressing in the direction of more participation of nontraditional 
actors rather than the public ones, so being more efficient, sort of bringing in the practices of 
the private sector is so good, for example, programmes are being managed way more on 
performance indicators, KPIs, timelines, budgets; it’s all looking at maximum impact and 
maximum efficiency." (Philanthropic Organisation O)   
  
Formal control mechanisms, such as KPI’ and timelines symbolise this corporate approach to 
the problems in the global health system. GHIs have thus imported key concepts from other 
settings to incorporate in the global health field. This can be interpreted as an increase in the 
responsibilities for professionals in the field. Furthermore, there might be a degree of 
frustration in some individuals as professionals are now exposed to stricter accountability 
mechanisms.   
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5.5.3 Growth of partnerships in the GHI networks  
Whatever the definition, it is unquestionable that the funding available to support PPPs has 
exploded over the last two decades. As a remarkable example of this increased attractiveness 
of PPPs from 2012 to 2013, USAID increased its PPP investments by almost 40 per cent, 
causing more than $380 million to be leveraged from private sources by USAID-funded 
programmes. The European Union has also issued more and more research proposals co-
financed by the pharmaceutical industry and philanthropy that demand successful candidates 
forge alliances and relationships with clear public objectives for public-private applications 
(Sridhar and Clinton, 2017).   
  
One of the main reasons for PPPs targeting HIV/AIDS (Global Fund) and vaccines (Gavi) 
has been the idea of commercial failures (Pereira, et al., 2020). In the late 1990s, amid the 
shockingly strong demand, vaccine prices remained high. This also referred to antiretrovirals, 
the primary cure of AIDS-causing HIV or human immunodeficiency virus. Anti-retroviral 
costs were between $10,000 and $12,000 per patient a year in 2000. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
less than 50,000 people got the requisite medicines to help them survive and be well, even 
though over two million people died of the epidemic during that year (Sridhar and Clinton, 
2017).  
  
The emergence of the Global Fund would not be the first attempt to change the antiretroviral 
market from a volatile high-price – low-volume to a competitive high-volume – low-price 
(Lee et al., 2016). Indeed, a collaboration formed in 2000 between the United Nations  
Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the WHO, UNAIDS, the World Bank, the United 
Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and five major pharmaceutical firms with HIV/AIDS 
medicines, was formed to make these medications more available for low- and middleincome 
countries (World Health Organization, 2019). By 2001, significant price reductions were 
apparent.  
  
The introduction of the money from the Global Fund to further incentivise price reductions in 
exchange for further drug transactions was key. Public-Private health collaborations now 
operate for a number of reasons including offsetting or mitigating business loss, such as; (1) 
finance, exemplified by the Global Fund to Combat AIDS, TB and malaria; (2) medication 
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distribution and technical assistance, such as Merck's Mectizan Donation Programmefor 
onchocerciasis or river blindness treatment;(3) lobbying, such as the Roll Back Malaria  
Partnership which involves WHO, UNICEF, the United Nations Development  
Programme(UNDP) and the World Bank, and; (4) awareness mobilisation for better action as 
in the UK/GlaxoSmithKline Alliance for Save the Children (Sridhar and Clinton, 2017).  
 
The health care innovation environment (Munoz et al., 2015) involves numerous players 
interested in the production, distribution and technical assistance of medical drugs. This can 
however lead to misalignment of management objectives and practices in the field. For 
instance, GAVI and UNICEF have divergent management and reporting lines. This can lead 
to a lack of coordination and communication:  
  "GAVI oftentimes doesn't work well together and on the ground with UNICEF, it shouldn't 
be the primary, you know, partner because they're working with children. So, because yes, 
again, the management lines are different. The reporting lines are different. So a lot of times 
I've heard from people who work and I've seen that when I was working with MSF in the 
fields, like, you see that they only find out about what the other is doing when they had the 
public reports.” (Non-Profit International Agency A)  
  
In this sense, it is important to point out that the distinguishing characteristics and operational 
nature of the PPP, make them radically different from other R&D-focused organisations in 
the health innovation model.   
Since PPPs operate on a non-profit model, they rely on donor organisations to finance their 
R&D projects and initiatives. Public and philanthropic investors who have acquired 
legitimised identity in this environment, calculate returns on profit from a different 
perspective as opposed to that of pharmaceutical sector owners or venture capitalists in the 
biotechnological R&D paradigm (Moran et al., 2010; Lezaun and Montgomery, 2015; Pereira 
et al.,2020). It is known that philanthropists and public donors do not apply the same leverage 
as entrepreneurs and venture investors and instead are more involved in promoting the 
production of final output-medical goods, produced to satisfy unaddressed health needs 
(Moran and Stevenson, 2014). This different perspective which is a clear focus on the 
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production of final output-medical goods has led to private foundations such as the BMGF to 
invest in different malaria innovations. These include innovations where insecticide bed nets 
are treated with a chemical that prevents mosquitoes from flying. There are also advances 
related to the genetic modifications of mosquitoes which prevent malaria transmission:   
"Gates is working on a number of different malaria innovations, from trying to come up with 
things that are more effective than the current market of insecticide treated bed nets, they 
were investing in some interesting options where the net actually is treated with a chemical 
that doesn't allow the mosquito to fly anymore, they're investing in genetic modification of 
mosquitoes that can try to prevent the transmission of malaria. They've invested a lot in 
water, sanitation, and toilets, honestly, which are really critical." (Non-Profit PPP R) 
Because they are outsourcing and subcontracting R&D, PPPs just have to pay for services to 
scientists participating in scientific operations, and contract research and manufacturing 
companies actively involved in research, clinical trials and fundamental manufacturing 
processes. This strategy helps PPPs to reduce the expense of product design and 
development, and thus legitimises the identity of partners such as contract research 
institutions. In this context, Chataway et al. (2007) suggested that PPPs also serve as 
integrators across a variety of private and public sector organisations, putting them together 
in the framework of the medical product development and distribution process. This 
extensive stakeholder engagement with contract research institutions can be linked to the 
professional logic of integration. Decision making processes in the field are hence now more 
evidence based, transparent and systematic. This relates to the objective of GHIs to deliver 
impactful results with maximum efficiency:  
  
"..essentially, what we do is broadly technical assistance. When governments are setting a 
strategic plan or their priorities moving forward, they tend to have the timeframe, like a five 
year time frame, and in that period, before setting what the goals, what the sort of targets are 
going to be and priorities moving forward there's a set of processes. So there's kind of wide 
literature that's grown around the idea that you need, you know, for effective priority setting 
with decision making, you need to have something that's evidence informed, transparent and 
systematic. And that has, you know, extensive stakeholder engagement, " (Academic 
Research Institution B)  
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Partnerships, like PPPs, in the GHI network also exploit donations in the form of 
contributions in the 'in-kind' model, including pro-bono human capital resources and access 
to patented molecular databases, from private investors in particular major pharmaceutical 
firms (Grace and Britain, 2010).   
In certain cases, considering the value of funding and its availability, PPPs have revived 
dormant or abandoned research produced elsewhere for product development. In other 
words, PPPs concentrate on the practices of production of reprocessed products rather than 
new chemical entities (NCEs) (Pedrique et al. 2013). Professionals working for PPPs have 
also repurposed tools and devices that were initially used for a single disease. Professionals 
now seek to integrate these devices in other programmes, so that they can be used to address 
different diseases as opposed to a specific disease:  
  
" Another example might be integration. So previously, where there could be a device that 
could test for TB and early infant diagnosis for HIV. That was only previously used for TB 
because they were procured by the TB programme. So the increasing push, so to speak for 
devices like that not to be siloed, in one programme, they're going to be expected to work  
also for HIV. And if they can do like, the Kinect machine can also do other diseases, that's 
the kind of device that's going to be more popular because it can meet the needs of multiple 
people with different diseases rather than just one group" (Independent Consulting Firm K)   
  
The two reasons restricting the PPP 's willingness to concentrate on New Chemical Entities 
(NCE) development are: (a) PPPs don't possess financial and technical capacities in-house in 
order to create new NCEs, and thus must maintain their interactions with the funders and 
negotiate field work with their operating partners; (b) new medications must be available to 
those who use them the most and be inexpensive (Ferreira and Andricopulo, 2019). 
Consequently, PPPs are not competitive in terms of producing new products, but in the 
creation of viable and inexpensive products. This might result in PPPs needing to work with 
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independent firms to calculate estimates of the uptake of medical products to be distributed in 
disease-endemic countries:  
"R&D is not an area we work specifically in. But in terms of development, we would be, I 
guess, the closest example might be one UNITAID. If they are trying to bring in a new 
product, we would look at which product that was, what the uptake was, like in countries 
where the donors are subsequently taking that product forward. What we wouldn't do is look 
at specific process of actually developing the product in the first place to end at the point of, 
of trying to get it scaled up and countries to stimulate some demand to then get it scaled up." 
(Economic Health Policy Institution A)   
 
 To conclude this section, it can be said that PPPs are important partnerships in the GHI 
network. As they are non-profit organisations, it can be found that the PPPs are on the one 
hand dependent upon their financiers for financial purposes, and on the other side, dependent 
upon the discovery and manufacturing of new medicines in large and small pharmaceutical, 
diagnostic and life science firms (Pereira et al., 2020). The potential of PPPs to deal with 
these two sets is crucial in designing innovative treatment options for emerging, new 
infectious diseases while preventing disastrous scenarios (Aerts et al., 2017). PPPs are 
increasingly being impacted by private foundations. The increasing trend of a corporate 
approach to global health issues has meant that PPPs in the GHI network need to integrate 
different partners in the field, such as independent consulting firms. These firms play an 
important role and help to provide viable and inexpensive medical products that could be 
used in disease-endemic countries. This alludes to a professional logic of integration:  
  
"So… is an economics and public policy consulting firm, and which we have a global health 
practice, the global health practice does a variety of work across a number of areas, which if 
you want specific details, you can have a look at our brochure on our website. But we do 
work for a number of organisations, which I think it's I would say, the majority of my work 
would be the organisation which are impacted by private foundations such as the Global 
Fund and GAVI and WHO and others who receive funding from them. And then some of our 
work is also directly contracted to some private foundations” (Independent Consulting Firm 
K)   
  99  
  
The growth of partnerships to now include Independent Consulting firms is a clear indication 
of the collaboration that takes place in the global health system through the GHI networks.  
The increasing role of private foundations in the network is clearly evident.  
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CHAPTER 6. Findings and analysis: Phases of the logic evolution process   
 6.1 Introduction  
The phases of change studied in this thesis, as illustrated above, extends approximately 40 
years, from the early controversy at the end of the 1980s to the new trends in the late 2010s. 
Several players in this time frame championed new concepts and connected them to existing 
trends in other areas building momentum for the transition. A variety of players were 
involved in the transition process; however, the non-state actors were the most prominent 
proliferation agents. As detailed in the previous section, at key points in the transition journey 
these non-state actors played a prominent role.  
  
Working out field-level logics is a more detailed mechanism at analysing institutional 
change. It is invested with formulating new (professional) identity and promulgating a 
(professional) legitimacy. These lead to the legitimising of identities across organisational 
processes and associating them with unique practices (please see Figure 10 on p.82). By 
legitimising the identity of the professional in the field, the proliferation agents wanted to 
frame the concept of improvement in health, socialise it with professionals and incorporate it 
into an existing structure (i.e. the overarching professional logic in Global Health Initiatives), 
thereby evolving the logic. This shifted the relationships of all those that enact the philosophy 
of working in the field.  
 
Throughout the process detailed above, the evolution of professional logic occurred. 
Commercial failures led to the proliferation of actors among which non-state actors played a 
prominent role. The non-state actors facilitated the legitimisation of the identity of the 
professional in the GHI field. The change process produced new control mechanisms and 
relational networks which empowered non-state donors to behave in a certain manner. The 
change process validated non-state donor activities and developed new models. These new 
models were based on a more corporate approach to global health issues.  
  
6.2 Triggers of metamorphosis  
The analysis will begin by looking at the factors that triggered the metamorphosis of the field 
of GHI. Before the advent of the new GHIs, centred on integration of Public-Private, the 
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professionals working for the health initiatives structured their practices around a 
professional logic of assistance. The proliferation of non-state donors, based on collaboration, 
gradually changed such a logic of assistance. The professional logic of assistance was not 
abandoned, but it could be termed as having evolved into a professional logic of integration.  
6.2.1 Drug provision failure leading to shift in mandates  
The initial trigger was related to commercial failures in the field of medical products for 
neglected diseases. These failures in the field of neglected diseases started from the fact that 
there were no clear details on the overall magnitude of the pharmaceutical companies' R&D 
spending in medical products. Although R&D expenses have soared over the previous two 
decades, pharmaceutical companies' sales have grown six times faster, with net after-tax 
income significantly higher than income for all other Fortune 500 firms (Light, Lexchin and 
Darrow, 2013). At the same time, in the pharmaceutical companies, the average pace of 
technological development has dropped. After the 1990s, the amount of overall licensed 
medicines has declined, although many are “me too” medicinal products and are no major 
new chemical (or molecular) entities. This void in terms of technological development of 
medicinal products for neglected diseases, culminated in the proliferation of non-state entities 
in the GHI field bringing with them new relational networks and control mechanisms that 
professionals in the field had to contend with. The professional logic of assistance evolved 
towards a professional logic of integration, leading eventually to a change in the mandate for 
previously dominant actors such as the WHO and the UN:  
  
“So say I think the UN does have a role to play, not in everything. But I think in particular, 
for WHO which is a technical body, if they keep their policymaking technical body and if they 
kind of don't go into I know for instance, they are sometimes involved in emergency 
sometimes not, you know, that they're not the best donors, I think, and their administrative 
processes are a really difficult I worked for them for a while and they you know, it's a 
nightmare, but I think if they can, if they can get their admin under control, and if they can 
become a little bit more, you know, agile and then stick to their mandate, you know, be the 
policy, the technical kind of go to organisation. Then I think they have a great future.” 
(Nonprofit PPP, M)  
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As can be seen in Figure 10 (see p.82), drug provision failure is an important reason when 
considering the triggers of change in the global health system. As detailed by the informant, 
this has impacted the WHO in a significant manner. The one-time leader is now required to 
become more agile, and engage in a review of its administrative process, if it wants to stay 
relevant.  
  
6.2.2 Limited funding sources/investment incentives  
Another key trigger of this metamorphosis was the limited amount of funding sources. For 
the prevention, control and removal of disease, new medical products are important. In 
contrast with the health consequences of these diseases, the level of investment in new 
medicinal products that tackle neglected diseases is insignificant. The disparity is obvious if 
we look at the amount of research and development output, firstly, as compared with global 
R&D spending towards all diseases and the health impact of neglected diseases and, 
secondly, as opposed to other diseases, the number of new medicines for neglected diseases. 
This failure of provision was attributed to the lack of resources for the WHO. This meant that 
they had limitations with regards to financing, recruitment of a skilled workforce and 
lobbying activities:  
  
“So, I think everyone says, all we’d love to have WHO chose and put on X y and z or it might 
be invited to meetings, etc. But in reality, they’re just not able to contribute as much as they 
potentially are skilled to do, because they don’t have the resources for salaries, etc, to do it. 
And, and I think the main, the main challenges is funding.” (Independent Consulting Firm K)     
  
“Obviously WHO does continue with its struggles when it comes to being too big to actually 
manage, trying to be everywhere and nowhere at the same time. I think it still has problems, 
but it will, I think take time to get to a place where it needs to be..” (Philanthropic 
Organisation O).   
A report found that global investment in research into neglected diseases in 2010  
(approximately US$ 2.4 billion) was just one per cent (US$ 240 billion) of overall health 
R&D expenditure (Røttingen et al., 2013). Neglected diseases funding has risen marginally 
from the estimated 2.8 billion US dollars of 2005 (Global Forum for Health Research 2008) 
to the 3.045 million US dollars of 2011 (Schäferhoff et al., 2019). The main funding sources 
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are public donors, totalling US$ 1.9 billion in 2011, and philanthropic donors, totaling US$ 
525.1 million in 2011 (Schäferhoff et al., 2019). Due to the reticence and/or lack of funding 
of pharmaceutical companies and universities to fund neglected diseases, private foundations 
such as the BMGF have gained prominence:  
“…. Pharmaceutical companies or universities wouldn’t really necessarily have money to 
fund for example, I trained at Oxford and my Vaccine Institute was a kind gift from the Gates 
Foundation.” (Philanthropic Organisation U)    
Companies are typically investing in R&D and expecting to raise profits from the sales of 
new medical products. They fund R&D through their own capital (profits) and through public 
funding mechanisms, such as tax cuts and grants. However, companies usually spend less 
than the R&D amount which is socially optimum. The reasons are high risk and cost, R&D 
funding problems, and the proportional reimbursement of R&D returns (Nelson, 1959, 2009).   
  
Another trigger of change is related to the fact that private sector actors in the new GHI field 
will wait for the price of a drug to become set, and that provides them with an incentive to 
invest. Non-state actors step-in to privatise incomplete publicly funded research, and take it 
to the later stage such as clinical trials and diagnostics. These non-state entities will then 
retain all the profit, from the sale of the drugs, or in some cases, diagnostics:  
“… So one, you’ve got significant public and philanthropic funding which goes into medical 
research, often not really fully recognised, and whenever the price of a drug become set, 
because what often happens is you have the private sector steps in and essentially privatises 
the publicly funded research, takes it through later stage clinical trials and then essentially 
retains all of the benefit of the of the drug from the sales of the medicine or the diagnostic or 
whatever.” (Public Global Health Agency R)  
Henceforth this key trigger of limited funding needs to be highlighted. It helps to explain and 
understand how non-state donors found a gap to step in the global health sphere. Over time, 
the influence of non-state donors has grown and they have played an important role in the 
logic evolution process (please see Figure 10 on p.82).   
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6.2.3 Power vacuum  
A vacuum was created in terms of the development for new medical products for neglected 
diseases. In contrast with other diseases, the low number of new medical products for 
neglected diseases shows the significant void in the area of research. A major analysis has 
shown that in the period 1975–99, there were 1,393 new medicines accessible to the public 
(with the exception of vaccines). Neglected diseases (Troullier et al. 2002) however, have 
received just 16.  
A recent study found that of the 850 effective treatment products recorded for 2000-2011, 
only 37 (4 per cent) for neglected illnesses were mentioned, including 25 new indicated 
products or formulas, and eight vaccines or biologic products (the NCEs and the new indices, 
the new formulations and the combinations of fixed-dose products and the use of vaccines 
and biologicals).   
 
This vacuum was one of the key triggers for the proliferation of non-state donors in the GHI 
field; the entrance of GAVI has enabled low income countries to have access to vaccines and 
medication at affordable prices. Due to these new relational networks, professionals working 
in the field have had a significant impact on the provision of vaccines in low income 
countries: "But, you know, like, the malaria vaccines, for example, would have never taken 
ground if the new resources were not there. The level of vaccines even if you think about 
GAVI, prior to GAVI entrance, most of the low-income countries didn't really have access to 
or never would even have thought about having vaccines like PCV, which are quite 
expensive. But now you do have a lot of countries that haven't been able to introduce and 
scale up PCV vaccines, same thing with HPV. So on the whole it is really did have a very 
good impact on the world of development of helping these low income countries." (Non-
Profit PPP J)    
  
It has also been pointed out that there is a level of acceptance from private foundations that 
there will be failures in the space of health innovations. It is known that private foundations 
do not apply the same leverage as entrepreneurs and venture investors, and instead are more 
involved in the ideology promoting the success of the production of final output-medical 
goods:  
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" And sometimes investing in innovation means failure, and so that you can learn, and I think 
foundations have done a really good job in filling that space and investing in innovations 
that, when working can then be funded by agencies like the Global Fund." (Non-Profit 
Agency R)  
 
However, there are some concerns that have been raised. Low income countries can become 
too dependent on donors for the provision of medical products. The proliferation of multiple 
donors has created many parallel structures that face possible collapse when countries move 
from low income status to middle income status. In such cases, low income countries will no 
longer be eligible for funds from donors. The resulting impact is that there will be nothing in 
place to sustain the provision of health services in those low to middle income countries. As 
such, these new relational networks do have certain disadvantages:   
 
 "And if you look at programmes from the global fund that have been disease specific. It has 
worked from a humanitarian perspective, but from a development sustainability perspective, 
it's a disaster. They've created parallel structures in a lot of countries. It's donors that are 
funding the provision of drugs. And once a country graduates from its low-income country 
status, and becomes middle-income countries no longer eligible for international funds, and 
then there is nothing in place to sustain the provision of health services." (Philanthropic 
Organisation W)   
  
Other concerns have been raised relating to the disproportionate influence held by the BMGF 
in this global health setting:  
" I think there's a real danger. And I think this stems from the way that WHO has been funded 
over the last kind of, you know, 10 or 15 years, where they have lots of country governments 
basically Member States haven't been funding if. And they have been ring fencing their 
contributions to specific projects that they have particularly interest in. You know, , in part 
creates the power vacuum,  but given the power vacuum, that allows entities like the Gates 
Foundation to step in and have a disproportionate influence over the organisation.." (Public 
Global Health Agency R)  
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The huge amount of resources poured by the BMGF into the GHI field has made the BMGF 
an important and influential player in this sphere. They have seized the opportunity to fill this 
power vacuum by investing considerably in health innovation technologies. As such, the 
power vacuum in global health is a key sub-factor in the triggers of metamorphosis (please 
see Figure 10 on p.82).  
6.2.4 Creating alliances to acquire legitimacy at the global level  
Another factor that triggered this emergence of the GHI field was the creation of alliances on 
the global level. This can be deemed as a quest to acquire legitimacy on the global stage.   
The developments in the GHI field are exemplified through this growing group of self-
governing, non-governmental private sector organisations. Partnerships in the production of 
medical products (PPPs) have created numerous new treatments and therapies in the form of 
redesigned or reconfigured variants of approved medications, vaccines and biologics. They 
have developed major R&D programmes, including new chemical entities (NCEs), and many 
new vaccines and drug candidates are in the pipeline. Many PPPs are not engaged with in-
house R&D but work through external cooperation.  
  
In order to implement R&D initiatives, PPPs raise funds from philanthropic and government 
agencies, and create alliances with various public and private organisations (including 
academia and public research institutes, pharmaceutical companies, biotechnologies, and 
other private for-profit businesses such as contract research organisations). This inclusiveness 
of PPPs to external R&D may seem to represent a similar pattern in the drug and 
biotechnology industry (Juliano, 2013). However, PPPs still maintain a strong association to 
their non-profit role in promoting research and development collaboration. This creation of 
alliances has paved the way for professionals to operate through the new relational networks 
and has thus contributed towards the engagement of new practices. Initially the field was 
organised around a professional logic of assistance centred around the WHO. Following the 
proliferation of non-state actors, the logic evolved towards a professional logic of integration, 
which was centred around alliances and partnerships. Global  
Fund and GAVI, for instance, don’t have a presence in disease-endemic countries. As such, 
they work through alliance members. A key drawback of this absence of country offices for 
Global Fund and GAVI is that both organisations seem to lack a unified vision in terms of 
  107  
their practices. Global Fund and GAVI are accountable to a multitude of donors. In 
comparison, PEPFAR’s programming is driven by Washington D.C:  
   
"So the Global Fund, I think it's very similar from GAVI, they don't have a presence for the 
presence in the country, they work through Alliance members. So you know, their 
programmes were a lot less unified. And the vision was a lot less clear on the ground than  
PEPFAR'S. PEPFAR’s programming, which was very, centred on, you know Washington DC 
wanted to get out of those programmes, and it was very unified across the board through all 
the countries…Because they also had a presence in country, their partners, also have, you 
know, are very connected with the country offices in country, whereas the Global Fund didn't 
have that level of detail in there." (US Government Agency J)  
  
The creation of alliances must also be considered as an important sub-factor in the triggers of 
metamorphosis. They have thus been included in Figure 10 (see p.82) as they pertain to 
alliances. Alliance creation is vital in the process of collaboration in the GHI network and in 
the subfield of PPPs. Figure 10 (see p.82) is a logic diagram which depicts the outcome of the 
analysis from Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
  
6.3 Reconstitution of sources of legitimacy and identity  
The evolution of logic continued with a reconstruction of the sources through which the 
professionals’’ identity are legitimised in the field. They had the ability to connect the 
existing feelings into a new framework and the ability to create something different in line 
with the evolving needs. There was a constant drive to legitimise the identity of the 
professionals in the GHI field.  
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6.3.1 Legitimising identity through success stories  
The gathering of data is seen as a key source for legitimising the identity of the professionals 
in the field. Data metrics has allowed, for instance, the board of major PPPs such as the 
Global Fund to set the criteria (Lee, et al., 2016) for deciding which countries are eligible to 
qualify for funding under the Global Fund. Validity is primarily calculated by an income 
level matrix (data taken from the World Bank), and high disease prevalence (data derived 
from WHO and UNAIDS) (Sridhar and Clinton, 2017).   
  
Low-income countries are entitled to apply for all sorts of grants from the Global Fund. 
These grants cover: HIV/AIDS, TB, malaria and improvement of the health systems. The 
eligibility of middle-income countries is calculated by their total HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria 
burden on the disease. Additionally, countries with elevated disease burdens in vulnerable 
communities are entitled to apply for Global Fund grants in those regions, even though they 
have lower disease burdens in the general population; for example, to treat elevated HIV/ 
AIDS rates among sex workers (Sridhar and Clinton, 2017).  
 
Sridhar and Clinton (2017), go on to specify that the estimated funding for each disease is 
assigned to each qualifying region, depending on income levels, the incidence of disease, and 
whether the rate of infection is projected to rise or decrease among other factors.   
  
125 countries are entitled for or presently accept donations from the Global Fund as of 2015, 
and the latter includes qualifying countries with Global Fund recipients and NGOs also 
receive funds under specific transitional arrangements (Sridhar and Clinton, 2017). GAVI 
explicitly provides grants on the basis of national income to the State Governments.  
  
Again, by 2015, GAVI applicants were entitled to demand GAVI funding in countries with 
Gross National Incomes (GNI) per capita of less than $1,580. This shows a clear upward 
trend, since GAVI applications had a GNI limit of $1,000 before 2010. Historically, the 
additional vector disease risk or penetration rate of vaccination to assess eligibility have not 
been complementary (or complicating from the national perspective).   
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According to the report by Sridhar and Clinton (2017), the Board agreed that the current 
DPT3 funding should only be provided for countries with at least 70 per cent DPT3 coverage, 
as defined by WHO/UNICEF, though GAVI has for some countries waived this requirement. 
No such limits were set by GAVI in the countries that are pursuing inactive poliovirus, 
meningitis A, yellow fever, HPV, rotavirus, Japanese encephalitis, or vaccine protection for 
measles-rubella. As of 2015, 52 countries already have the right to apply for at least one form 
of Gavi support. The current organisations are collaborating on a range of issues with nearly 
every nation worldwide, while the World Bank is engaged in a projects-by-project basis, with 
countries that follow the various IBRD and IDA income and credit requirements respectively.  
  
All these data gathering processes are important sources for legitimising the identity of the 
global health professionals working for Global Health Initiatives. This also demonstrates that 
attempts were taken to homogenise the processes, thus increasing the fields and the 
organisations’ own credibility. Finally, the incorporation of R&D-related practices 
culminated in the establishment of an appropriate subfield, the PPP subfield, which has 
allowed for improvements to be made in the field of medical products for neglected diseases. 
Consequently, the use of data is of importance. It allows the legitimising of the identities of 
the professionals (see conceptualisation of professional in 2.1.3) in the field:  
  
"So a lot of them have data managers in the fields and they outsource Data Manager. So we 
have sometimes a lot of good quality data because again, data for them is very important, 
because they want to use this data for you know, communicating and for, you know the PR 
purposes, so they need to have the data " (Non-Profit International Agency A)  
  
As detailed above, the BMGF is a major non-state donor of a Global Fund. This 
legitimisation of the identity of professionals working for the Global Fund allowed big 
private foundations, such as the BMGF, to further proliferate their own legitimacy and 
identity in the field. Since the real return on investment for the BMGF is really publication 
and theorisation, the gathering of data and its implementation as detailed above is an 
important source of legitimacy and identity:  
  
  110  
"You know, people do different things differently. The Gates foundation, part of it’s return on 
investment You know, it's really publications. So where people will say my return on 
investment is going to be x percentage of your profits? The Gates foundation doesn't do that. 
You know, even though they have some kind of strategic investments. Where, you know, is 
more or less like for profit? Oftentimes, your return on investment is really publication. So 
that people will know, you know, the benefits of that research, you know, and is publicly 
available." (Non-profit Organisation U)       
  
The use of success stories to legitimise identity of the professional in the field, is the first sub-
factor pertaining to the reconstitution of sources of legitimacy and identity. New sources of 
legitimacy, and identity are key characteristics in the institutional logic discussed in this 
thesis. They are thus present in all the logic diagrams (please see Figures 9,10 and 11). These 
logic diagrams have been integral in the construction of analysis and theory in this thesis.  
6.3.2 Strategic communication with the field to inseminate new practices  
To further consolidate the identity legitimisation process of the professionals operating in the  
GHI networks, the aspect of communication has been found to be a crucial source of validity.  
  
Support for PPPs in the long term is not guaranteed. PPPs are extremely vulnerable to 
funding volatility, particularly in the event of economic recessions that impact both 
governments and funders. Taking into account the economic downturn since 2008, public and 
donor funding to partnerships in the GHI network is estimated to have dropped by US$ 128.7 
million (Policy Cures, 2012). Considering the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, GHIs must 
spend significant resources in marketing and in strategic communication. This strategic 
communication is important, as it enhances the reputational perspective of the professionals 
in the field. Furthermore, successful communication of positive outcomes of research can 
lead to policy and practice change. The ultimate objective would be to create more 
engagement from the general public. This would further consolidate the process of 
legitimising the identity of the professionals in the GHI network:  
  
"… one of the big priorities we have is to make sure that we communicate that research 
properly, the things that we're funding, the outcomes of research, so that not only that is used 
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to change policy and practice, but actually it's engaging the person who is just passing by the 
street…So I think it's really, really important not only from a reputational perspective, but 
also to break down our mission and vision into things that people actually find useful and 
things that are actually going to benefit their lives. So it's extremely important. A lot of the 
companies I know and other foundations do that sort of model….I think it's extremely 
important, especially in the 21st century."(Philanthropic Organisation O)   
  
The proliferation agents in the field worked at legitimising the new identity among those who 
work in the GHI field. The development of partnerships by integrating services offered by 
field collaborators has established a new professional identity. This has altered the definition 
of professionals (please see 2.1.3) in the GHI field. The reputation of professionals was no 
longer affiliated with "being second-order experts", who offered support or merely 
references. This process of legitimising the new identity was propagated through the use of 
strategic communication. This was key in detailing the different successes that have 
happened due to the creation of these new GHIs:  
   
"they need to definitely make a lot of noise about what they're doing. Because, one, it's 
amazing. And secondly, is inspiring. Thirdly, it's so impactful. You know, it's going to really 
show which shows a totally different engagement with people and these issues. And if they 
don't talk about it, somebody else will talk about it in a very negative way." (Pharmaceutical 
Company Q)   
  
The portfolios of PPPs, in R&D, are mainly in the initial stages (development and initial 
clinical phases), with significant exceptions. As initiatives move toward larger clinical trials 
along with overall funding requirements, the expenses rise dramatically. To raise new 
investment, they need to undertake publicity and lobbying activities. As explained in 8.3.4, 
the use of data to publish allows PPPs to share their success stories, and hence is key to 
legitimise identity. The sources of legitimising identity are further expanded by the use of 
publicity and lobbying to attract new investment. The Global Fund replenishment cycle takes 
place every three years. In the year of replenishment, the push towards recording and 
releasing results to the field is described as being “paramount”. This allows initiatives, such 
as the Global Fund to strengthen their legitimacy and identity in the field:  
  112  
"It's paramount. And it's the reason that we release our results report every year. And that is 
driven primarily by the evidence from our investments and not and we've moved well beyond 
sort of output, and outcome-based results recording, and really now moving much more 
solidly into reductions in mortality and impacts level for recording of results. In fact, we are 
releasing our next results report in, I think, next month, if I'm not mistaken. And we go 
through our replenishment cycle, which is when our donors replenish our funding for the 
next three-year period, is this year. And so, in the year of a replenishment conference, there's 
always a bigger push than in the off years in terms of recording of results." (Non Profit PPP 
R)   
  
Estimates of the total necessary funds for completion may not be appropriate. Certain PPPs 
are still battling to obtain the projected funding needed for their Phase III projects (as is the 
case with DNDI estimates) (Tuttle, 2016). In addition to lobbying for increased resources, 
certain PPPs have also been experimenting with new methods to acquire funding. Placing 
success at the centre of their communication is a crucial aspect when analysing the source for 
legitimacy and identity for the professional in the GHI field:  
"Our strategy in the past, in at least in the past four or five years has been placing the 
countries that we're investing in and their successes at the centre of our communications 
about our results." (Non-Profit Agency R)  
The sub-factor of strategic communication and sharing of success stories is thus very relevant 
in the field. It aids in enhancing the reputation of the GHIs in the global health system. 
Additionally, strategic communication seeks to engage more public involvement in issues 
pertaining to global health. Furthermore, sharing of success stories via strategic 
communication, strengthens the legitimacy of GHIs in the eyes of major donors and key 
opinion leaders.   
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6.3.3 Legitimising identity through positioning strategy  
Legitimacy may be defined either as a mechanism, as inclusivity and transparency (input 
legitimacy), or as effects, such as life and money-saving benefit (output legitimacy) (Mena 
and Palazzo, 2012). Some say that there is an intrinsic compromise between the validity of 
input and output, but it is yet to be extensively studied (Atalay, 2018). I do not agree that 
organisations can not adhere to all levels of credibility, and as such they should be kept 
accountable to them.  
  
Critics contend in terms of input legitimacy that GHIs grant corporate companies a seat at the 
table — such as in the Global Fund's Board to Combat HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 
and GAVI — resulting in goals that are more geared to their needs than that of governments 
and their people. The methodological problem in this analysis is whether it is possible to 
distinguish between GHI challenges and any other focused initiative (public, private or 
general), and challenges general to all externally supported initiatives in developed countries. 
In such cases, are there special features of GHIs? It is impossible to predict. Civil society 
organisations, for instance, have denounced entities such as, the US Presidential Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Assistance (PEPFAR), and the multilateral World Bank, for being dominated 
by corporate interests. This positioning strategy by the non-state entities can be seen as a key 
component in the process of reconstructing the legitimisation of the professional’s identity in 
the field.  
  
The requirements of the emerging professional identity have been legitimised by the updated 
standards that outline the competencies required (including their duties and responsibilities). 
Proliferation agents, such as the BMGF, succeeded at socialising professionals in the GHI 
field to this new culture, by planning and improving the various services steadily. This 
positioning strategy is key for non-state donors such as the BMGF:  
 
"For example, Gates being one of them, who come from, you know, corporate experience, 
which is about fundamentally driven by developing clear strategies, tackling specific issues. 
And, essentially that thinking brought into the private foundation as well they tend to use that 
kind of positioning strategy thinking where you know, they position themselves and address 
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certain issues. So Clinton Foundation, for example, is largely around vaccinations”. 
(Nonprofit Organisation V)   
  
Through their positioning and aligning with independent university offices and the formation 
of professional societies and the legal acceptance of new practices in the field of medical 
products for neglected disease, the BMGF have uncovered a potent source to legitimise the 
identity of the professionals. Using these sources, they intended to raise the social standing 
and reputation of the professionals in the field and motivate them to engage in more 
practices:  
  
"But there is a constant fight to increase the legitimacy and increase the voice of the private 
sector within all of those multilateral organisations. And yet, that's, in the governance 
architecture of the Global Fund. It's also across GAVI and the other kind of global health 
multinationals." (Public Global Health Agency R)  
Through the emergence of these GHIs, the voice of the private sector is thus getting louder in 
the global health system. GHIs can be interpreted to be an instrument that drives and 
strengthens the legitimisation of the identity of prominent non-state donors in the field. GHIs 
are reliant on funds from major non-state donors such as BMGF, and thus these GHIs might 
be quite malleable to the needs of these non-state donors.  
 
6.4 Reconstitution of relational networks  
Another important aspect of the logic evolution process is the formation of relational 
networks and control mechanisms to comply with the newly introduced sources of 
legitimising identity which have been detailed above. In this section of the analysis, the focus 
will be on how the professionals in the field have evolved as a result of new relational 
networks.  
  115  
6.4.1 Tangible differentiation, between old and new networks  
The big distinction between the "old," and "new," is the change in the paradigm of 
governance and engagement from state-centric to multi-stakeholder involvement. Both the 
Global Fund and GAVI have gained their credibility by enhancing very real health results 
and outcomes (output validity) as mentioned earlier. The first is a move towards more 
flexible financing and away from central or long-term dedicated investment. Secondly, there 
is a movement towards multi-stakeholder governance, and away from conventional 
leadership and policy-making centres (Patel, Cummings and Roberts, 2015; Kostyak, et al., 
2017)  
Through legally formalising the new concepts in health initiatives, State-centric bodies 
allowed the improvements in the GHI field to crystallise. In this revised framework, 
proliferation agents and technical associations have been able to recognise barriers to a 
smooth production and solid growth with regards to medical product improvement.  
Therefore, they have earned the confidence of key opinion leaders and have been able to 
work proactively to guide and remove these barriers to production and growth.  
  
The process has contributed to significant structural shifts in the area of health initiatives 
through the reform of control mechanisms and the creation of new relational networks. The 
concept of having specific donor blocks and implementing blocks present on the board of 
GHIs, provides insight into how this new model -of partnership based relational network- 
impacts the professionals in the field:  
"So, well the way our board structure works, we are a partnership model... So our’s has a 
donor block and an implementing block. And the donor block is made up of most of the donor 
countries…. NGO has a board seat, the private sector has a board seat, and private 
foundations have a board seat. And then there's an implementing block, and they are equal 
voting blocks in the implementing block is made up of the primarily recipient countries... So 
that's sort of the partnership model. WHO, UNAIDS, Rollback Malaria, Stop TB, each of the 
multilateral global partnerships also have non-voting board seats on our board." (Non-Profit 
Agency R)   
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The issues of accountability have thus been raised, with measures put in place to regulate the 
actions and policies implemented by actors such as the BMGF who have a private seat on the 
board of GHIs (Martin Hilber, et al., 2020). GHIs, like the Global Fund and the GAVI 
Alliance are widely recognised as the most popular forms of these multilateral agreements 
that have replaced the vertical collaboration that existed between the WHO and the member 
states. Their participation has been lauded with their strategies on health policy, as they have 
helped to provide a solution to problems related to financing, development of new drugs and 
chemical entities in the battle against infectious diseases. However, a concern arising from 
these new relational networks are that despite the plaudits, there have been calls for more 
clarity in terms of transparency and accountability for these international public-private 
organisations (Yamey, Sridhar and Abbasi, 2018; Barnes, Brown and Harman, 2016). These 
calls for more transparency and accountability, are specifically applicable to foundations such 
as the BMGF. The level of influence that the BMGF has on traditional organisations, such as 
the WHO, has surprised professionals in the field:  
  
“ So the largest donors are DFID, followed by the Gates Foundation. So, DFID being a 
traditional donor. And the Gates Foundation being a non-traditional donor. So, it's kind of a, 
it's got a very diverse set of funding and models. So yeah, and in terms of those, and then, in 
terms of implementing partners, you have like, the WHO, and, and other extended partners?” 
(Non-Profit PPP J)   
  
"And I think one thing to share is even at a department level, I have been surprised that the 
high degree that is financed by institutions such as Gates, which and often that the whatever 
it's been financed, has been earmarked. And what I don't know is the extent to which Gates 
funds what WHO wants to be funded anyway, or whether it has to be some sort of bending to 
make it fit with what Gates is willing to fund. But I think that is a real challenge for WHO 
just being quite hamstrung by the funding sources as to what they can focus on." 
(Independent Consulting Firm K)   
  
The reconstitution of the relational networks in the field has had a significant impact on 
traditional organisations such as the WHO. Questions are being raised about the level of 
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influence that, major donors such as BMGF has on WHO. This raises important issues, since 
WHO is still considered the main body for normative guidance in the field of global health.  
  
6.4.2 Visible successes through new networks  
One of the major successes for the professionals operating in the new relational networks is 
the increased involvement of major pharmaceutical firms, but also of other industries which 
would have been deemed to be out of reach for those early health initiatives.  
Indeed, in order to increase growth and sales opportunities, major pharmaceutical firms are 
gradually providing R&D portfolios with in-licensing external R&D ventures and mergers 
and acquisitions (Schuhmacher, 2015). The common objective of PPPs, by contrast, is to 
develop R&D portfolios that meet unfulfilled health requirements. This implies that the 
overall product must be available to the community and be reasonably priced. Collaborators 
in research and development activities led by the PPP must therefore work within the PPP 
mandate. This 'partnership' and relational networking view assumes a shared sense of 
purpose by jointly providing complementary tools, expertise and mutual risk sharing 
(Nwaka and Ridley, 2003; Aerts et al., 2017). New relational networks had fostered this 
partnership view and approach. This has engaged the pharmaceutical industry but also 
aligned others; even extending to the music industry with the participation of the MTV’s 
Staying Alive Foundation:  
  
   "They have a foundation based in London, Staying Alive Foundation And what they 
actually do is, what is their video production and stars and all this kind of stuff, to go out into 
Africa to go to Nigeria and African countries and they created a soap opera called MTV 
Sugar. They had this all like local actors, all local production, facilities, everything. It's like a 
soap opera setting a high school lived experience, you know, girls, boys in a whatever. It's 
like, the drama element though, that's the basic. Their core was really clever about it. The 
entire foundation is aimed at stopping mother to child HIV transmission. Right. So they put 
into this script healthcare messaging that they develop on site in the country's.." (Non-Profit 
organisation Q)  
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There have thus been some important visible successes through the reconstitution of 
relational networks. In the old GHI networks, it would have been less feasible to envisage the 
engagement of the music industry in global health.  
  
6.4.3 Legitimising identity through risk control mechanisms  
The criteria for risk control in PPPs are identical to those for pharmaceutical companies. This 
aims to legitimise the identity of the professionals operating in these new relational networks.   
The ultimate performance metric for pushing the R&D portfolio forward is the amount of 
project permits satisfying the target product template, with few project dismissals. PPPs focus 
on turnover levels and pre-established schedules and milestones. The success of a PPP is 
assessed based on the original strategy, by project management; this is the same method as 
applied in a pharmaceutical or biotechnology business. In fact, PPPs followed ‘private sector’ 
administrative strategies in the work. Even though, PPPs are not for profit they still aim to 
work efficiently to minimise cost. This enables them to provide high volume-low price 
medical products to disease-endemic countries. Funders/financial backers often track PPP 
performance, and can include cost-effectiveness and public health impact assessments, 
however donor criteria are not always aligned, and indeed neither are the mechanisms or 
metrics between PPPs always harmonised.  
  
In general, this step of risk control facilitated the decentralisation of duties from the donors to 
the key PPPs, and these then transitions from the PPPs to their collaborators in the field. 
Collaborators will be liable and accountable for their actions and, to some degree, for their 
management, depending on the form of company in which they operate. This is illustrated by 
the elaborate procedures which must be followed by recipients when seeking to access funds 
from prominent donors in the field:  
  
“And this is this is so pervasive, for example, but you know, a lot of these recipients of 
funding, whether it's universities or charities that will have processes in place in house, how 
to make sure that maintain that relationship with its donors….same goes for universities, I 
mentioned to you about lots of interesting earlier, I had some engagement with Oxford 
university last year, and some of the things you know, they, there was a group of people who 
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run it to approach the Gates through the university’s existing channels, and those people who 
maintain the relationship with Gates, in that they were really receiving funding, they said,  
No, no, no, you know, there's a whole process around how it works.” (Historic Academic 
Institution V)  
  
The non-state actors, in particular private foundations, have insisted on the reconstitution of 
control mechanisms in the new relational networks. The aim is to legitimise the identity of 
the professionals working for the GHIs in the new relational networks. Additionally, it also 
legitimises the identity of the non-state actor. This tackling of global health problems using a 
corporate approach, has for aim to enhance the reputation of the new relational network in the 
eyes of key opinion leaders in the field.  
  
6.4.4 Legitimising the transition  
 There has been a clear rise-in a field where the multilateral mechanism (and Member  
Governments) had less funding- of new private philanthropic organisations such as the 
BMGF. Including the creation of GAVI following a $750 million grant to help close the so-
called vaccine gap, the Gates Foundation has greatly invested in PPPs. Furthermore, one 
reason for PPPs insistence on success metrics, productivity and innovations, was the shift to 
implementing more corporate approaches in public health.  
  
The WHO has more effectively contributed to the discussion on the creation of a private-
centred field of medical products for neglected diseases. Although state-centric bodies 
existed in the initial phases of health initiatives, their function and prominence in the process 
were markedly different.  
  
In the current relational network, key proliferation agents such as the BMGF, searched in 
differing ways for the engagement of other players, and in so doing ushered the birth of these 
newly-formulated approaches. They sought to gain political support at the macro as well as 
the local level, by partnering with the technical associations to persuade governments, banks 
and the WHO to drive change in a specific direction. This can be interpreted as a way of 
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legitimising this transition. This strengthened the process of legitimising the identity of the 
professionals working in these new relational networks:  
"So how did they start gaining legitimacy? In addition to that, the sort of working with 
governments, international partners, WHO, the World Bank, they started making donations 
to those organisations, for example, Gates, also is the single largest donor  to WHO  they 
contribute significantly to the World Bank. Those guys, oftentimes don't have money to do 
projects." (Non-Profit Organisation U)  
 
This increased power concentration of non-state actors is potentially expressed in PPPs and is 
therefore supposed to be resisted, at least by some participants. Nevertheless, multilateral 
institutions, as Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal describe as an egalitarian body, have no 
alternative but to communicate directly with non-state actors (Abbott, 2012). However, it 
cannot be denied that there is some level of scepticism over the configuration and impact of 
these new relational networks. Non-state actors such as the BMGF aim to subvert this 
scepticism via steady investment in Global Health Partnerships such as the Global Fund and 
GAVI. Thus, it is important for non-state actors that GHIs are recognised as legitimised 




"There is some level of scepticism in terms of Gates funds. I mean, not mega, but they're 
starting, and other countries are also asking why a foundation is having so much influence 
on programming and things like that. So, there is some little pushback that is coming up. So 
that says there may be so there and I think the Gates Foundation also understands that, and 
that's why they are, I think investing in a lot of organisations like GAVI and the Global Fund, 
and even WHO actually they're very involved in WHO as well"(Non-profit PPP J)   
  
In the reconstitution of the relational networks, the influence of the BMGF has led to multiple 
calls for more transparency and accountability. However, it must be noted that it would be 
incorrect to claim that the BMGF has gained influence strictly via the huge funds disbursed 
(see Appendix B). As can be seen through their processes of positioning and strategic 
communication, BMGF have a surgical approach to legitimise their identity in the field.  
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6.4.5 Notion of Trust in the new relational networks  
A clear distinction between modern relational networks and the more conventional relational 
network based on the multilateral approach, applies to how partnerships are organised with 
funding recipients. The aspect of trust is of importance in the establishment of these 
partnerships. Hence, a key aspect of these new relational networks is the concept of Country 
Coordination Mechanisms (CCM).  
  
Unlike the World Bank and the WHO, that operate primarily through government 
departments, and have offices and employees in recipient countries, neither the Global Fund 
nor Gavi operates directly within the region.   
  
GHIs rely on Country Coordination Mechanisms (CCMs) for the creation and submission of 
grant requests focused on national priority requirements. CCMs monitor improvement 
through implementation of CCMs, following receipt of grants. CCMs are typically made up 
of government officials, NGOs, sponsors, citizens dealing with disabilities, faith-based 
organisations, the private sector and academics. The CCM nominates one or two groups for 
each grant to act as the Principal Beneficiary (PR). This framework has two advantages. It 
not only allows GHIs to have trust in the country mechanism, but it also allows GHI donors, 
such as the BMGF, to have trust in the GHIs management mechanism.  
 
"if I take Nigeria, for example, the Gates Foundation, who was a huge donor to the Global 
fund at the global level, but they don't invest a lot of their money at country level in 
individual HIV, TB or Malaria programmes, because they give their money to the Global 
Fund for those purposes. So they have, I would say, a little bit more limited engagement at 
country level." (Non-Profit PPP R)   
  
These new relational networks have also caused field collaborators such as universities, to 
develop their own in-house frameworks called working groups. These working groups are 
made up of technical experts within the field and as such enhances the notion of trust 
between donors and recipients. The frameworks for these working groups are designed by 
highly skilled technical experts:  
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"Yes, often, organisations will have to develop their own frameworks in house, they may have 
to convene what are called working groups. So, they'll bring technical experts in a number of 
different stakeholders within the field to provide their own experience and examples. So, they 
also develop frameworks in house and then present them at kind of a forum where 
international stakeholders, particularly technical experts, are provided the opportunity to 
give feedback. And then that feedback is often taken into account towards the final version of 
whatever that strategy document may be." (Historic Academic Research Institution F)  
  
The use of technical and academic experts strengthens the legitimacy of the GHIs and the 
professionals working in the field. Not only does it enhance the notion of trust in the GHI 
networks, but it grounds even further the legitimacy of those major funders in the GHI 
networks.    
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6.5 Reconstitution of control mechanisms  
6.5.1 Decentralising responsibilities  
The process of logic evolution was further built on the restructuring of control mechanisms in 
the GHI field. In the previous section, the concept of CCM was detailed from the perspective 
of trust.   
Although the CCM is a panel and not an implementing body, and although it is legally 
responsible for supervision of grants, it delegates to the PR responsibility for executing the 
grants (Sands, 2019). Currently two-thirds of all PRs are government agencies, but most 
recently the Global Fund first allowed, and then started actively promoting "dual track 
funding”, where both government and non-governmental PRs had grants. UNDP continues to 
play the role of PR on Global Fund grants in vulnerable states (Klingebiel and Hildebrand, 
2010). The Global Fund Board sets the criteria for deciding which countries are eligible to 
qualify for funding under the Global Fund (Fund, 2015). Hence, CCMs can be interpreted as 
an instrument that allows the decentralisation of responsibilities. This has, in turn, 
implications on the reconfiguration of responsibilities and eventually leads to a restructuring 
of control mechanisms in the GHI field. While CCMs at the Global Fund are one example of 
the reconstitution of control mechanisms other instances can be found. Academic research 
institutions are employed to engage in processes of priority setting. This is a non-linear 
process, where a whole host of possible types of financing mechanism and capacity building 
strategies are designed. These types of control mechanisms are crucial for GHIs. It allows 
them to have specific plans to quickly respond to field changes:  
  
"… a priority setting on which services are going to be provided, which services are going to 
be subsidised…you know, usually you decide on what services are going to be provided, and 
at the same time, you're considering how it will be financed, you know, how much of it will be 
subsidised? If it will be subsidised? And how will you pull that money?...where does provide 
the industry come in, etc. So, how's it going to be implemented? comes back down to the 
things you're going to say know what vaccine you can use? If we are using that vaccine, do 
we have the capacity to maybe develop it ourselves? I mean, most of the country, we work in 
are low income, middle income countries…" (Academic Research Institution B)  
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These control mechanisms detailed above are related to priority setting and the subsidisation 
of services to be provided. These further consolidate the relationship of trust between donors 
and recipients, meaning that donors such as the Gates Foundation do not have to be 
micromanaging the process. Non-state actors have a crucial input in terms of recruitment of 
the key personnel who work in the GHIs. The degree of micromanagement by prominent 
non-state actors is dependent on the personality and track record of the key personnel 
employed:  
  
"Well, I think it is, to certain extent personalities. Who sits on what post so to say in an 
organisation and how much they feel that they can, they have the authority to, to sort of, they 
need to control or they are authorised to kind of let go a bit. I think it's also with time that 
GAVI has to show that, you know, it's doing its thing and it's working. So, so while they're 
doing that, you don't have to be as involved in everything. "(Non-profit PPP M)  
  
 It can thus be interpreted that the degree of micromanagement by non-state donors in the 
work of GHIs is dependent on the personalities, and professional background of those in 
senior positions.   
 
6.5.2 Facilitating independent decision making 
A key aspect of the restructuring of the control mechanisms has been the promotion of 
independent decision making for the professionals in the field. As self-employed bodies, 
PPPs retain governance independence, but are dependent on external finance. The 
management of R&D ventures includes internally disintegrated partners and provides the 
PPP with flexibility in the decision making of this internal management system. The PPPs are 
not under any obligation to diversify, as is the case with pharmaceutical companies who also 
face demands to enter into mergers and acquisitions to meet investor growth ambitions.   
  
Many are often expected to be private entrepreneurs, and it was considered important to 
essentially encourage professionals in such independent organisations. It thus enhances their 
autonomy and eventually ensures that professionals would be able to practice what they had 
learnt when they emerged as new recruits in the network. Such institutional improvements 
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will make it easier for professionals to genuinely continue to achieve respect, both in the eyes 
of the general population, and in the minds of peers in the profession.   
  
Professionals working in this updated global health system can very quickly activate financial 
and intellectual resources without the hindrance of bureaucratic procedures. This degree of 
freedom and independent decision making has helped to build the legitimacy of the identity 
of such professionals:  
  
".. the majority of times, we can work on a list of priorities that we defined based on our own 
vision and we can align that and we can very quickly activate, you know, resources, both 
financial and intellectual resources, but we can make that happen very quickly without the 
bureaucracy that you see for example, in many multinational organisations, or a foreign 
countries  Country governments. So, I think it's more that you can see a lot of interesting 
things because we have the sort of freedom to look at what are the main things that we could 
do?  What are the key things that we think there is a big gap? Where is it that we can 
complement others to kind of see it sort of like that kind of presents way more that you would 
you would see in the past…"(Philanthropic Organisation O)   
  
  
GHIs develop specialised, agile project management skills through their emphasis on a 
specific form of health product and a particular disease or core number of diseases. This 
system offers GHIs the expertise that infection-type biotechnology or pharmaceutical 
businesses seldom have. It is worth emphasising the creative dimension of GHIs. GHIs are 
created by people and groups with a concept (their goal is to integrate R&D into neglected 
diseases), to identify ecosystem possibilities (new sources of philanthropic support and 
improved access to R&D cooperation in the pharmaceutical field), and to establish an 
organisational structure in which resources/services can be brought together in the 
appropriate way.   
  
However, in the case of decreased investment, pressure to decrease in size is much more 
probable. In order to maintain the R&D programmes of GHIs, reviews of the position of  
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R&D management and management systems (technical consultants, staff and administrators) 
are taken into account. These control mechanisms can often mean that the independence of 
GHIs can be affected.   
As such, to maintain their position, professionals may be required to follow specific and 
explicit guidelines. The outcome of adherence to such strict guidelines may result in research 
that is more funding driven as opposed to needs driven. This means that certain diseases, 
which pose a high burden in certain disease endemic countries, might receive less funding 
than required:   
  
  
 "I've worked  for drugs for neglected diseases initiative, which is,  let's say a 
nongovernmental PPP like a product development partnership that still has, let's say, among 
the PPP is some sort of, I would say, Yeah, like neutrality or independence, because it has a 
broader let's say, scope of donors and foundations and people giving money to it. But still, 
like I've seen, even there, where the guidelines are so obvious, so  explicit, in terms of we 
focus on this diseases because this disease has received less funding, they carry a high 
burden in developing countries, there is no research and development for these kind of 
medical conditions." (Non-profit Research Institution A)  
  
Henceforth, despite evidence that independent decision making is enabled in the field, there 
are still instances of erosion of neutrality and independence. This is particularly applicable to 
decisions on research and development for diseases that are not considered “popular”. There 
seems to be a drive to generate stories of eradication of popular diseases. These types of 
stories make more sense from the strategic communication point of view. Indeed, eradicating  
“popular” diseases is expected to gain more extensive media coverage and hence enhances 
the legitimacy, and reputation of the GHIs and their funders.   
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6.5.3 Increased managerial responsibilities  
Organisational and administrative procedures in GHIs include identifying goals for R&D 
projects and handling the list of projects, including the specific alliances/collaborators. 
Managers, advised by boards and professional bodies, play a key role in the making of 
organisational and strategic decisions in defining compatibility, and for choosing and 
integrating internal and external assets to produce target products. This « asset orchestration » 
is a fundamental concept for developing and constantly improving PPPs (Teece, 2018). These 
increased managerial responsibilities for GHIs can be attributed to the restructuring of 
control mechanisms. A domino effect has meant that these increased managerial 
responsibilities have also filtered down to those professionals that are operating at country 
level administration departments. For example, in a country like Nigeria, any request for 
funding needs to be made from the body in charge of “Country Coordinating Mechanism”:   
  
"For example, in Nigeria, the Minister of Health is the chair of their Country Coordinating 
Mechanism, the donor countries are represented at the moment by the US government. On 
the CCM, UNAID and WHO are also members of the CCM and that body is who makes all 
the decisions on the Global Fund investments for Nigeria. So when they submit a request for 
funding to us, every three years, it is that body that submits the requests to so an individual 
agency or person cannot apply for funding to the Global Fund, it has to be a country 
request." (Non-Profit Agency R)  
  
Reconstitution of control mechanisms has added to the workload of professionals in the field. 
Since non-state donors follow a corporate approach, there is a drive to systematically monitor 
and evaluate. This might trickle down and cause an impact on the key workers operating on 
the ground. Those key workers in low income countries, for instance, might have less time to 
engage in crucial health improvement process, as they find themselves filling up monitoring 
and evaluation forms.  
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6.5.4 Legitimising the identity in the eyes of opinion leaders   
The use and restructuring of control mechanisms further legitimise the identity of non-state 
donors. The new relational network also has substantial influence on key decision makers in 
the system.    
  
As most financing streams emanating from donors are termed as voluntary, the usage for the 
majority of these funds even if increasing, can only be carried out according to certain 
preagreed codes of practice. It has been argued that the adherence to these strict codes of 
practice when it comes to the usage of funds is the main reason for the slow response to the 
recent Ebola outbreak (Senanayake, 2016).  
  
The term voluntary funding encompasses financial support from particular governments as 
well as private, for profit or not-for-profit donors (Mackey, 2016). However, these voluntary 
funding streams come with certain control mechanisms which can act as bottlenecks, since 
they can only be spent on certain pre-agreed initiatives such as the Stop TB Partnership. 
While most of the voluntary funding to the WHO comes from organisations associated with 
governments, the contribution of non-state actors is becoming increasingly important 
(Clinton, Sridhar and Sridhar, 2017). These control mechanisms have caused prominent 
nonstate actors to gain a substantial amount of influence on governments and governmental 
bodies, such as the WHO. There are certain criticisms of how non-state donors utilise their 
influence over “captured institutions and governments”, to influence medical product prices 
in favour of the pharmaceutical industry:  
   
"I'd also say that you've seen in the WHO, lots of examples of the private sector utilising the 
influence of , I would argue, like some kind of captured institutions and governments. So the 
US government, for example, the European Union, often very, very closely aligned their 
talking points with those of the pharmaceutical industry, as one example, you have seen the, 
the use by the USTR, so the US Trades Representatives, body, USTR of the 301 watch list, 
where they try to pressure developing in particular country governments, but also 
increasingly other Western governments who are trying to take action to address high drug 
prices, either through price control mechanisms, or through exploration of reform of the RD 
model? Or exploring the use of TRIPS flexibility?" (Public Global Health Agency R)  
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The majority of the contributions to the WHO are voluntary compared to the norm; in 2013, 
the WHO could only make free use of 7.6 per cent of the voluntary funding. Along with the 
restriction imposed on the use of these funds, are the auxiliary costs associated with 
administrating the voluntary contributors. Therefore, NGOs' funding will be an important 
contributor to the WHO in the future (Clift, 2014). The influence of non-state funding also 
extends to country governments. Despite certain countries taking a strong stance against 
nonstate donors, a level of influence is very much still present with regards to the recruitment 
of professionals providing technical assistance:  
  
"So in Ethiopia, the government has taken a very strong stance, the Minister of Health is  in a 
strong position whereby they want the money to be mostly used through the ministry or 
through the state ministries, because it's a decentralised process. So some of that money goes 
to the, to the ministry, to the set of decentralised ministries, ministries by region, but they 
have to hire technical assistance and technical assistance is really American NGOs that have 
a presence in countries and that provide technical support to the Ministries." (US 
Government Agency J)   
  
Another example of an impact of these new relational networks and control mechanisms is 
the increasing use of independent organisations by governmental bodies such as UN 
agencies. Independent organisations are engaged in order to conduct strategic or 
programmatic reviews of UN projects. The control mechanisms in this case are forms of 
evaluation, which can be both specific and prospective. The aim is to ensure relevance, 
efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability:  
  
"And that can be strategic reviews, or there can be programmatic reviews? So I guess 
examples might be for UNITAID, where they might ask us to do a review of one of the 
midterm on interim review of one of their projects. And generally we apply the OECD Debt 
criteria as looking at relevance or efficiency and effectiveness or sustainability or the results. 
That can vary; that's just one example, but I think it really does depend on what specific 
evaluation is required. And we have also done a prospective evaluation" (Independent 
Consulting Firm K).  
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While these control mechanisms do provide efficiency, they might also become cumbersome 
in the long run. Systematic reviews and evaluation might hinder the dynamism and flexibility 
of the GHI network.  
6.5.5 Legitimising identity through control mechanisms  
The big challenge perceived is not the high cost of R&D, but inadequate market viability. To 
fix the question of the absence of trading markets, pull instruments are targeted. They are 
intended to generate demand for drugs that have yet to be developed, as well as to increase 
the medical products’ market in neglected diseases effectively. Pull devices pay off the 
production (developed new medical products) but not for R&D inputs. Real world experience 
with pull instruments for neglected diseases is minimal. One appealing advantage of pull 
instruments is that they are less expensive than other devices, because they do not require 
advance payments. Money is only spent when benchmarks are met, or when new medicinal 
drugs are developed according to predetermined rules. Buyers (i.e., government, 
philanthropic organisations, or international organisations) must pre-set the defined 
requirements. In order to meet the requirements, the company or other agency must then 
agree on the R&D plan to be applied. If the benchmark has been achieved or the drug has 
been created, the payment will be rendered of the money committed and the buyer will make 
products accessible to patients at significantly lower costs. Examples of pull tools include 
incentives; end-sale funds (such as the Health Impact Fund); programmes that can assign 
money to any research agency; and advance business commitments (AMC). A crucial feature 
of the pull instrument is that the pay-out needs to be sufficiently enticing to provide 
opportunities for the scheme applicants. In theory, there can be a varying size of the reward 
among participants (Munoz, 2015).   
  
Boulton et al. (2014:36) described five areas in which donors place restrictions on the use of 
funds to:   
a) A particular disease, product region, or developmental stage  
b) A project community (funding portfolio)   
c) A scheme unique to the exclusion of all others   
d) Precise budgets authorised, and thus any modifications or alterations that need prior 
approval   
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e) A specified timeframe, usually after a grant deal has been concluded and within a 
particular year.  
  
Further expanding on these, major non-state donors such as the BMGF tend to fund those 
initiatives better aligned with their own strategy. This form of informal control mechanism 
related to strategy alignment further strengthens the identity and propagates even further the 
legitimacy of key donors as the BMGF:  
 
"So Gates Foundation has its sort of broad strategic objectives. And if the charities or other 
agencies…, if the interests align with the Gates interests, then more likely than not, if you put 
a good proposal, you will get the money. So in that respect, again, you know, because Gates 
has its own strategy. People who get the money need to align with a strategy." (Non-profit 
Organisation V)   
  
However, prominent non-state donors such as the BMGF have been known to be more 
collaborative. A form of formal control mechanism is the involvement in day to day activities 
of GHIs. This can be interpreted in a positive manner as it encourages collaboration and 
communication between the key stakeholders. These close and intricate processes can 
become key in establishing a consistent standard across the system and in turn can boost the 
non-state donor’s recognition and innovative ways of operation:  
 
"And then Gates has a much more, I would say, a very close collaborative process in the 
sense that they're really involved on our day to day activities. So they know exactly what 
we're doing exactly how we're doing things. It's a very close and very intricate process…" 
(Non-profit PPP J)   
  
Furthermore, through these formal and informal control mechanisms, major funders such as 
the BMGF, can link any progress made to the funds that they are disbursing. This aligns with 
some of the key findings detailed above, under the section of legitimising identity. The 
importance of publication and communication of success stories in the GHI field is key for 
the growth of legitimacy and identity. However, to further consolidate their control, 
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prominent non-state donors may also occupy board seats to ensure that the funds are being 
used in alignment with their overarching objectives:  
  
"I mean, it's not private foundations, the only one that is considering really putting money 
into organisations like that is Gates. And that's the only significant player at the moment. 
And so they set up all these they work with WHO closely but they set up separate 
organisations like ROLL BACK MALARIA and Stop TB etc, that they are happy to put money 
into, and then they sit on the board, and they can exercise greater control over what the 
organisations do and how they use their money." (UK Government Agency Z)   
 
Control mechanisms such as Country Coordinating Mechanisms are a way for countries to 
access funds from the Global Fund. However, it can also be construed that these Country 
Coordinating Mechanisms are important for GHIs. These control mechanisms allow them to 
further legitimise their identity in the eyes of major private donors such as the Gates 
Foundation and key opinion leaders in the field:  
  
"And one of our requirements of countries to access Global Fund funding is to set up at the 
country level, a Country Level Mechanism that mirrors our board mechanism. So countries 
have what are called Country Coordinating Mechanisms, we call them CCM is for sure and 
are basically mirrors of membership of our board, but at a local country level and 
chairmanship changes by country. " (Non-profit Agency R)  
  
Country Coordinating Mechanisms is a creative tool in the GHI field, as it allows low to 
middle income country governments to develop and implement practices that have proven to 
be successful in the corporate sector.  
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6.6 Effects of reconstitution in practices  
By introducing those practises that centred on teamwork, cooperation and integration, the link 
between identity, legitimacy and practices were forged. They also reconfigured relationships 
and definitions between the different professions. Field leaders and prominent technical 
associations engaged in discussions for the latest policies to establish credibility.  
 
The gradual recognition of the new professional identity of micro-level professionals centred 
on the professional logic of integration, through regular interactions between funders and 
beneficiaries. This facilitated the legitimisation of private entities at the macro-level as well.  
  
While the previous stages primarily addressed meso-level structures, the final stage of logic 
evolution involved analysing micro-level processes more closely centred on evidence of 
activities compatible with the professionals legitimised identity, relational networks and 
control mechanisms.   
 
6.6.1 New role configurations as a result of transmission of practices  
With regards to non-state donors, the probability of returns on their R&D investments needs 
to be improved (at best, it brings income, at worst, no loss). The size of funding required 
could be smaller for certain types of organisations such as non-profit PPPs. A key factor in 
the development of pull instruments is the number of obligations (including requirements 
such as the doses to be acquired and the purchase price) that would be needed to provide a 
powerful incentive to build a marketplace that would transcend the deterrent to investing in 
R&D (Le, 2014).  
Highly experienced managers are thus pivotal GHI tools to build such a marketplace. When 
the PPP (taking into account research, finance and access considerations) maps out disease 
and goal drug profiles, project managers, coordinate, and maintain relationships with public 
and private sector participants. They push research ventures pick which applicants are 
promising enough to progress to trials, which products to proceed across the pipeline and 
which projects to terminate (Munoz et al., 2015).  
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Managers are important, as they organise the individual projects and create synergies 
between collaborators. They also oversee the bulk of R&D operations carried out by GHIs as 
well as those carried out beyond the PPP. Decision-making leadership occurs within GHIs, 
while most GHIs research and development operations are branched out to affiliates 
identified as 'virtual' R&D organisations (Grace and Britain, 2010). The position of project 
managers is basically identical to the one played by other project managers in (bio) 
pharmaceutical firms.   
The above branching out and expansion of practices has represented a holistic approach to the 
provision of drugs, and have been caused as a result of the complex relationship of relational 
networks and control mechanisms.   
Professionals employed in state-centric organisations were less likely than professionals 
working in autonomous private organisations to follow the concepts of integrated logic.   
They were less likely to make unilateral choices, and the hierarchical authority of the head of 
the state-centric organisation controlled their work to a much larger degree. The professionals 
performing in the reconfigured field have taken more roles than the older ones and offered a 
wider range of services. In effect, this reconfiguration has impacted the role of previously 
dominant actors, such as the WHO, in the field of Global Health. The relevance of the WHO 
has thus been diminished due to the prevalence of new practices. WHO is no longer in the 
driving seat when it comes to health related issues:  
 
"So it means that they have to partner with academia to produce the research, they have to 
partner with foundations to support programmes, have to partner with the private sector, but 
at the same time, I agree, it would become too much for WHO to actually manage all of it. 
And it's not that they're not relevant. They are relevant, but they don't necessarily drive this.  
They don't need to be on the driving seat in every single scene that is health related.” 
(Philanthropic Organisation O)   
  
These new role configurations are likely to be further extended to managers operating in  
independent organisations. GHIs such as the Global Fund will increasingly have to prove 
how their practices are linked to broader ideals such a Universal Health Coverage. This shift 
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towards focusing on universal health coverage is likely to demand more skills from managers 
working in the field:  
  
" An increasing focus on non-communicable diseases and less of a focus on communicable 
diseases. I think there is also going to be an increasing focus on aspects that specifically 
relate to the sustainability development goals. Example of that might be, for example, an 
institution such as the Global Fund, which is set up for HIV, TB, and Malaria is closely 
linked to the NDG's, but increasingly, they're going to have to prove how they also linked to 
universal health coverage, strengthening is going to be much bigger focus towards those 
broader ideals and ideals with border and goals." (Independent Consulting Firm K)   
  
Furthermore, this extension of role configurations and new practices is also impacting 
management professionals in state-centric organisations such as the World Health  
Organization as well as the World Bank. The professionals in these organisations are likely to 
be focusing more on policy guidance implementation and translation. These practices and 
new role configurations for the WHO and the World Bank can be interpreted as an erosion of 
their legitimacy, as non-state actors proliferate the field:  
  
"they don't receive an enormous amount of money, like, let's be honest. So they produce a lot 
of policy guidance. And they are, you know, they are collaborating with the World Bank, 
which has far more clout in terms of policy implementation and translation. And actually, 
kind of having some say in how money is spent, but WHO I cannot see having that power.  
They don't provide grants to countries, they're there for assistance. And they do have a 
country office in every single country." (Academic Research Institution B)  
  
These extensions of role configurations have impacted organisations and institutions 
operating throughout the field of the global health system. The proliferation of new practices 
is thus, a clear result of the reconstitution of the microprocesses in the field.   
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6.6.2 Promulgating the identity of the academic expert  
Other evidence of the new practices in the field is with regards to the redefinition of the limits 
of professions.  PPPs in the GHI network have a limited key staff team with expertise in 
public health and the industry, whose research is supervised by a council. PPPs aim to 
account for their insufficient internal personnel ability (restricted project management skills 
from innovation to production and supply) by employing professional experts in an advisory 
capacity (analogous to the WHO TDR framework) (Muñoz, et al., 2015). Enhanced 
professional and analytical expertise is offered by independent expert advisory bodies. 
Boards are important in PPPs overall policy and portfolio planning, but project management 
continues to be left to project managers who make up the main PPP workforce. The 
professional staff members of PPPs also seek guidance from scientific advisory committees 
which consist of specialists in the production of medical products and related fields. The 
board's membership combines skills and experience from both the public and private sectors. 
The benefits for members of the board are not monetary.  
Academic institutions have held a central position in that respect. The frequent interactions 
between the recipients and the non-state donors helped to express the sense of belonging to a 
particular profession focused on a holistic approach to health provision. Hence, it can be seen 
that prominent non-state donors align themselves quite closely with academic experts in the 
field. In doing so, it also legitimises the expert’s identity while also redefining the limits of 
the profession for those operating in the academic sphere: 
"Well, I worked with them, you know, as a fellow, in addition to that, based on my experience, 
you know, working in a field of vaccines in Africa, and also did a PhD. You know, also 
working on vaccines." (Non-profit Global Health Organisation U)  
The extension of the role configuration due to the reconstitution of new practices is 
particularly evident for academic experts who work in the field vaccines in Africa. This has 
promulgated and legitimised their identity in the field, particularly through their collaboration 
with GHIs and major non-state donors in the field.  
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6.6.3 Cross legitimation  
Despite the power relationship imbalance between the GHIs and donors, particularly the 
prominent non-state donors, donors still have to rely on GHIs to find successful solutions. 
The progress of GHIs also legitimises donors who are basically new players in the wider 
spectrum of the health innovation system (Grace, 2010; Moran et al., 2010). In turn, this 
paradoxical partnership illustrates the challenges that exist in the global health innovation 
structure, and shows the necessity of the board members and senior managers to have unique  
skills. As a result, GHIs need to coordinate and maintain the GHI’s focus with the needs of 
funders, business stakeholders and policymakers in the countries where the clinical options 
needs are the highest. Simply stated, GHIs performance, comparable to any dependent 
individual in an unfavourable exchange arrangement depends on its ability to overcome 
restrictions as it advances in achieving results (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Reimann and 
Ketchen Jr, 2017)  
  
Through mutual routines, such interactions have contributed to strengthen the 
interrelationships between the partners. These micro-processes of shared learning, and the 
regular cooperation between donors and recipients have facilitated the building of mutual 
trust. Through the provision of resources in the capital settings of global health, non-state 
donors have legitimised their presence and activities from the bottom of the field. Creation of 
jobs in those siloed capital settings of global health, has helped field professionals to gain a 
deeper understanding of the message being transmitted by the prominent non-state donors:  
 
“I mean, at least in the capital settings, they have poured a lot of resources in these settings. 
And they have created jobs and things like that within those settings. So people do have a fair 
understanding in capital settings, again, I’m caveating would have a better understanding of 
what these people do, essentially, you know, whether it’s Gates or, you know, the big ones,  
I’m talking about Gates and PEPFAR. So again, it’s within, it’s the siloed thing” (US 
Government Agency J)  
  
The sub-factor of cross legitimation needs highlighting, as it shows how the GHI network can 
result in processes that generate mutual benefit for both the donors and the recipients.  
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 6.6.4 Evidence of successful initiatives linked to the new network  
The outcome of the causal chain of new practises due to the new relational networks is 
demonstrated by the evidence of successful initiatives.  
Many GHIs are pursuing resources for initiatives that can be extended to neglected diseases, 
based on inactive or abandoned work elsewhere. Drug-producing GHIs generally aim to 
develop recreated products instead of NCE (Pedrique et al., 2013). In the area of 
vaccinations, this is also the case. For example, the pharmaceutical firm GlaxoSmithKline 
(GSK), the GHI MVI, and PATH are developing the most scientifically advanced malaria 
vaccine product so far (RTS, S). RTS, S is not a new candidate for vaccine. The vaccine was 
developed by scientists at GSK in 1987 in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Defense 
BIRL. The reported pricing agreement for the RTS, S vaccine for young infants and children 
in sub-Saharan Africa is that GSK will be compensated to cover the vaccine production costs, 
and will earn a 5 per cent return (Malaria Vaccines Initiative 2013). GHIs often typically aim 
to reduce R&D costs. Although GHIs must cover product creation costs and take product 
distribution costs into consideration (including registration costs), they recognise that they 
must stay close to marginal production costs to achieve their access goals. GHIs must not 
lose sight of the cost of service.  
  
The chain of new networks bringing about new practices is also extending to state-centric 
organisations such as the World Health Organization. WHO is now adopting similar models 
to that of a Global Fund and GAVI:  
   
"I mean, it's changing as in like, you know, with the new leadership, they're implementing 
quite a bit of changes. So, I mean, it's a good space to watch just because. And they also and 
they're adopting, you know, like fundraising methods that are very similar to what GAVI and 
the Global Fund have done in the past. Yes. So it is, it's a, it's a good space to watch, just to 
see how successful they will be." (Non-profit PPP J)  
 
The adoption of similar models as GHIs shows that the new leadership of WHO is open to 
changes and focused on becoming more agile. In order to keep its relevance in the field, 
WHO needed to become a more agile institution and steer away from its conservative 
approach in the global health sphere.   
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6.6.5 Transmission of new approaches in practices 
In addition to R&D portfolio management and investment lobbying, GHIs can funnel much 
of their efforts into pure R&D activities, especially in comparison to marketing (in order to 
boost sales), which may require a greater budget for research in larger pharmaceutical 
companies.   
  
GHIs search, pick and derive these capacities/assets, including academics, drug 
manufacturers, biotechnology firms, contract research institutions, public and philanthropic 
institutions from multiple agencies. As an example of developing a product by GHIs, the case 
of a new anti-malaria drug being developed is a relevant one. Drugs for Neglected Diseases 
Initiative (DNDi) led the project with cooperation from TDR (Nwaka and Ridley, 2003). This 
new collaborative approach is clearly reflected in the new practices, as demonstrated below. 
Due to the development of these new health initiatives, engagement from industries and 
fields can now be seen that would otherwise not have been connected with the field of 
neglected diseases:  
 
"Cola life was a design engineer , Simon Ferry. And what he did was he you know, you have 
a palette of six bottles of coke or 12 bottles of coke in a distribution hub, and they send it out 
to the villages, right? He looked, he took a CAD CAM design approach and looked at the 
space between the bottles at the plastic insert in one part of it  anti diarrheal tablets, one's a 
mosquito net, one has a clean water tablet… " (Non-Profit organisation Q)   
  
However, a common critique and impact of these new approaches to health initiatives is that 
they are based on short-termism. A more conceptual view to solving problems such as water 
and sanitation issues for example in the neglected disease field might be more efficient in the 
long term. For example, the BMGF was an active funder in the rollout of cholera vaccine. 
However, this was deemed to be only a short-term approach to the real broader issue of water 
and sanitation. The reason specified for this inability to offer long term solution is the 
complex issue of multi sectoral engagement. Aligning various sectors such as water and 
planning, can be severely complicated as some GHIs do not have in country offices:  
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" So an example that I can give you as illustration is the cholera vaccine that is provided. So 
Gates supported the rollout of that, of which there is a role for it. And that it's not, it doesn't 
solve all the problems. And obviously, the much bigger issue is water and sanitation more 
broadly. And that is something that very few donors want to support. Because it's 
complicated. It's a long term, it requires multi sectoral engagement. But the sectors that are 
required to introduce it in the water sector, or the planning sector depends on which country. 
And so I think that was a situation where, within relatively limited resources for cholera, a 
lot of focus, being on a vaccine, whereas actually, if you really wanted to, to cure cholera , 
we should be addressing the larger water and sanitation issues. But you can see why Gates, 
which is more about innovation, etc were working to fund that." (Independent Consulting 
Firm K)  
  
While this integrated vertical approach has produced interesting technical materials, an issue 
has been identified with the fact that these advances work only in specific fields for specific 
diseases. In other words, the progress made in a specific field does not automatically extend 
and interact with other sectors. This backs the call for more horizontal approach to address 
global health issues:  
  
"And I think that is also very much the issue with donors because donors, fund you work on 
very specific things with very specific guidelines, and people just, it's the same with science 
and academics, right? People working in very, very specific fields. And they produce very 
interesting technical material. But basically, they missed the point. Because if they don't look 
at the interaction of this with that…" (Philanthropic Organisation W)  
As has been discussed throughout this Chapter, the emergence of the GHIs has provided 
some critical successes but also questions pertaining to influence and accountability. In this 
subsection, the fact that the new approaches of GHIs are based on short-termism has been 
raised. There is the need for GHIs to collaborate with their non-state donors, to engage 
multisectoral engagement to fix broader issues. Integrated vertical approach to tackling 
diseases provides advantages, but the ripple effect of these benefits is not felt in other sectors 
of the global health arena.  
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6.7 Conclusion: Professional logic of integration introduced in GHI networks  
Figure 11 Professional logic of integration introduced in GHI networks (author’s own 
diagram)  
 




Figure 11 is derived from findings and analysis presented in the above section. Over time, 
there has been a rethinking of global health; opportunities emerged over cooperation with 
industry for product creation. It appeared, though, to be too costly and difficult for TDR to 
plan and execute and was beyond its mandate. Having this in mind, the concept of 
developing autonomous, disease-focused companies emerged as an option for speeding up R 
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and D, and producing innovative health-care goods which shows how the field objective has 
been modified. As of 1999, TDR has participated in the development of numerous PPPs 
while some other PPPs have been individually established. Non-profit philanthropic 
foundations such as the Rockefeller Foundation have taken an important role in the 
production of PPPs. There has also been a key role for international humanitarian 
organisations (Hoffman and Au, 2017). Bill and Melinda Gates' creation of the Gates 
Foundation in 2000 has given PPPs a significant boost as a new source of possible funding. 
Throughout the pharmaceutical industry, PPPs have exploded throughout the background of 
the 'vertical disintegration' phase (Torchia, Calabrò and Morner, 2015).  
  
This rethinking of global health has now meant that industries such as clothing, eyewear, 
transportation, as well as other sectors have aligned themselves with the field of medical 
products for neglected diseases.  
  
An important theme that needs to be discussed as a result of this field objective modification 
is the difference in governance structure between that of the WHO and the World Bank, and 
that of GHIs like the Global Fund and GAVI. The biggest differentiation is in terms of how 
their respective goals are set out. GHIs are known to be more business and result-driven, 
therefore have a set of specific outcomes, unlike those of the WHO and the World Bank, 
whose motto is based more on broad objectives such as, the reduction of poverty and 
improving the quality of health and life globally (Sridhar and Clinton, 2017). This 
demonstrates how the field of global health is being restructured in terms of governance 
structures:  
  
As specified above, the WHO and the World Bank are not geared towards specific 
programmes and infectious diseases. On the other hand, the Global Fund’s operating 
principles are to use the resources available to address health concerns in HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and malaria; GAVI’s framework when it comes to utilising its financial 
stream is to invest in aiming to protect the health of children in countries most at risk.  
  
This research draws upon existing institutional change concepts and discusses how 
developments in fields occur in various ways. It challenges the predominant approach to 
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institutional theory which is focused on explanations of change about shifts from one 
dominant logic to another, or due to contradictions between logics. This demonstrates that 
field transformation can actually occur by an evolution of the prevailing logic in a field. 
Logic evolution is conceptualised as a process of legitimising and socialising identities of 
professionals in the field. It is also concerned with creating new control mechanisms and 
relational networks that will be enacted by professionals via the infiltration of new practices. 
This will evolve an overarching institutional logic in a field. New beliefs and practices that 
are part of a modern framework are thus not simply a replacement for existing beliefs and 
practices, but they are blended and coexist together.  
Field professionals have to incorporate themselves into the current context; these actors, via 
the microprocesses of practices will recombine old and new concepts, thus revising existing 
underlying paradigms. By doing so, they alter the relationships among all those that 
implement these field-level logics and reorganise the field structure. Tailored to specific 
social dynamics and field-level factors, the evolution of a specific institutional logic (the 
professional logic in this case) will unfold via a process which can be termed as blending.  
Field level reform is not only due to changes in the prevailing logic or contradictions between 
the logics of different institutional orders. Logics tend to be toolkits, in which actors in the 
field can introduce, change or delete concepts and practices in various ways. Since logics are 
not set, they may distil values and behaviours that pose some degree of ambiguity depending 
on the cultural context in question. They can therefore be somewhat compliant and 
incorporated into other field logics as has been demonstrated in this thesis. Logics arise as 
structures based on identity. Logics can accommodate various claims on identity as well as 
legitimacy (legitimising identities). They can explain the emergence of new relational 
networks, new arrangements for control mechanisms, unique practices, and they also provide 
explanations on how these are endorsed. The logic evolution method described here helps 
one to consider how these internal logic characteristics are integrated and connected together.  
Since logic evolution may involve potentially conflicting characteristics, actors within a 
social group,such as GHI networks when viewed through the lens of professional logic, may 
reconstitute different characteristics of the professional logic. In addition, they consist of 
several subgroups, each of which supports a different identity and missions; these identities 
and missions are integrated into the overarching professional logic, which binds and links 
  144  
them with particular practices. Lastly, the evolution of the one institutional logic and 
fragmentation within the field (the global health system) generates layers (GHI networks) 
that muddies structures, relationships and distribution of power among actors.   
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CHAPTER 7. Findings and analysis: Macro and meso factors influencing the process of logic 
evolution   
7.1 Introduction  
In this segment of the study, the types of factors that profoundly affected the global health 
system will be presented. These are linked to social level (macro) and field level (meso). 
Factors at the macro level include the capacity to crystallise change and the degree of trust in 
accepting alternate perspectives (e.g. heterogeneity of identities).   
Some critical factors guiding the logic evolution process also belong to the field level. This 
includes the legitimacy of proliferation agents in the field and, more generally, their status 
within the wider society; the likelihood of establishing a strategic field hub. Also important is 
the ability to create a participatory hub which allows professionals to socialise and interact.   
  
7.2 Capacity to crystallise change  
There was a pronounced constructive and organised subtext to the change process. Actors 
were trying to interpret and introduce a proposal that would fit within the context. In forming 
the change, proliferation agents maintained an internal emphasis on the issue of medical 
product development for neglected diseases but attempted to incorporate and take advantage 
of external opportunities. They remained open to discussion with external stakeholders and 
kept exploring the viability of proposed changes and on potential alternatives, wanting to 
make it seem more accessible to the international community.  
  
The essence of the decision-making process that led to the health initiatives overhaul was that 
players engaged together to systematically legitimise the updated identity of the 
professionals. Various actors engaged extensively about what the core identity of the 
emerging professionals in the field should be, within the organisation of the GHI field. They 
attempted to find a specific (integration) approach to the issue identified.  
In the institutional setting of the global health system, additional professional roles and drug 
distribution models have been added. This change approach reflected the aim of allowing the 
structure to evolve itself, so that changes can be made incrementally over time.   
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7.2.1 Efficiency of decision-making model  
In order to be able to crystallise change, the efficiency of the decision-making model in the 
field needed to be assessed continually. PPPs in the GHI field need to critically analyse  
“access criteria” (Muñoz, et al., 2015; Clinton, Sridhar and Sridhar, 2017) when negotiating a 
partner's manufacturing and distribution rates as well as the approval of a partner's production 
and distribution of products in disease-endemic countries, with long-term sustainability being 
an important factor. Non-state donors have very specific agendas and objectives. Non-state 
donors will not engage with those stakeholders who don’t align with these agendas and 
objectives. This can be interpreted as a way to ensure efficacy and results:   
  
"I think that's another challenge. Again, some of them have very specific agendas and very 
specific objectives. And oftentimes, if they are not 100% aligned with other organisations, 
objectives, they will separate you they will work separately. " (Non- profit Research 
Institution A)  
 
PPPs require their project managers to have business experience and negotiating capabilities.  
This can be argued by PPPs that some neglected diseases such as HIV/AIDS , malaria and 
TB, are economically viable, and are common in developed countries as well as in the 
developing world (Muñoz, et al., 2015). PPPs also define priority products that could 
potentially provide the private-sector with a trade market in disease-endemic countries where 
producers can maximise their profit margins, and PPPs also use that opportunity to gain 
improved public-sector agreements (i.e. reduced costs for production and final pricing) in 
disease afflicted nations. The PPPs may also seek to minimise costs through the management 
and funding of the registration process or through the quest for other collaborators (Muñoz, et 
al., 2015; Clinton, Sridhar and Sridhar, 2017; Aerts, et al., 2017)  
  
The proposal to improve the supply of medical products emerged from the UN. In that 
context, for the legislation to achieve credibility, the personal power and recognition of 
certain people was also crucial. The focal players, being the prominent non-state donors, have 
been able to catalyse other groups' involvement, triggering a coordinated mechanism in 
which every public participant was engaged. Cooperation during the proliferation phase was 
crucial, not only in drug distribution changes, but in all decision-making processes.  
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This collaboration defines the negotiations on the key proposals of the reform but it was also 
directed at generating practical outcomes and creating concrete improvements so that further 
steps could be taken if necessary. That embodied an attitude that was rather rational and 
result-oriented based on forming an alliance with strategic partners in the field:  
  
" So, in terms of the structure itself, GAVI is interesting... but it is an alliance of Alliance 
members include WHO UNICEF, CDC and others, partners. So they're part of the GAVI 
Alliance, essentially. So the role of the Secretariat is to coordinate these Alliance members. 
So when we work in countries, for example, so where we invest in vaccines, this is done 
through the alliance members, and other partners." (Non-Profit PPP J).   
  
Sustained alliance work is therefore one of the key elements in the development of an 
effective decision-making model.  
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7.2.2 Dynamism and flexibility  
 Another factor that aids the crystallisation of change is the dynamism and flexibility of non-state 
actors as compared to state-centric bodies. The ecosystem can be driven by innovation principles for 
medical products that lead to health requirements. The following ideas were proposed by a group of 
experts (World Health Organization,2006) set by the World Health Assembly:   
• Availability: new product production and ample availability of the drug (quantity)   
• Acceptability: product compatibility and suitability tailored to different specifications   
• Quality: reliability of the drug, quality criteria and clinical trials   
• Accessibility: assured product production funding-choice and acquisition, competitive 
prices.  
  
The creation of decision-making mechanisms was driven internally, as with the health 
initiative overhaul, even though they were still open to dialogue and external consultation. 
They took principles originating from other fields such as contents of a more corporate 
approach, and incorporated them in the field so that these new ideas could really function 
seamlessly and homogeneously.   
  
  
Many of the PPPs interested in designing novel drugs and other neglected disease remedies 
do not hold technological skills, and thus do not perform any in-house research or production 
work. What the PPPs possess in general is the human capacity, and the skills and experience 
of the senior management engaged in managing the PPPs' organisation and operation through 
a dynamic and flexible approach. With the propagation of PPPs in the field, non-state donors 
seek to demonstrate how their dynamic approach to global health can be effective. They seek 
to communicate the message that they have a corporate approach to global health problems. 
The rationale behind this dynamic capability are mainly due, to the fact that they 
unencumbered by bureaucracy and accountability:   
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"Artificial Intelligence is another example. It's very difficult to look at, for example, any kind 
of big investments in Artificial Intelligence if you don't really have the private sector 
investing of that, but also being sort of led by a public health agenda, if that makes 
sense.”(Philanthropic Organisation O)   
  
But at the same time you have these different actors such as foundations that have different 
lines of accountability, different missions and visions, and they're usually way more dynamic 
and they can move so much more quickly and flexibly than other actors can,.."(Philanthropic  
Organisation O)    
  
" And I think they really want to say like, we have best people with a corporate background, 
to make sure we have a corporate approach to a public health problem" (Non-profit 
International Agency A)  
  
The capacity to crystallise change is therefore dependent on the ability of the GHIs to keep 
harness this dynamism and flexibility.   
  
7.2.3 Ideological drive  
 The ideological orientation and drive of non-state donors in the network of GHIs has facilitated the 
change crystallisation process. The Millennium Development Goals brought about the entry of a 
new source of financial resources outside the normal development assistance that existed pre-1990s, 
where the WHO was the central coordinating body. GHIs objectives are very much results driven. 
Their goals are to provide an ideology-based approach to healthcare in terms of drug development, 
drug distribution and qualified staff. Specifically, they seek to target communities that lie in the 
spectrum of low to middle income countries (Ritman, 2016):  
 
" I think they're also very pragmatic. I think they're definitely ideologically oriented. And it's 
the same for the Open Society Foundation, which, which is very ideologically oriented, but in 
a very interesting way, and much, much more progressive. So that is definitely something to 
that can be an done easily also with the project that Gates is funding in Geo engineering and 
GMOs in Education. I mean, it's very obvious that there is an ideological drive. I mean, I 
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guess everyone has their own ideological visions. So that's fine. Yeah, so that is definitely fine 
but the thing is that what they're funding us in doing it shouldn't have if, if we just do what 
they're asking us to do, should have anything to do with ideology. " (Philanthropic 
Organisation W)  
  
Like any result driven model, a key objective of these GHIs is to engage as many powerful 
stakeholders as possible to maximise the chances of providing the services. In many cases,  
GHIs target specific regions and diseases. GHIs are driven by the funder’s ideology and 
mission. As a case in point, the ideology of the BMGF is more programmatic as opposed 
to that of the Rockefeller Foundation which is more research focused:  
  
"So we know that anything that we are going to be interested in is with the basis of 
supporting great ideas to thrive through research. If you go to Rockefeller, some of the 
programmes they do have similar research interests, others are more programmatic. If you 
go to Gates they are so much more programmatic than necessarily research focused. It's a 
question of, of how much all of our contributions have been contributing to a bigger, a bigger 
agenda." (Philanthropic Organisation O)   
 
More specific concerns, such as focusing on financing a single disease cure or on specific 
politically specified goals have been driving the member states in the field over the recent 
years. For instance, much of the current funding for global health is being devoted to specific 
diseases, especially HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria. However, there are certain criticisms 
directed towards this approach on focusing on a single disease. Indeed, the issue of lack of 
balance in terms of targeting the wrong diseases has been raised.  
  
This can be interpreted as a negative aspect of this ideological drive of non-state actors. An 
integral part of their mission is to enhance their legitimacy through the communication of 
disease elimination stories. However, as they seek to increase their legitimacy in the eyes of 
the key opinion leaders and general public, there can be a tendency to neglect diseases which 
are considered to not be “sexy”:  
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" Targeting diseases that primarily they wouldn't be targeting. And I think that the rigidity, in 
their approaches because of that, just because they you know, they probably have a big 
board of people with a lot of knowledge on global health issues, but also a lot of pressure by, 
you know, shareholders and the public. Also, to the public is starving for big, big story, you 
know, eradication story of an elimination story. And I think that's also something that drives 
a lot  of the force behind that, if we want to be that big in that scenario in that role, I think we 
should put all of our efforts into that. And the problem is that again, it's fine if this happens, 
that I think the big issue for me here is the fact that this might cause this lack of balance," 
(Non-Profit Research Institution A)  
 
New co-operation trends in the Global Fund and GAVI can be seen to be a method of seeking 
to harmonise co-operation more with national goals, particularly through the use of fiduciary 
funds and charitable donations by donor governments (and emerging participants like the 
Gates Foundation). Furthermore, private foundations find it easier to distil their ideology, as 
they are not accountable to any member state or government. On the other hand, the World 
Health Organization cannot be too critical of member states practises and operations which 
mean that they find it harder to homogenise the system:  
  
"I think one of WHO's problems is that they, they're kind of invited by the country, so they 
can't be too critical. You know, you can't say to us, you cannot do that, because, you know, 
the country will say, well, you go home then. And then they want they asked for another 
WHR, you know, the representative." (Non-Profit PPP M)   
  
Henceforth a clear ideological drive and relatively non-existent accountability towards local 
country governments has enabled non-state donors, via GHIs, to crystallise change in the 
network. This enhances their capacity to crystallise change in the GHI network.   
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7.2.4 Holistic attitude  
It should be noted that simplifying the work of GHIs to only support low to middle income 
countries in terms of funding and financing would be an error (Ogundahunsi, et al., 2015).  
While there are some GHIs who specifically engage in such schemes, there other GHIs who 
seek to establish long-term sustainable change by concentrating their activities on long term 
policy development, integrated healthcare, research and development of new chemical 
entities and training of field workers in targeted deprived countries. As mentioned above, 
key to their objectives is a holistic drive towards a commitment to grow the network of 
participation with the alliance of new actors who will then be given specific roles once 
again aligned to long term sustainable objectives:  
  
"And in that we have people that do modular photovoltaics, their engineers looking to clean 
water pumps in rural Africa, there's no distributed electricity going to it, it's got you've got to 
have its own power source. And so, they look to make partnerships in this. " (Pharmaceutical 
Company Q)  
  
There have been critiques that the vertical approach adopted by GHIs tends to be based on 
short termism, However, it cannot be denied that innovations such as modular photovoltaic, 
can help to fix broader issues such as water and sanitation at country level. These innovations 
might trickle across to boost health systems within local communities in fragile states.  
 
7.2.5 Rigidity of WHO  
On the other hand, the World Health Organization due to its commitment to its member states 
and lack of funding and resources seems to have less flexibility and is seen as a more rigid 
organisation. This rather pragmatic mindset portrayed GHIs, backed by non-state donors to 
be more enterprising and innovative. By being seen under such positive light, GHIs are 
deemed to be more efficient. Non-state donors use this portrayal of efficiency to crystallise 
change in the Global Health System based on their ideology and mission:  
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"They do have less flexibility than the other than then the new type of organisations like 
GAVI and things like that. Because they are part of the UN system they do, they can't just, 
they have staff that have been there for a long time. So, it's a much more traditional 
organisation. It doesn't have as much flexibility to move around. And of course, the big thing 
is, they have country members, they have to agree on everything, right. So, which is not 
necessarily the case with things like, GAVI."(Non-profit PPP J)  
  
There are however positive signs that under the leadership of Dr Tedros, the WHO has started 
to engage extensively with the non-state donors. Furthermore, they have also been adopting 
models that are prevalently used by GHIs in the global health field. Nevertheless, critiques do 
contend that this alignment between the “normative guidance” body and major donors such 
as the BMGF, might lead to further issues around transparency and accountability.  
 
7.2.6 Monitoring and evaluation  
 The risks and costs of developing new products for neglected diseases can be assumed to be the 
same as for other illnesses. Production of pharmaceutical products is usually very expensive and 
dangerous. However, exact details are usually inaccessible or incomplete at the expense of R&D for 
pharmaceutical companies. When businesses provide cost data, the measurement of R&D costs or 
what is included in the cost is not stated (Waye, Jacobs and Schryvers, 2013). A drug in the form of 
NCE is expected to take 5-13 years from scientific breakthrough to when it is commercially 
available. With vaccines, it can take 12 years to complete the R&D phase. Failure rates (probability 
of failures) in the breakthrough stage may be close to 60 per cent higher. Reported R&D cost 
figures differ widely with the methods, data sets, sample and time frames differing from current 
studies. A new analysis by health economists, for example, estimated that the net median cost of 
R&D could be between US$ 13–204 million, although current estimates range from US$ 161 
million to US$ 1.8 billion (Clendinen, et al., 2016).   
  
Risks and costs are key bottlenecks that inhibit the crystallisation of change and prevent the 
delivery of excellent market mechanisms which can then be used to boost R&D in both 
neglected and other diseases. Hence, the use of modelling analysis in monitoring and 
evaluating risks and costs is crucial, in order to successfully develop new products for 
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neglected diseases. GHIs use research institutions who then use modelling analysis to design 
a number of scenarios to prepare and tackle any key bottlenecks:  
 
"For us, it's actually limited to the Ministry of Health, who then go to minister of finance, etc. 
But for, you know, you kind of everyone gets together and tries to understand what the 
problem is, and how best to allocate those resources. And where we come in is, we 
essentially provide an analysis. So it's kind of modelling analysis with a number of scenarios. 
What are you considering? What do you value as health maximisation protection… So you 
kind of establish criteria that are nationally that are a national priority... And based on that, 
you run an analysis and you go kind of, okay, is your first scenario where you propose this; 
second scenario? " (Academic Research Institution B)  
   
The assessment of the donors' interaction with GHI partnerships (PPPs) usually takes place 
through appraisal processes. From a donor viewpoint, value-for -money (VfM) explanation is 
the key argument underpinning the assessment of PPPs and their operations (see Boulton et 
al., 2014). In general, VfM seeks to illustrate optimum utilisation of donor capital to produce 
the desired results which ultimately contribute to new drug development.  
  
" in terms of we, you know, because it's important for us to have independent assessors, 
essentially. So, I mean, a lot of it's done through external partners and Alliance members, 
like research centres, and external monitors. So in terms of looking backwards, we look at 
impact evaluations, that kind of stuff is independently  assessed, as well as looking at the 
future." (US Government Agency J)   
   
"Yes, it's mostly like your mission indicators, like how many children have been immunised 
with GAVI support? What is the impact in terms of deaths subverted in terms of strategies? 
Like in the future? What would be the most impactful? If? What space would we be more 
impactful? and things like that, basically? "(Non-profit PPP J)   
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In order to be able to sustain and build the capacity to crystallise change among multiple 
stakeholders, monitoring and evaluation instruments are thus considered instrumental. These 
instruments, if properly aligned, strengthens the efficiency of the decision-making model.  
 
7.2.7 Unmet expectations  
Donors were frustrated with the management process of the WHO which included, in part, 
concern that the WHO could not handle the position of the collaboration of rival UN  
HIV/AIDS agencies. Researchers have also indicated that WHO’s weaknesses and the lack of 
confidence donors have in WHO’s efficiency help to explain the roots of UNAIDS.  
  
The approach to change became more apparent after the financial crisis of the 1980s, as new 
relational networks and control mechanisms were introduced by theorisers in conjunction 
with the new professional roles. Change agents such as the BMGF worked for a more 
detailed and fundamental reform.   
  
This led to the proposal to change not just the brand, but also the network setting in which 
everyone attempting to act at the level of health initiatives would function; it also changed 
the allocation of power within traditional institutions:  
   
“Sometimes when those expectations are not met, I think at some point you find some 
frustrations, because sometimes there is a great idea of having public and private 
collaborating. If you don’t see then all the changes happening in the surroundings and 
environment, for example, where these PPPs are supposed to be benefiting, for example, in 
some low middle-income countries. I think there is some risk of actually questioning the sort 
of long-term sustainability of these partnerships.” (Philanthropic Organisation O)  
  
As these partnerships in GHI’s are inherently dependent on collaborations, unmet 
expectations from any of the other collaborators might lead questions over the long-term 
sustainability of these partnerships. Henceforth, the capacity to crystallise change critically 
hinges on the efforts of collaborators to meet expectations.  
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7.2.8 Rate of implementation  
However, the new GHIs and their innovative relational networks tend to be more dynamic 
and reactive. This subsequently helps non-state donors to strengthen their legitimacy even 
further:  
  
“So, for example, the private sector tends to be way quicker and more reactive and dynamic” 
(Philanthropic Organisation O)  
 
The World Health Organization is perceived to be very rigid and slow to implement changes.  
This factor has meant that private foundations have grown rather suspicious of the World 
Health Organization to implement initiatives and change in a dynamic fashion.  
  
"Whereas the public sector tends to be a little bit more slow and a little bit more like, you 
have to move things very slowly." (Philanthropic Organisation O)   
  
The World Health Assembly which is the governing body of the WHO is made up of  
Ministers of Health from member states who each have their own regional organisations.  
These regional organisations are themselves intertwined in their own independent governance 
structures. This convoluted web of governance can be interpreted as one of the main reasons 
behind the rigidity of WHO:  
  
"The World Health Assembly, which is made up of ministers of health from every country in 
the world. And then they and that make decisions at the global level. And then they have all 
these regional organisations as well, which have their own independent governance 
structures. And I think it's very difficult, because they have separate governance structures. 
It's difficult. It doesn't operate like UNICEF or UNDP, which has much more authority over 
it’s not they're more of a kind of vertical programme structure, where whatever the centre 
says that the region's kind of have to do it. But WHO doesn't operate like that at all" (Historic 
Academic Institution Z)   
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In order to circumvent the rigidity posed by the WHO, non-state donors have thus used GHIs 
such as Global Fund and GAVI to implement dynamic changes in the field:  
  
"I think that private foundations are rather suspicious of whether WHO has the ability to ever 
get anything done. And so that’s one of the reasons they set up all these independent 
initiatives is to get around the WHO?" (UK Government Agency Z)  
  
This last quote is quite pertinent when it comes to the dissecting the origin of GHIs in the 
global health system. The lack of trust in WHO by prominent non-state donors has meant that 
actors such as, the BMGF, has circumvented the WHO by creating GHIs. They have imbued 
them with dynamics from the corporate world in order to make radical changes in the global 
health field.  
  
7.3 Degree of trust in accepting new approaches  
Trust is one of the major challenges in inter-organisational relations (Harris, 2006; Lumineau, 
2017) that mitigates risks and ambiguity in principle (Rousseau, 1998). Competence trust, in 
a relational inter-organisational sense, refers to one partner's faith in the other’s skills. While 
the PPPs lack the ability and power of private pharmaceutical firms to conduct research and 
development operations, the participation of board members and scientific and technical 
experts gives donors the trust that PPPs holds the human capital and skills required to ensure 
the successful and productive production of new drugs (Naciti, 2019; Velte, 2017). The 
second consequence of including seasoned board members and science and technological 
expertise, is in legitimising the PPPs.  
  
7.3.1 Openness to different mandates  
WHO’s openness to accepting different viewpoints present in the field could be attributed to the 
limited use it can make of voluntary contribution. As such, WHO has had to accept the different 
mandates, remits and approaches that are emerging in the field:  
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"And I think, the same way you could talk about Gates Foundation, we talk about 
Rockefeller, about many other foundations and I think, all of those have their own internal 
priority setting and really good idea of what their remit and mandate is, for example, if 
you're talking about Welcome, our specific approach is improving health through 
research."(Philanthropic Organisation O)   
  
The GHI field emergence promoted the changeability of ideals  as well as choices. 
Alternative responsibilities were taken up by professionals involved with health initiatives 
and alternative models have been created; these alternatives were deemed entirely valid. 
Actors supported more dynamic and blended agreements that enabled them to make choices 
from around the PPP subfield via collaborations and partnerships.   
The use of evidence-based intervention is crucial for GHIs such as the Global Fund. Field 
actors gain a higher degree of trust when they observe the strong technical oversight and 
independent technical review mechanism undertaken by GHIs such as the Global Fund, 
before the disbursement of funds:  
   
"I think there's been a strong technical oversight and independent technical review 
mechanism at the Global Fund that has tried to ensure that there's a balance between sort of 
evidence-based interventions that are invested in by the Global Fund and those that are 
really determined by local country contacts. " (Non-Profit PPP R)   
  
Professionals in the GHI networks augment public sector practice. A clean-cut overhaul has 
maintained the intrinsic continuity of the overarching professional logic of assistance and the 
adherence of its standards and procedures. These influences have reflected themselves more 
clearly in the development of complex relational networks and control mechanisms, and in 
the acceptance of new approaches. There can, however, be several divergent perspectives, 
and there are occasions where field misalignment resulted in a fragmented process: 
 
"But it's true that the PPPs have not been super cooperative, because it's not, it's not in their 
mandate to do policy and advocacy. They're very interested in doing policy advocacy, to get 
more funds from the EU to do their work. But not to ultimately change EU policies so that 
they are more conditionality to getting public funding, which is our interest to getting public 
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funding, we would like The EU, for instance, to make sure that whenever someone applies for 
funds, that there is an access plan that they have to fill in that they have to, and that is a 
criteria of how the money should be allocated. And then there is also monitoring and 
evaluation, you have to show like, what would be the impact if they make this product 
accessible, etc?" (Philanthropic Organisation W)  
  
Despite being a key cog in the Global Health System, GHIs, such as PPPs do not actively 
engage in policy and advocacy at the global level. There is a school of thought that PPPs 
should use the trust gained in the network to change policies with regards to funds 
accessibility, monitoring and evaluation.  
   
7.3.2 Openness to different perspectives  
A crucial ramification of the asymmetric partnership between donors and PPPs is that 
attempts to produce new medicines and services may in turn contribute to a situation where 
the goods or services produced in the process do not reach the disease-endemic countries 
directly. In other words, donors' emphasis may not be aligned with the needs of the disease 
endemic countries and as a result, the PPPs product range does not apply specifically to 
addressing the needs of the countries. This may arise due to the inability for collaborators to 
trust new perspectives. Indeed, there are instances where new approaches and practices of 
dealing with non-state actors are not taken up by field participants. Some participants might 
stay rigid and only engage with state-centric bodies:  
 
"an example is one donor we did a piece of work for which they were selling, so  they were 
introducing a commodity, which would be really well placed to be supplied from private 
pharmacies in developing countries. But because the donor just always worked with the 
Ministry of Health, work through the health clinics, etc, that it just wasn't presented as an 
option to even discuss it with, with pharmacies, who actually, I think we're better placed." 
(Independent Consulting Firm K)   
  
The openness to trusting the presence of different views within the same area may be related 
to the versatility of a revised logic to be accepted. A defined institutional framework will 
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allow a variety of legitimised identities, relational networks, control mechanisms and 
practices to occur simultaneously even if the approaches were derived from other 
environments. Others, however, prefer continuity, and thus oppose such ideas that are not 
entirely coherent with previous assumptions:  
  
" So, you know, the Gates Foundation funds GAVI Alliance, different countries have different 
perceptions about the utility and cost effectiveness of vaccines. Some countries don't believe 
in vaccination, even though we have a policy and evidence level. So there have been seen to 
be instances where international organisations are pushing vaccines on countries through 
GAVI, including Gates Foundation, as well as others, and that local countries have really 
pushed back because they felt that their population was having vaccines or drugs pushed 
upon them by international organisations. So really, that kind of undue political influence 
from an international organisation on a local country population is where the difficulty lies." 
(UK Government Agency F)  
Despite having clear evidence that vaccines are the most cost/clinically effective intervention 
in a health system, some countries have different perceptions about their utility.  Some 
countries also refused to interact with GHIs because they felt that there is an undue political 
influence from prominent non-state donors such as the BMGF. There are claims that, these 
organisations are pushing/forcing vaccines onto local population in disease endemic 
countries.  
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 7.3.3 Recruitment and model of governance  
 The trust in these new GHI networks was further built on by their model of recruitment and 
governance. Broadly speaking, PPPs include two groups of persons who are vital to their operation. 
First, in most PPPs, the central staff consists of experienced people with expertise in the field of 
neglected diseases in public health, and research and development. These persons, in conjunction 
with the board, advisors and organisational structure of the PPP, play the vital role in the creation 
and formulation of the strategic alignment, and thus helped to perpetuate this notion of trust. A key 
impact of this new model is therefore the amalgamation of staff that have had expertise in the field:  
  
"And I've also been a part of different organisations. So at some point, I was representing 
academia. And another point I was representing medical doctors and health professionals in 
the field, then went on to do international organisations and now from donor’s perspective." 
(Philanthropic Organisation O)  
 
The second group of people is project administrators, who have previous expertise in 
supervising and overseeing addiction treatment projects. While the first group of people 
offers strategic guidance for PPPs and surveys, as well as recognising prospects in the land of 
medical research and engaging with funders to raise money for the creation of innovative 
drugs, the second group creates and accelerate drug exploration and production efforts in 
partnership with numerous institutional partners in the global health innovation environment.  
  
The continuous adoption of new concepts and their embedding into the emerging systems 
have helped players to build a modern PPP framework and improve its stability. It also 
allowed them to clarify the ties between the new health initiatives and improvements in the 
drug supply system, thereby increasing the trust of the new model.  
 
The overhaul of health initiatives was part of a larger strategy to improve the drug provision 
that has been implemented over the years, creating a more streamlined and cohesive 
treatment system that could be relied upon. Proliferation agents organised the overhaul of the 
health initiative in a very systematic manner, ensuring that the "whole package" was 
continuously modified over time. They legitimised the new identities in the field, but also 
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changed other elements, such as entities, legal standing, funding processes, status of the 
decision-makers and service delivery frameworks, and directly related them to the new 
identity:  
  
 "Yes, so the way it works is your seat on the board is more or less determined, in some sense 
by what kind of donor you are. So the US government, for example, is our biggest donor, and 
they have their own board seat. The UK is similar in that they have they are the second or 
third biggest donor, depending on the foreign exchange rate at the time. And they also have 
their own seat. The private foundations have a board seat. And then within that constituency, 
they determine who their representative is. But our biggest private foundation donor is by far 
the Gates Foundation." (Non-Profit Agency R)  
 
In that regard, prominent non-state donors such as the BMGF occupy seats on the board of 
major GHIs such as the Global Fund, alongside the US and UK government. This allows 
them to have a strong input with regards to recruitment and governance.  
 
7.3.4 Success criteria  
 PPPs will work on a non-profit basis if they are able to obtain enough financing for their research 
and development programmes and operations; therefore attracting funds from donors is an 
important component of the PPP. The returns to investment criterion for public and philanthropic 
donors diverge from the shareholders in the R&D model for the pharmaceutical companies. 
Philanthropic and public donors also do not place the same stress on profitmaximising as for-profit 
firms do. PPP donors’ ultimate performance indicator is in medical products developed to satisfy 
deficient patient needs. Non-profit PPPs would operate if they can obtain adequate money for their 
research and development projects and activities. Hence, an important part of the PPP is collecting 
funds from donors. The returns for public and philanthropic donor’s investment criteria differ 
significantly from investors in the pharmaceutical companies' R&D model. Often, philanthropic and 
charitable donors don't put the same emphasis on optimising income as for-profit companies do. The 
main trust and success measure for PPP donors is in medicinal products that have been produced to 
satisfy inadequate health care needs and sharing those success stories via publication and 
communication.  
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Consequently, concepts around medical product development have evolved in the field. 
Professionals have worked progressively and have taken increasingly informed actions via 
the new relational networks. The prevalence of old principles, attitudes and activities as a 
result of the change has now been minimised, thus promoting the quick exclusive application 
of new ideas relating to medical products supply. This removes the integration gap and 
reduces the inconsistencies between the desired improvements and the actual application.   
  
Thus, in order to cross this divide between desired progress and improvements in practice, 
proliferation agents such as the BMGF needed to provide resources for the field professionals 
to fulfil their function. As such, investments in the Institute for Health Metrics by the BMGF 
has been identified as an important instrument to bridge that gap. However, the main 
criticism of this metric is that the data sourced from the surveys may be outdated:  
   
"So, GATES has spent a lot of money into the Institute for Health metrics. And for 
vaccination to try to get some national data which in principle is great. But the approach that 
IHME has taken is really just trying to, it's very removed. It's based on surveys that were 
done, you know, years ago, on DHS surveys that were done you know, like, at a very 
disparate interval. And they use basically, the use a lot of, you know, regression methods to 
get to once a one metre by one metre type of coverage questions. But if you really delve into 
that, and you think about what's happening on the ground it’s very far from that.." (Nonprofit 
PPP J)   
  
In addition, change agents such as the BMGF shared their viewpoints and combined the 
efforts of other players thereby establishing integration of the PPP subfield to a single 
paradigm. Incorporating the reform via the sharing of viewpoints was one of the success 
criteria in the process of the changing of health initiatives:   
  
"I think  some of the objectives are very clear, but at the same time, I think we also have to 
keep in mind that they are also driven by a lot of media and communication and publicity. 
And I don't want to say that this is the driving force behind it. But of course, they would like 
to work on something that they can, you know, publicise widely and broadly, if something 
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happens, you know, so it's much more interesting to, I don't know, to focus on something that 
will give a big return in terms of attention, media attention, that's something that's, you 
know.." (Non-profit Research Institution A)  
  
As detailed previously, the aspect of communication and publicity is crucial for non-state 
donors such as BMGF. Hence, a major part of their success criteria is generating media 
attention via the sharing of their success stories. It is important to realize that this sharing of 
success will increase their legitimacy in the field and allow their approaches to gain a higher 
degree of trust.  
   
7.3.5 Providing strategic support to engage the professionals  
The final sub-element in the factor of- degree of trust in accepting different approaches- is 
that of the provision of strategic support. Economic theory has shown that collaborations 
between large pharmaceutical companies and PPPs which are limited to shareholders' values 
in terms of R&D resources sharing for neglected diseases, should not ideally exist (Muñoz, et 
al., 2015; Pereira, et al., 2020) Yet these alliances actually come about via PPPs. The private 
sector does not want to participate exclusively in a variety of R&D activities on neglected 
diseases for the production of medicinal products. However, under the GHI network it seems 
that, if the costs and risks are minimised, other factors like a benefit to public relations might 
occur, then the private sector may be driven to collaborative efforts. PPPs focus around 
generating evidence allowing the minimisation of costs and risks. For this reason, more and 
more pharmaceutical industries are now aligning with the network of GHIs. This would not 
have been possible in the initial set up of health initiatives. Hence the degree of trust can be 
enhance on the basis of “evidence-based trust”:  
  
"Yeah, in terms of them impacting priority setting, I wouldn't say so. They're not they're not 
policy makers, you know, yeah, they're not policy makers are not policy focused institutions, 
they're more around generating evidence, they can actually feed into policy processes and 
kind of better ones rather than ad hoc decision making" (Academic Research Institution B)   
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Through cooperation with PPPs, pharmaceutical companies are also able to maintain 
shareholder trust and interest, by using- development methods and technologies, and 
producing and selling end products,with lower risk and less cost. Accordingly, PPPs can use 
scientific, biotechnological and major pharmaceutical companies as information sources for 
discovery projects.   
For research projects, they can negotiate access. PPPs also employ pharmaceutical firms for 
manufacturing, the latter offering in-kind services to lower cost of production such as 
provision of equipment and staff resources. Henceforth, weaving this web of strategic support 
is an important element in creating a higher degree of trust for these new partnerships in the 
network of GHIs.  
The new ideas were integrated particularly due to the corresponding day-to-day activities and 
their repeated usage in the last phases of the proliferation process. Medical product provision 
frameworks have been correlated with specific relational networks, control mechanisms and 
practices. Therefore, this convergence of ideas and principles, in conjunction with the 
gathering of strategic support, and technical expertise, led to the proliferation of trust in 
accepting this different strategic perspective at tackling health problems:   
  
"Yeah, that's more or less my role. Yet, though. I acted as advisors to the Gates and a number 
of their programmes. And I do the same with WHO done some work with the World Bank. So 
generally, what happens is that these organisations look for technical expertise in a given 
area, whether that be from a strategic perspective. So health systems strengthening and 
innovation programmes can be gathered to work together to support those aims, or whether 
it's specifically a given area like improving value for money or control of non-communicable 
disease. " (UK Government Agency F)   
  
However, there are critiques that this process is dependent on good data sharing. When there 
is a breakdown in the practices of good data sharing and practices, it can lead to severe 
under-funding of certain diseases. A case in point is that of Bolivia who receive 10 to 15 
times more funding for HIV as opposed to Chagas Disease. However, the HIV prevalence in 
Bolivia is very small as compared to Chagas and other diseases. This has been attributed to 
very poor data collection and sharing:  
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"So I was reading once about Bolivia who have very small HIV prevalence very small, but 
then it has a lot of Chagas and other diseases that are very prevalent. But if you look at the 
funding for each one of these conditions, so HIV receives like 10 to 15 times more funding, 
than Chagas disease or any other disease like more emerging viral diseases, etc. Because, 
you know, the problem with there's very poor data sharing because there's very poor data 
collection. So I think that if there is one main thing that needs to be addressed to make the 
Global Health it is data sharing…" (Non-profit Research Institution A)  
  
An issue that needs to be addressed in the global health system is that of data sharing. Poor 
data collection has meant that high prevalence diseases, such as Chagas, receive substantially 
less funding as compared to low prevalence but more “popular” diseases such as HIV.  
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7.4. Legitimacy of proliferation agents  
 7.4.1 Societal status and history of institutions  
The next factor is related to the legitimacy of the change agents in the field. The first sub-
factor to discuss here is that of societal status and in particular the role of historical 
institutions. Change agents such as the BMGF, are increasingly aligning themselves with 
historical institutions such as The European Union to drive policy change at the highest level. 
This allows them to engage in socialisation and enhance their societal status in the field:  
  
"So yeah, they're involved in  policy change, but the policy change that interest them, they are 
very good at policy analysis, they have very good contacts at the highest level… they're quite 
powerful. And that has pissed off quite a lot of members of parliament when they started 
doing memorandum of understanding with the director general for research. And yeah, the 
weight that they have in certain institution definitely is. But I mean, this is also because of the 
legislature that we have now on the political system we have in place in the EU, which is very 
much on the right, which is very much pro-growth, pro competition, pro neoliberal economic 
models of developments." (Philanthropic Organisation W)  
 
Prominent non-state donors such as the BMGF, excel at policy analysis and through the 
socialisation process have been able to garner very good contacts at the highest level. As an 
illustration of their influence, the BMGF have imprinted their ideologies through documents 
that are termed as “memorandum of understanding”. This memorandum was validated by the 
Director General of Research at the EU. It is important to realise that non-state donors such 
as the BMGF might be trying to encourage growth and competition in the field through these 
involvements at the policy level.  
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7.4.2 Socialisation platform  
The next sub-factor pertaining to the legitimacy building is related to the importance of recognition 
and prominence. Public health scholars conceptualise the development and functioning of PPPs in 
the wider sense of the ecosystem of medical product/health innovation that operates outside national 
borders (Munoz et al., 2015; Papaioannou et al., 2009; Pereira et al., 2020). The product 
development environment consists of, among others, (a) the business and non-profit sector 
including (bio) pharmaceutical, medical and R&D organisations; (b) government agencies including 
national regulatory authorities. And; (c) individuals (including public health experts, scientists and 
decision makers in infectionendemic countries and patients) who have an endemic environment.   
Essentially, the ecology of innovation is made up of several players participating in the 
development and delivery of medicines, vaccines and diagnostics for neglected diseases, and 
is affected by external influences, including those relevant to public health policy, funding, 
legislation and intellectual property rather than human capital and infrastructure. Hence, the 
GHI network can be viewed as a platform for actors to socialise and collaborate towards a 
specific objective. This platform has resulted in the setting up of events such as “science 
communication festivals” where different actors (peer to peer, civic society, private 
foundations etc) engage:  
   
"we put a science communication festival via the Welcome Trust every year. We are at the 
fourth year, we had this year's one, just now, we get a lot of awards in that as well. And I 
always get the impression that for a while, it has been peer to peer. Yeah. And maybe that's 
because of the stakeholders involved. That's what I think they're starting to reach out now 
that we've seen a turning in that over the last four years of this festival that we've run. It's 
starting to turn outside of that, I think this is, this is also part of the realisation process, and 
that they are this, the, the communication that they do, can actually bring in civic society, you 
know, different actors’ image. " (Non-profit Organisation Q)    
 
However, there are certain criticisms directed towards major players such as the BMGF, who 
use this socialisation platform created by the GHIs to drive the whole agenda in global health 
initiatives. The non-state donors are the key driving force behind these new GHI networks.  
Markedly, the BMGF have also driven the London Declaration for Neglected Diseases in 
2012 by bringing together other private foundations and pharmaceutical companies:  
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" I think it was two years ago when I was in Geneva for a big meeting, I worked a lot of 
neglected tropical diseases. So, this meeting was the NTD Forum was a big meeting and  you 
know, that there is this there was this London Declaration on neglected diseases which was 
signed in 2012. And basically it was driven by Gates and you know, the Gates Foundation 
brought together a lot of institutions, primarily private institutions, private, big pharma, and 
some NGOs and some other smaller private foundations that were they were working on 
neglected diseases and they made basically they built this roadmap with very ambitious 
goals" (Non- profit International Agency A)  
  
The BMGF is seen as a key driving force behind the setting of the goals for tackling 
neglected diseases. The BMGF have acted as a catalyst to bring and engage diverse 
stakeholders.  
  
7.4.3 Personalities  
The BMGF has been a significant new head of global health since the millennium. At the end of 
2013, it retained the status as the world 's largest philanthropic organisation with an endowment of 
about $41 billion, with several more billions promised by Warren Buffett to expand its work 
(Sridhar and Clinton, 2017). It retains seats on the Global Fund and the GAVI Boards, which 
represent the value of its donations over time, and it is the largest or second largest volunteer fund 
lender. Another factor that drives the legitimacy of main change agents such as the BMGF is that of 
the personalities associated with such private foundations:  
 
"So, because of his clout, of his high profile, he's able to use that to leverage to influence 
policymakers to give them  money to specific causes, as opposed to another. So again, there's 
an element of, you know, one person's agenda or one agency’s agenda, to move funding 
towards that…" (Historic Academic Institution V)       
 
There is also evidence of private foundations such as the BMGF, enhancing their own 
validity by recruiting personalities who have been successful and gained legitimacy in fields 
such as biological drugs for cancer. Notably, the appointment of Sue Desmond is an eye 
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catching one. Sue Desmond was the previous medical director for Genetec, and she played a 
prominent role in the development of biological drugs for cancer:   
"And then the CEO is also this woman who was very successful in registering and bringing to 
the market, I think biological drugs for cancer. Sue Desmond, and she was very successful. 
You know, being the medical director of I think it's Genetec, the company, and, you know, 
highly successful, very ambitious, and, again, with a lot of legitimacy by the opinion majors, 
yeah. And have that beyond the beneficiaries, as also this is, you know, have that, that 
difference between the, and I think that they might also invest in the communications for the 
potential beneficiaries, but also for it for the opinion makers, like key opinion leaders in the 
world and people who will be looking at those kind of legitimacy and say, okay, who do I 
trust?" (Non-profit Research Institution A)   
Through the recruitment of these highly successful and ambitious personalities, non-state 
donors enhance their own legitimacy in the eyes of potential beneficiaries as well as key 
opinion leaders in the field. An important point to highlight is the shifting dynamics in the 
notion of trust in the field. In the early years of health initiatives, the trust and legitimacy lay 
with individuals in the public health. In the contemporary health initiatives, the trust lies 
mostly with individuals with a track record of success in the non-state sector.   
 
7.4.4 Leadership  
Leadership has been uncovered as a key sub-factor with regards to the legitimacy of proliferation 
agents in the field. As autonomous agencies, PPPs also utilise external input from the worldwide 
public health environment. Actually, any degree of control is only privately exercised by donors. 
WHO are now increasingly seeking to engage in providing coordination in setting goals for R&D in 
neglected diseases. They are also collaborating with other emerging multi-stakeholder organisations 
to help purchase and disburse innovative medical products such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria and the GAVI Alliance. Since the inception of Dr Tedros (Ghebreyesus, 
2017) at the WHO, there has been a marked openness towards collaboration with the private sector.  
The old leadership was however more reticent on such partnerships:   
   "And I think they're I think there was an interesting period when  Margaret Chan the 
previous DG finished her term and Dr. Tedros started, and I think there was a period where 
no one really knew what was going to happen. I think Dr. Tedros has, you know, leadership 
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has been quite interesting to, to witness, I think he's taking WHO to the next to the next stage. 
"(Philanthropic Organisation O)   
  
The new leadership of the WHO has on the other hand, been more flexible towards 
partnerships and collaboration with the private sector. This can be viewed as an attempt for 
WHO to reconstruct its identity and strengthen its legitimacy in the field:  
  
"And I really appreciate that Dr. Tedros and his office is really looking at a strategy and the 
global programme of work that is actually quite strategic and clear, looking at the 3 billion 
target, looking at prioritising certain areas for the next five to 10 years. And I think that's the 
way to go, sort of providing really strong leadership, a lot of charisma to make sure that 
countries and partners come together and are able to sing to at least play different songs, but 
really being mastered by the same agenda, I think has been quite successful with that." 
(Philanthropic Organisation O)   
  
The aspect of leadership from Bill Gates in the construction of legitimacy of change agents 
such as the BMGF has also been underlined. In particular, Bill Gates is seen as being a leader 
who seeks to “put his head above the parapet”. He is not recognised as being a leader in 
terms of day to day activities but more about external management:  
  
"I think Gates has shown extraordinary leadership, really, in the global health field. I know, I 
know that he's been critiqued in other fields, but I think it's amazing what he's done. I don't 
think he's an easy, day to day kind of management type leader I think he struggles. You know, 
sort of internal management, I think he's quite tricky on a personal basis. But I think he's 
shown extraordinary leadership. And it may be that it takes people that are more tricky to 
sort of put their head above the parapet and do that kind of thing." (Historic Academic 
Institution Z)   
  
" I think they've been able to, I think they can do things that sometimes multilateral 
organisations that are governed by member states are restricted to do. You know, Gates 
Foundation has been really key, and I go back to Gates, so often, because there's such a big 
partner, and they, you know, they are such a massive foundation. But they've really been able 
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to invest in innovations that are harder for other institutions to invest in with public money.." 
(Non-Profit PPP R)   
  
Nevertheless, the change in leadership at the WHO and its closer alignment with major non-
state donors such as Gates Foundation has also given rise to some critique. Indeed FENSA 
which is a framework built around controlling and managing private sector involvement at 
the WHO, is set to be reinterpreted by the new leadership at WHO. The emerging legitimacy 
of BMGF and its close alignment with pharmaceutical industries, has meant that the 
reinterpretation of WHO Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors (FENSA), has 
raised eyebrows about the undue influence of this new leadership in the global health system:  
  
" FENSA, which is basically designed to kind of manage conflict of interest, within and 
approaches to how the private actor is engaged, was one important piece of work, which was 
done at the global health level, to try and determine how and when these private entities 
should engage with and how they should engage with WHO processes. Again, worryingly 
that looks like it could be being reinterpreted at the moment by Tedros the new leadership at 
WHO.. " (Public Global Health Agency R)    
WHO Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors (FENSA) is a key framework when 
it pertains to managing the influence of non-state donors in global health. However, as has 
been evidenced in the quotes above, the alignment of the current leadership of WHO with 
major non-state actors such as the BMGF could mean that FENSA could be compromised.  
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7.4.5 Role of academia in legitimising identity  
The final sub-factor to be analysed in the context of legitimacy of proliferation agents is that 
of the role of academia. Academia and other public research agencies, although determined 
to meet the unaddressed medical needs, may not in fact, have all the tools, expertise or 
attributes required for conducting medical product R&D. Public sector research and 
development agencies traditionally focus on the innovation and advancement of technology 
(upstream) and translational work, while industry focuses more on product development 
(downstream) and drug approval initiatives, production and expanding supply chain 
processes. For GHIs, success is not simply the creation of a product but it is also the 
amalgamation of academic experts in the field.  
  
In fact, the greater the prominence of academic figures within society in general, the more 
they have become able to promote knowledge of emerging ideas and affect government 
decisions. To demonstrate this increasing role of academia, it is important to highlight the 
growth of university departments related to global health. The enormous funding of  the 
BMGF towards historic institutions such as Oxford University and the increasing prevalence 
of global health related courses at Universities are a testament to the growing role of 
academia. Through these educational activities, the new concepts around global health 
become theorised and set in stone. This aids to propagate even further the legitimacy of the 
proliferation agents in the field of global health: 
  
"And then you have universities, you know, so who also tried to capitalise on this? I mean, if 
you looked at the the university/public health school  15/20 years ago, you wouldn't see 
global health so much on that agenda with exceptional, maybe look, Liverpool University, 
Leeds University, or Howard University, Johns Hopkins. Now, almost every university will 
teach something along the lines of global health(Save The Children).I think was last year, 
about a year ago at Oxford University…. receive, you know, millions and millions of Gates 
money to do research.. "(Non-profit Organisation V)  
  
Nonetheless, there are certain critiques that are attached to this rise in the role of academia. 
There are claims that the prevalent academic institutions such as Johns Hopkins University 
might have excessive influence on the administration of health programmes in countries such 
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as Cote D’Ivoire (CIV); whilst their main aim as academia should be at producing analysis to 
aid the development of health programmes:  
 "a lot of the money I mean, you know, not to be, you know, at least 50% goes back to, you 
know, whoever is no, yeah, yeah, the US entity essentially. Yeah. Yeah. So that's, that's part 
of it. In other countries, I used to work on CIV  quite a bit. And they basically the money goes 
directly to US based NGO, the US based NGO sets up in CIV, and they run the programmes 
from there. So again, a lot of the money goes back to US NGOs, you know, things like ICAP, 
which is a Columbia University. They also have quite a bit of what is that one from John 
Hopkins has also an offshoot organisation that has a presence there. So a lot of the money 
goes back to them. And they, they administer the programmes."(US Government Agency J)  
Academia has thus taken a crucial position as theorisers of transition, and has retained it 
throughout the whole period. Especially during the initial shift phase, academic institutions 
have leveraged their personal academic status and professional prestige, as well as the 
credibility of universities within society, to enact values that stem from the professional logic 
of integration. They have used their links with the international research community to 
familiarise themselves with the new discourse, and to inseminate practical knowledge of the 
new processes in the environment:  
  
"So normally its a government is considering changing up its strategic priorities, they might 
get in touch with the development agencies such as, you know, the World Bank, and the 
World Bank, then commissions, essentially, consultants or partner organisations, which tend 
to be universities. And then they'll say, look, you know, there's, there's this kind of policy 
process going on in the country, and they're looking for some evidence to inform what it is 
that they'll end up going for. Whether that, you know, the role of us at this sort of universities 
ends at producing an analysis, there is no policy engagement..." (Academic Research 
Institution B)  
Simultaneously, this identity has been passed to their peers. In particular, they have used their 
practical experience and professional skills to legitimise the identity of non-state donors 
within the existing environment, and to support a change in approach. The elevated profile of 
academic leaders has helped them to legitimise the identity of non-state donors in GHIs.  
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7.5 Feasibility of identifying a strategic field nexus  
Next in the analysis of contextual factors is, the feasibility for professionals to clearly identify 
a strategic field nexus. The coordination of initiatives meant that a common vision was 
implemented, and the other related players were actively involved in the transition. In the 
central government and in most local areas, a nexus of proliferators linked the supply of 
medical products with the increasing decentralisation of government and privatisation in all 
sectors and have received crucial support from the political leaders. Hirst and Humphreys 
(2013), showed how the development of a strategic hub can be a central factor, in allowing a 
more focused attempt to turn the conventional field into a new networked organization:  
   
There was a clear focus on the bottom-up legitimisation of the identity that was widely 
adopted by most in-field professionals. This legitimisation of identity was propagated 
through clear and cohesive relational networks, control mechanisms and practices.  
  
7.5.1 Mission synchronicity within the strategic support network  
In order to build a field nexus, the addition of key actors to provide strategic support was 
considered to be of crucial importance. Large pharmaceutical companies are historically 
hardly ever willing to share expertise outside the company. However, there are increasing 
trends in subcontracting research, merger, acquisitions and in-licensing compounds from 
biotechnology firms (Schuhmacher et al. 2013). It seems paradoxical that pharmaceutical 
firms are able to invest in PPP-led R&D ventures, because they are typically boxed into 
finding the next breakthrough drug (Cockburn, 2006). Along with pharmaceutical industries, 
this field nexus has also extended to other organisations and professions:  
 
"So, you see also a lot of people joining organisations who you didn't see in the past both for 
WHO and private foundations, you know, doctors  working for organisations like Welcome 
like myself…. I think that creates sort of a, an interest in in organisations like Welcome and  
Gates that I think that was not there before."(Philanthropic Organisation O)  
  
The feasibility of defining a strategic nexus in the field was essential to the logical evolution 
process, especially in the construction of new relational networks and control mechanisms. 
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The existence of a "nexus" for the transition increased the likelihood of developing a shared 
sense of identity, and of considering a uniform collection of concepts between the agents of 
change and the recipients. Pertinently, the internal concentration of proliferation agents and 
their subsequent capacity to express support and credibility is significant. Informants have 
constantly identified the BMGF as the catalyst in creating this field nexus in the ongoing 
emergence of networks of GHIs. Explicitly their private model approach was seen as key 
driver, as it allowed alignment of pharmaceutical industries (who were previously reticent 
to engage in neglected diseases) and thus use their capacity and skills:  
   
 "What the critique of the Gates approach is that they are quite embedded with the private 
sector approach. They like the kind of private sector business model, yep, they will always 
play in play the game on international, international intellectual property rules, etc, etc. So 
some people would argue that they are too embedded with pharmaceutical companies. I think 
that the Gates Foundation would argue that they are using the capacity and the skills of the 
pharmaceutical industry. And they prefer because of their own heritage within the private 
sector, to play by those game play by those rules." (UK Government Agency Z)   
 
Alongside pharmaceutical companies the strategic field network is also saturated with 
academic and research institutions who have tended to be responsible for organising the 
measures to facilitate drug provision and health initiatives, by spurring innovation. This boost 
to innovation has led to the growth and creation of jobs:  
   
"But what we've started to realise, okay, if research is not needs driven, because the research 
budget, which is a massive budget in the EU is under a budget heading called Jobs Broken 
Competitiveness. So basically, research and innovation is seen as a way to put closer 
together academics and research institutions so that it can really do a lot of research and 
spur innovation that then can help the private sector grow and create jobs, and can 
ultimately maybe once it trickles down the line benefit citizens with innovative technologies 
that we can use." (Philanthropic Organisation W)  
  
Through their roles and behaviours, field professionals and participants thus represent a clear 
connection to the new relational networks and mechanisms of control that are prevalent in the 
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new global health system.  Academia and research institutions spur innovation and help the 
private sector to expand. Alongside the growth of the private sector, it is envisaged that there 
will be creation of jobs and technological benefits that could impact the day to day life of 
citizens positively.  
  
7.5.2 Ability to ensure support  
In order to build the strategic field nexus which can be easily identifiable by field 
professionals, the sub-factor of political support is critical. The BMGF was the single largest 
contributor to the WHO to the tune of $300m in 2013 (Clinton, Sridhar and Sridhar, 2017). In 
return for this important contribution, non-state donors have been actively looking for a 
position in global health by seeking to be active policy makers at board meetings and 
international conventions. While they have a limited voice currently, their increasing role in 
the implementation of programmes such as the STOP TB Partnership, which seeks to tackle 
the spread of tuberculosis in low to middle income countries, show that their objective of 
being able to vote on policies will be achieved sooner rather than later.   
  
Non-state donors such as the BMGF exert a lot of power through their funding of advocacy.  
These are termed as “elements of work” and these elements of work have been aided by 
willing players such as DFID. This willingness of DFID to participate ensures that there are 
no severe bottlenecks for BMGF when they set out their “elements of work”:  
  
" So they (Gates), I mean, they exert a lot of power, through their funding of advocacy, and 
also through the world of the CO chairs and the best sort of privates. The kind of public, the 
government relations, I think they call it elements of their work. But know, they, in the end, 
governments will I mean, I wouldn't say that they necessarily changed DFID funding plans. 
They might have encouraged  it along that particular path. But DFID was pretty much a 
willing player." (UK Government Agency Z)   
At a more country level, in low income disease endemic countries, the health systems are 
often fragmented, and severely handicapped by low funding. This has created a void for non-
state donors to fill via GHIs, with pre-programmed approaches. Alongside pre-programmed 
health approaches, GHIs might provide basic products such as fridges and generators.  
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Provision of these products and programmes has ensured political support from local country 
governments. As many country government officials lack the skills to manage these 
programmes on the ground, GHIs might also provide liaison officers at the Ministry of 
Health. These help to remove any barriers in terms of political support at country level:   
  
" so the government, as we said, health systems, very poor, fragmented, low funding, no 
human resources, brain drain turnover, etc. And then, you know, then, these big, big 
foundations come with cash, people, you know, pre-programmed approaches, and then for 
the government, it's great to me, okay, that's whatever you want, we don't mind like you 
putting another fridge in our, our help centre, as long as you put a generator, you know, if 
you should put a person a liaison officer in our, in our Ministry of Health," (Non-profit 
International Agency A)  
 
For certain PPPs, agreements and alliances are driven by specific laws like Intellectual 
Property (IP). For certain PPPs, an IP policy helps to advise their plan for handling 
intellectual property rights (IPRs), in particular to guarantee that IPRs will not generate 
roadblocks for the PPP to obtain technical expertise and resources, new product viability, and 
follow-up on R&D. That being said, in certain PPPs, IP control measures are conducted on a 
case-by-case basis, which is perceived to offer more autonomy for the PPP. Generally, there 
is a wide difference in IP PPP activities (Munoz et al., 2015; Pereira et al., 2020). From the 
beginning, some PPPs specify that IP can usually not be obtained with any product created, 
whereas others describe that the developer may demand or end up sharing the IP for a future 
product with the PPP, along with licencing terms (i.e, non-exclusive or exclusive licencing 
terms with pre-established IPs or new products). PPPs might often have different rules related 
to the degree of influence the PPP, collaborator, or donors might ascertain the R&D project.  
Using these complexities on IP laws as an example, it can be interpreted that the notion of 
power relations is important. To further illustrate the integral part that politics and power 
plays in the sustainability of this strategic field nexus, close attention has to be paid to the 
recruitment policy of organisations performing in this new network of Global Health System. 
This could include the recruitment and hiring of former Prime Ministers to work and 
represent GHIs at the global level. Hiring individuals with political connections ensures that 
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GHIs and thus non-state donors to have a foothold when it comes to negotiations with 
government agencies:  
   
" Who was the chief executive? Chief exec until recently. Well, it was the former prime 
minister of Denmark. Why Prime Minister? This is a bit unusual  for prime minister to 
become a Chief Exec to begin with, but also Chief Executive for charity. You don't often hear 
Prime Minister's doing that. But she did. And part of the indication towards is because, well, 
a lot of the money…comes from government agencies. And having somebody who has those 
political connections really helps. So politics, and power and mighty kind of really get it 
really integral here” (Non-profit Organisation V)  
  
Proliferation agents such as the BMGF have helped to maintain their key partners’ positive 
contribution to the process. Constant and successful efforts were made to facilitate a 
systematic reform in the field. This was also helped by the concentration of academic experts 
and, simultaneously, because of technical organisations and the stable political environment. 
However, there have been instances of political environments that have prevented the 
infiltration of these new practices:  
 
"So for example, in India, the media had a very strong voice against the Bill and Melinda  
Gates Foundation, created an environment or an ecosystem, it was difficult for the Gates 
Foundation to operate. And any Gates Foundation grantee found it very difficult to work with 
government partners, knowing that their funding came from a foundation." (UK Government 
Agency F)   
  
India’s reticence to engage with the BMGF demonstrates how the ability to ensure political 
and governmental support is a key enabler for GHIs to engage and drive change in a 
particular social context.  
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7.5.3 Responding to country level complexities  
The final sub-factor in the context of strategic field nexus identification is the response to 
local fluctuations. Governments of endemic countries and the WHO, as well as public and 
philanthropic donors, were ignoring synchronised and systematic research and development 
goals, and were focused financing initiatives on the high prevalence of fifteen diseases. 
Activities are actually very isolated. The lack of cohesion among GHIs is indeed evident.   
  
GHIs are validated by their success in the improvement of clearly identified health objectives. 
This has been emphasised in relation to other multi-stakeholder entities in global health. In 
comparison, conventional multilateral agencies gain validity from international participation 
and negotiation (Clinton, Sridhar and Sridhar, 2017). In GHIs, funders agree on priority 
spheres of investment, the criteria for the release of funds ‘sustainability, specifications for 
accountability, etc. These specifications are neither harmonised nor publicly disclosed among 
GHIs. The risk is that governments' interests do not fit those of the benefactor, especially in 
countries with endemic disease. Therefore, GHIs will deliver products that are not launched 
in disease-endemic countries despite R&D efforts. These types of not fit for purpose 
solutions could be negatively interpreted by field participants and key opinion leaders. 
Notably, these could be an important stumbling block in the strengthening of the strategic 
field nexus:  
 
"And ultimately, the number one issue that I see is that people who are suffering the most are 
never consulted, in terms of, you know, the people who think about the solutions, but like me 
know are not the people who are affected by the issues that we're trying to solve. And so 
ultimately, we're constantly devising solutions that are not fit for purpose, because the people  
have not been consulted, they should be the one implementing and not someone else from 
another country. And they should be the one monitoring it. And as soon as we don't respect 
this principle, which if we were to respect it would mean that we would be totally 
disinterested, and that we would have only solidarity and ethical values at our heart, which is 
different" (Philanthropic Organisation W)  
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There have however been some success stories in terms of responding to local fluctuation. 
The powerful figures, who play a crucial role in the change process, and who engage actively 
in the development of the modern drug supply market, were in the position to establish a 
particular model. The funders and the recipients maintained a high degree of trust which 
resulted from a relentless desire to foster a homogeneous conception of the idea of integrated 
logic, with regards to the development and distribution of medical products:  
  
"These micro industries, I mean, you know, look at the Grameen Foundation, the microcredit 
stuff that they set up, you know, in Bangladesh, where they allow women to make buttons, 
make soap, this money coming into their household has a direct effect on the clean water, 
they're going to drink on the on the, you know, so these things have to be linked, and they 
can't be linked if they are not spoken about. That's why they have to widen the net in terms of 
speaking to definitely I think it's starting to happen, starting to happen." (Pharmaceutical 
Company Q)  
  
The micro industries that have been set up, such as the Grameen Foundation, have created 
jobs for women in Bangladesh. Hence, the use of strategic communication to promulgate 
those successes and in turn strengthen that strategic field nexus, is crucial for GHIs and 
nonstate donors.  
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 7.6 Ability to create a participatory hub  
The BMGF had the ability to pass the theories and values of modern approaches to the professionals 
in the field through their ability to create a participatory hub.  
As a result, additional concepts relating to the field of medical products of neglected diseases 
are continuously inserted to complement the old principles and functions connected to an 
assistance logic. These will be connected to the new and emerging global health initiatives.  
The PPP subfield will then be composed of concepts and models that might be partly in 
dispute.  
  
7.6.1 Combining technical aspects/Legitimising Identity  
Through the participatory hub, proliferation agents are able to create a platform where the 
professionals will be able to legitimise their identity. Data suggests increasing cooperation in 
research and development for neglected diseases. One report discovered that there are about 
348 government and business organisations (academic/research institutions, biotechnology 
companies and other medium-sized and small businesses such as contract research 
organisations and major pharmaceutical companies), operating alone or in collaboration with 
one another in the production of a total portfolio of 374 drugs and vaccines for 23 neglected 
diseases. The bulk of the projects will be carried out by PPPs, which account for 40 per cent 
of the total number of projects (BIO Ventures for Global Health, 2012).   
  
In addition, many PPPs have policies of access. A PPP policy on access may require the early 
description of the features of an effective technology through an appropriate resource-limited 
framework. In the general sense, the product target profile (Hussaarts et al., 2017) is built on 
the basis of the unsatisfied need, illness profile and the local context in which the drug will be 
distributed (such as legislative framework and spending power). They may also describe the 
product design and set targets for cost of production and selling price. The characterisation of 
PPP products helps to explain needs for both collaborators and subcontractors in the R&D 
venture:  
“But obviously was gradually because I was back then still studying or doing my medical 
degree and It started with doing a lot of national policy and sort of working with the Minister 
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of Health and Education, Science and Technology and sort of evolved with global health 
interests.” (Philanthropic Organisation O)  
  
Consequently, to provide an appropriate product target profile, professionals need to have 
skills that relate to a combination of aspects. Henceforth these professionals working in the 
new global health system, bring with them a whole panoply of experience.  
  
7.6.2 Creation of a hub for professionals.  
The GHI integrator function, in the form of PPPs, is advantageous to all parties, by uniting 
and integrating the activities of different businesses and other organisations. PPPs can be 
conceptualised as a hub making it easier for professionals to access funding and information 
sharing. In addition, they disseminate information between the classes, which can then be 
internalised by each participant. PPP programmes and R&D partnerships should be endorsed 
by public policies. Therefore, prominent non-state donors such as the BMGF have been very 
influential in triggering this establishment of a hugely complex web of initiatives. The hub 
comprises of professionals who are trying to implement research on health innovation 
technologies, others who are focusing on delivering grants and delivering health 
programmes:  
"I mean, the Gates Foundation in particular, I wouldn't say that other foundations have been 
particularly influential. But Gates in particular has been very influential, particularly in 
terms of setting up a lot of new organisations, and triggering the establishment of a hugely 
complex web of initiatives and some of the organisations, some of which are trying to do 
research and work on global public goods, and others of which are trying to deliver grants 
and money and programmatic activities." (UK Government Agency Z)   
   
Creating a participatory and hub-like environment allows professionals to collaborate and 
benefit from each other through everyday activities. This demonstrates the importance of 
providing dedicated role models to convey the new identity to the intended audience of 
professionals. This will help to elevate the degree of trust in these modern practices.  
Alongside field professionals, the new GHI networks are also using “outside resources” such 
as hackers and coders through the organisation of hackathons:  
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" We put a hackathon out about three years ago for Dengue. Our rationale behind it was all these 
mad hackers and coders they are a resource, but they don't really know about this particular 
disease. So we wanted to do, we wanted them to develop a patient recording app, that doctors 
could use it field. There were layers to the prizes that we were giving out we were giving out 
military prizes actually and we were shocked at the amount of submissions we had not just in 
Dengue, we were swamped, we will have this swamped. Right across different diseases. People out 
there want to engage, they are just not aware of it.The more you are made aware the more  you're 
driving engagement and responsibility that this is our problem as well" (Non-profit Organisation 
Q)  
  
The intention was to use these hackathons to develop patient recording apps to be used by 
doctors in the field. Admittedly, what was designed initially as a tentative attempt to drive 
engagement was met with a tremendous amount of submissions. The level of engagement 
and responsibility demonstrates the value of these hubs in driving valuable change in the 
network.  
7.6.3 Usage of models and building blocks  
The next sub-factor pertaining to the creation of participatory hubs, is the replication and 
usage of transparent models. Knowledge sharing systems depend on cooperation, knowledge 
sharing among volunteers and open access to data during the discovery process. Two 
examples of these ventures that were researched are "CSIR Team India Consortium's Open 
Source Drug Discovery Project", and the "Synaptic Leap's Schistosomiasis Project" (Ardal 
and Rottingen, 2012).   
  
Different devices have been developed over the last decades, and many have been introduced 
to resolve the underinvestment problem outlined. The push-and-pull devices have now been 
tested in public-philanthropic sectors to fill the void between social and private R and D in 
the field of neglected diseases (Le, 2014).  
  
The 'push' tools are aimed at stimulating R and D by reducing the market R and D expenses.  
In addition, it can include research work (grants to academic institutions and government 
research laboratories, and collaborative ventures with industry), R and D tax cuts, direct 
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grants to small companies, funding for clinical trials in developing countries, and open 
innovation. This relates to the technology sector's financial support, which is the only manner 
in which the project has been supported. Some of the issues with pull instruments are that 
they alone cannot provide sufficient motivation. R and D incentives between donors and 
beneficiaries might align imperfectly, and devices are susceptible to lobbying/politicisation 
(Hegde and Sampat, 2015).   
  
Significant attention was placed on infiltrating the new culture among professionals during 
this whole proliferation period, from the early through to the alteration phase and, most 
notably, during the phase of proliferation. In order to align with the new role and orientate 
the professionals with the new relational networks, control mechanisms and practices, the use 
of models was considered important. This concept of using collaboration is clearly evident 
when it comes to investment. PPPs such as The Global Fund invest using the building blocks 
designed by the WHO in order to achieve Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)  
   
"we invest based on WHO six building blocks of sustainable systems for health. And there are 
six very clear building blocks that they have, that they have outlined, that are critical to 
invest in, in order to build a health system. And with the Sustainable Development Goals, sort 
of, as the NDG are merged into this one SDG related to health, we're seeing a lot more of an 
emphasis on those building blocks along the path to UHC." (Non-profit PPP J)  
  
 “ governance is one of them. financing is one of them, supply chains is one of them. There's 
actually an enormous body of literature on them. And WHO has an entire department, I 
believe, dedicated to it. And I'm not sure since Tedros has restructured and exactly where it 
sits within their current management structure. But yeah, it's a huge and important piece of 
work that they do in that and our investments in health systems are within that those building 
blocks" (Non-profit PPP R)   
  
These models were required not only to socialise professionals to the new initiatives, but also 
to develop and enhance the partnership model between the GHI and field collaborators.  
These GHI models are deemed to be the most effective in the system:  
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"What was very interesting about these models was that it was needs driven, and it was 
product driven. So it was very concrete and the access conditionality, it's something that we 
studied also very much have been addressed. From the beginning, we've actually studied all 
the PPPs and all the models and how they made sure that there was acceptable access 
conditions that could work also for the private sector. And we're trying to actually replicate 
that in public funding of governments and institutions, and it hasn't worked anywhere. It 
hasn't been done before" (Philanthropic Organisation W)  
  
Hence, these models and building blocks are being replicated by governments and historic 
institutions such as the EU in the field. This aims to legitimise the identities of the GHI 
professionals in their respective roles through processes at micro-level and through the 
perspective of opinion leaders such as policy makers in the EU Office.  
  
7.6.4 Gaining trust and legitimacy  
The initial function of the WHO was to act as a hub to bring member countries and various 
stakeholders on the same stage to discuss global health concerns by establishing rules. Once 
those rules are established, the WHO will implement strategies to provide the support 
required by the countries in need to address global health concerns. However, for the 
continued participation of the member states, they need to have a relationship of trust with 
the WHO. As the case of the Indonesian Minister demonstrated, members need to trust that 
the information shared will be used to implement policies that will benefit countries that are 
at risk of not being able to deal with infectious threats. Member states have to obey the 
revised 2005 International Health Regulations(World Health Organization, 2008), where the 
participants need to share information about potential outbreaks which might be cause of 
concern internationally. However, this notion of trust towards the WHO has been slowly 
eroded and transmitted instead to private foundations such as the BMGF. This has meant that 
the hub is now centred around non-state donors:  
“And I have to say that the majority of experiences that I had, as a worker here at Welcome 
with Gates has been really good, really, really gets very constructive, very, you know, a lot of 
sharing of expertise, which is useful for everybody.”(Philanthropic Organisation O)   
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 "they really have to put their money where their mouth is essentially, you know, and they 
also have very clear ideas of what they want us to see.  So in that sense, I think, you know, 
they've managed if you look at their, the way they've hired too, they really hired at their 
senior positions they did they have hired people who were in the traditional industries, you 
know, they do have quite a bit of breath of  representation from the World Bank, and, and, 
you know, USAID and things like that, that have, so its people with you who had deep 
connections to the field that went to Gates." (US Government Agency J)  
  
However, with the changing global health landscape and the dynamics of new actors, 
member countries can now apply for grants from bodies such as the Global Fund or the 
Clinton Foundation to help tackle endemic diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria. In 
doing so, they don’t have to deal with WHO, hence causing the one-time sole leader in the 
provision of global health services to take a back seat and re-think its strategies to maintain 
relevance. As a consequence of the reconfiguration of these relations, private actors have 
accumulated more trust and legitimacy in the field:  
 
 "So the Gates Foundation started funding, you know, those organisations, then they started 
gaining legitimacy. You know, so it is really around funding. And in addition to that, also 
recruiting experts. Recruiting foundation. Yeah.credibility and knowledge to advance the 
work with the Gates Foundation" (Philanthropic Organisation W)   
  
Any participatory hub created needs to be sustainable in the long term. Hence, non-state 
actors have further strengthened this trust and legitimacy in the eyes of key opinion leaders in 
the field, by tightening regulations and accountability mechanisms. Another feature of these 
added layers of documentation is an increase in terms of managerial responsibilities which 
can lead to some level of frustration:   
  
" So I think that's something good that I think we should not neglect. And then you know, 
because it's easy to say all that there, there's kind of like, strict in that way, in that way. But I 
think this is something that stems out of working with them, that's quite positive, because this 
really ensures that, you know, you can't, you can't do something bad because the regulations 
and the accountability mechanisms are very, very strict, which sometimes might, you know, 
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make the NGOs or this this partnerships, quite angry, because they have to, you know, add 
another layer of layer of documentation. But still, I think it's good for both sides." (Non-
profit Research Institution A)  
  
Nevertheless, the impact of these regulations and accountability mechanisms has on the 
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7.6.5 Stimulating cooperation between participants.  
The Gates foundation kick-started the GAVI alliance by contributing a massive $750 million 
to the initiative (McNeill and Sandberg, 2014). As for the Global Fund, they were created in 
2002 by the alliance of eight countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the 
United Kingdom and the United States) (Fund, 2002). The blueprint for both these initiatives 
is to seek the collaboration of various key actors, such as private sector, for profit, not-for-
profit and NGOs. The Global Fund acts as a grant reviewing body; the grants are put together 
as a bid by officials from countries that are affected by neglected diseases. These officials 
may belong to the country’s government, but they could also be individuals working in local 
and international non-governmental organisations, or from private sector and even from 
individuals who have themselves been affected by the disease. GAVI provides financing 
directly to governments; hence it can be seen that these GHIs have gained legitimacy in the 
field of global health by relying on clearly defined goals. This is in contrast to the 
methodology of the WHO. The WHO works specifically with in-country officials from the 
government.  
   
This process of collaboration between the field participants has also extended to alignment of 
interests between major foundations such as the BMGF and Clinton foundation. There is a 
convergence in terms of lobbying work at the policy level in order to drive funding from 
government departments within the US, UK or in the European Union:  
  
"I suppose it probably depends on the cause. So this alignment, for example, between Clinton 
Foundation's interests and Gates Foundation. So alignment, the lines in terms of trying to 
reduce child mortality, particularly through vaccination, they're both interested in pushing as 
much vaccination as possible. Now, do they work hand in hand? I don't think so. At least not 
in the way they fund, because these agencies also interested in  certain outcomes related to 
measure. So if they both fund one agency working in the same place that kind of dilutes, who  
is really making a difference…But they could be working together more on the political level, 
on the policy level, so you know, they could be for example, lobbying government 
departments within the US, UK or in the European Union, towards driving have more 
money..” (Historic Academic Institution V)   
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Non-state donors have been instrumental in setting up GAVI or the Global Fund but also a 
whole set of smaller organisations. A key objective of the setting up of this participatory hub 
is to use this public private partnership approach to attract public funding and stimulate 
cooperation:  
  
"instrumental in the setting up of GAVI or the Global Fund, those are the big ones, but also a 
whole slew of much smaller organisations,  I have done a lot of work in product development, 
a huge number there, a lot of which have initiated by Gates, or, you know, the idea comes 
and they seem to like this will public private partnership approach as a way of using their 
money to seed and attract public funding?" (UK Government Agency Z)   
  
This ability to create a participatory hub has also ushered active engagement between the 
different major PPPs in the field:  
  
" GAVI is a big one, the Global Fund, and UNITAID and then WHO and different 
departments within it. Some we've had to engage with for a number of years, some just for  a 
short period, but obviously, there's multiple departments within WHO, and then Partnership 
for Maternal Child Health PMNCH will be be another one." (Independent Consulting Firm 
K)  
  
As evidenced by the above quotes, there is now an environment where independent 
consulting firms are now engaging with prominent GHI partnerships such as GAVI, the 
Global Fund and UNITAID. The key observation is the growing participation of WHO with 
non-state actors.   
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CHAPTER 8. Discussion of the research findings for the study of institutional field-level 
change 
8.1 The linkage between findings and literature 
The purpose of this study is to explain how institutional change at the field level is taking 
place in the context of the global health system. The thesis explores the field of GHI 
networks. It studies how one of the institutional logics within it, i.e., the professional logic, 
has undergone a change, and has gradually evolved. The findings pertaining to the phases and 
factors of this logic evolution process are detailed in Section 8.2 below. The impact of the 
revised logic is expounded and developed upon in Section 8.3.   
 
The study identifies the macro/meso factors that affected the change process and eventually 
contributed to the restructuring of the field. The thesis thus aims to study how one of the 
institutional logics, specifically the professional logic, in the field of GHI networks has 
evolved. Section 8.4 centers on the macro and meso factors that have profoundly impacted 
the process of logic evolution. Structures have evolved in various ways in the field of GHIs 
under the overarching professional logic. This professional logic was prevalent in the early 
vertical approaches to tackling diseases. Following the proliferation of non-state donors, the 
professional logic has evolved. Internal logic evolution triggers mechanisms of institutional 
change in the field which radically reshape the field structure. Logic evolution makes space 
for a new subfield, redefining the objectives of the field and shifting the power dynamics 
between the actors. These key issues are delved into in Sections 8.6 and 8.7 below. 
 
Empirical literature on changes in GHI networks indicate that healthcare services were 
incorporated into vertical programmes before the 1990s. Following the proliferation of non-
state donors, the sector underwent a change process that, among other things, aimed at 
improving vertical efforts and creating an innovative approach in the field by fostering a 
more comprehensive view of the profession. Section 8.8 discusses how non-state donors have 
been the key proliferators in enabling the process of transformation. They have molded new 
ideas and engaged other stakeholders' interest in a particular cause, thus creating specific 
identity for field professionals who subscribe to the new practices.  
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8.2 Institutional change through logic evolution: blending as a process to restructure fields   
This thesis aims to investigate how institutional change dynamics unfold in a historical arena. 
The goal is to extend existing institutional theory studies on field-level change. It explores 
the field of GHI networks to explain how particular field structures develop through the 
process of evolution of an institutional logic, namely the professional logic. It reflects on the 
evolution in the field of one overarching logic, specifically that of the professional logic.  
  
The concepts of the emerging professional logic of integration are blended onto the old 
professional logic of assistance. The recently developed GHI networks and the PPP subfield, 
and the role of various professionals in medical product development programmes, has been 
infiltrated by private sector practices and methods. By introducing new characteristics that 
are simply and coherently related to old ones, blending will evolve the logic. Through 
extending the assistance concept to include emerging concepts with a more systematic and 
interconnected vision of the field of medical products for neglected diseases, the overarching 
professional logic has been expanded. This research defines the evolved logic as one of 
holistic assistance by blending.   
  
Blending is hypothesised by a highly respected and inclusive leadership network that 
endorses integration and innovation. They transform the relationships of actors so that the 
tasks and roles of professionals in various parts of the field reinforce each other and are well 
incorporated.   
The concepts of integrated logic are blended to the assistance logic. Blending can overhaul a 
logic by inserting new elements into existing frames by attempting to connect and explain 
relationships between these two. A synthesis of the assistance logic and new concepts of a 
more comprehensive view has expanded the overarching professional logic. This study refers 
to the logic elaborated through blending as one of holistic assistance.  
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Blending is theorised by a range of agents referred to as “proliferation agents” who frame a 
new legitimising identity and socialise participants via this construct. They allow 
professionals in the field to independently develop their own identity, legitimacy, control and 
practice in the newly created PPP subfield. They reshape the relationships of the 
professionals such that professional duties and responsibilities coexist in various parts of the 
field, even though they might not be fully harmonised in some aspects.  
Two sets of factors fundamentally influence evolution of the logic which occurs by blending 
process. These refer to the societal level (macro) and the field level (meso). Factors at the 
social level are the degree of trust in embracing alternate approaches (e.g., diversity of 
identities) and the ability to crystallise change. Professionals may be more likely to embrace 
and trust different legitimised identities and behaviours under an overarching logic if the 
degree of trust is well infiltrated in the field. They may reject all those claims and practices in 
another setting that does not exactly adhere to old ones. Therefore, actors may be more or 
less responsive in embracing these heterogeneities of identities and traditions and may strive 
to connect them to different rates. Field-level considerations relate to the legitimacy of major 
proliferation agents in the field and their status within society; to the likelihood for 
participants to identify a strategic field nexus where proliferation agents are saturated, and 
from which they can direct resources and sustain a firm commitment to change; and to the 
ability to create a participatory hub which allows the creation of these new legitimised 
identities. The participatory hub is crucial to the evolution of the professional logic, as it 
introduces the latest concepts into the field and stimulates micro-processes of interactions 
between those who implement various paradigms. Moreover, it helps the new brand and 
procedures to be reshaped from the bottom of the field.  
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  8.2.1 Phases and factors of logic evolution process     
 Figure 10 Phases and factors of logic evolution process (author’s own diagram)  
 
   
Logic evolution relied on five factors each of which was dependent on subfactors. Figure 10 
above demonstrates the process. The figure was created by combining the findings and 
analysis from chapters 5, 6 and 7.   
  
These are detailed below:  
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1. Capacity to crystallise change which depended on the efficiency of the 
decisionmaking processes; the dynamism and flexibility, holistic attitude and 
ideological drive of non-state donors.  
  
2. The degree of trust in embracing different viewpoints which depends on the level of 
openness to accepting different mandates; the model of recruitment and governance; 
provision of strategic support to engage actors.   
  
3. The legitimacy of proliferation agents encompasses history and societal status of 
institutions; recognition and prominence of proliferation agents, as well as the role of 
academia in the legitimation process.  
  
  
4. Feasibility of identifying a strategic field nexus; which depends on the density of 
strategic support network, as well as the ability to ensure political support both at the 
global and country level.  
  
5. The ability to create a participatory hub, where the concepts derived from the updated 
logic can be propagated: creation of a hub for professionals was central in converting 
ideas into practices, in order to create new values, identities and positions in the field 
by means of everyday micro processes of interactions.  
   
Within each stage of the transition, each of these variables gained more importance but 
nonetheless played a role all through the transition (please see Figure 10). The proactive and 
collaborative method, the corporate approach, the emphasis on internal integrity, and a strong 
focus on the conversion of concepts into practices, have generated a framework which has 
spread and legitimated the whole of the GHI network. A new ideology has been formulated 
by influential, high status proliferation agents and incorporated into an established 
overarching logic.  
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Ideological impetus, strategy, accessibility emphasis and "implementation void" led to the 
creation of health initiatives as one of the viable solutions available in the field of medical 
products, and it also led to a variety of potential relational frameworks.   
  
The field structure required a champion for theory to be clearly defined. This helped foster a 
cohesive organisational model of GHIs centred around non-state actors. It gave rise to the 
PPP subfield. The choice of defining a strategic field hub made proliferation simpler. Major 
proliferators were centralised within a common context that allowed the catalysis of  new 
ideas, and therefore left little room for multifaceted interpretations of the concepts 
introduced.  
  
The importance of experts aligned with the history of academic institutions and proliferation 
agents, offered a forum for the launch of the transformation process and thus allowed sharing 
of ideas. Universities set up independent drug development departments which were mostly 
led by high-status professionals in health.  
  
These networks have been used to legitimise the identity for GHI professionals. It was meant 
to de-institutionalise the old and legitimise the new strategy. Eradicating the old identity 
produces a new generic community of professionals. The new paradigm was associated with 
explicit separation from the old system in terms of new relational networks, novel control 
mechanisms and new practices. Based on globally accepted standards, it was described as the 
most suitable approach for the given context. The replacement of the original model occurred 
through socialisation and was enacted via the field practices. Within the new relational 
networks, these practices were subject to new control mechanisms in the GHI field.  
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8.3 Evolution of revised logic as blending, leading to field- level institutional change  
Non-state donor ideology and working habits have evolved in the last 20 years. Pointing to 
"ideal types" of professional logic in the field of medical products for neglected diseases, this 
study suggests that the old paradigm was based on a pervasive professional logic of 
assistance  Instead, the concepts surrounding the organisational strategy following the 
proliferation period belonged to a professional logic of integration (Figure 11 on p.142).  
  
The development of a proper PPP subfield based on the integration logic with its identifiable 
norms, influenced the conventional ways of organising and speaking about the GHI field. As 
a result, the advent of non-state donors shifted the interaction between donors and 
beneficiaries, thus changing people's view of the general operation.   
  
Present literature on institutional theory could justify this transition, by arguing that a new 
logic replaced the prevailing logic in the field, or that the mixture of logics in place was 
increasingly changed. While this study does not rule out such powers playing a part, it draws 
attention to a separate mechanism of change; one arising from one of the logics' intrinsic 
evolution. In that sense, the professional logic of assistance evolved into that of integration.  
The overarching professional logic in the GHIs has thus been updated.  
  
Based on the context-specific features, the particular method of logic evolution connected the 
premises of these approaches in a distinctive way (please see Figure 10 on p.82). New 
innovations are blended into the current system so that the exclusive role of non-state donors 
in the GHIs, supports that of government programmes. In certain contexts, new proposals are 
related to the prior logic, such that non-state donors actually coexist with policymakers and 
former public drug manufacturers. These modes of logic evolution are developed in more or 
less uniform fields.  
Private foundations, in some cases, augment government programmes. This section refers to 
the resulting underlying logic as one of holistic assistance, to highlight the essence of this 
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consistent system of interconnected areas of the field. Private and public have specific 
functions that do not clash, but holistically assist each other instead. The overall professional 
logic of assistance has been evolved to include new concepts of integrated logic. In this 
sense, the concepts of assistance logic and integrated logic are cohesively combined in the 
field.  
  
8.3.1 Field integration through blending  
Major non-state donors’, such as the BMGF have helped to change the field of medical products for 
neglected diseases which is the overarching aim of Global Health Initiatives. Health coverage was 
meant in a wider context, encompassing not only distribution, but other aspects as well. This can be 
termed as an enrichment process which will eventually lead to logic evolution via a blending 
process.   
The term blending or integrating is derived from the fact that product development 
partnerships in the GHI field are seen as system integrators.   
As defined by Chataway et al. (2007), PPPs will act as an interface and a negotiator with 
diverse players in the private and public sectors. PPPs play the role of 'system integrator' 
within the innovation process, which can include players at any point in the R&D cycle; from 
exploration through to development and distribution. In most PPPs, R&D capabilities/assets 
(e.g. financial capital, vaccine/drug research, development, manufacturing, and distribution) 
may not occur with the PPP itself. Therefore, the key avenue by which PPPs establish a 
foundation of R&D expertise is through cooperation; professionals in the field have to work 
by combining and collaborating. This follows the professional logic of integration, which 
symbolises the evolution of logic in the field of Global Health Initiatives (GHIs).   
  
Public health scholars conceptualise the development and functioning of PPPs in the wider 
sense of the ecosystem of medical product/health innovation that operates outside national 
borders (Munoz et al., 2015; Papaioannou et al., 2009). The product development 
environment consists of among others; (a) the business and non-profit sector, including (bio) 
pharmaceutical, medical and R&D organisations; (b) government agencies, including 
national regulatory authorities, and; (c) individuals (including public health experts, scientists 
and decision makers in infection-endemic countries and patients), who have an endemic 
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environment (Buse and Tanaka, 2011; Munoz et al., 2015; Aerts et al., 2017). Essentially, the 
ecology of innovation is made up of several players participating in the development and 
delivery of medicines, vaccines and diagnostics for neglected diseases, and is affected by 
external influences, including those relevant to public health policy, funding, legislation and 
intellectual property, rather than human capital and infrastructure. The Expert Committee 
under the umbrella of the World Health Assembly (WHO, 2006), outlined the main four 
pillars which govern the health innovation environment and which, in essence, also provide 
overall guidance on the projects of the PPPs. The professional logic of integration is further 
expanded upon this environment of innovation as it operates outside national borders. The 
creation of this specific PPP model further signifies the evolution of logic in the field of 
GHIs.  
This blending and integrating have been structured around PPPs being effective and 
productive in bringing new medical products to the market. Many PPPs consist of select 
teams with expertise in the public health and pharmaceutical industries, and these members 
generally oversee different facets of PPP organisational activities, including project and 
portfolio management. A committee panel and external advisory members supervise the work 
of the core team, which contribute science and technological experience to the PPPs (Moran 
et al., 2010; Munoz et al., 2015).  
  
These new GHIs in the form of PPPs have induced change at the grassroots and supply chain 
level. The healthcare structures that are emanating out of these changes are good examples of 
the enrichment process taking place. There are claims that these changes could influence very 
positively different aspect of policies in disease endemic countries.  
  
Nevertheless, this increasing growth in corporate agenda in the global health system, has led 
to claims that certain topics might become marginalised. There are indications that the 
agenda is leaning more towards improving the competitiveness of European Industries as 
opposed to fixing health systems in disease endemic countries.  
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8.3.2 Field enrichment through coexistence   
Non-state entities coexist with other sources of drug delivery, and its role vis-à -vis the health 
system is technically evident. This thesis refers to the resulting underlying logic as one of 
coexisting in order to highlight the essence of this unsettled interaction between various areas 
of the sector. The task of non-state donors is to provide services; however, their position is 
not exclusive, since other players may also provide services. Moreover, the services delivered 
are not standardised across a region.  
In this area, there are separate concepts of assistance logic and integration logic and no clear 
and unambiguous statements are made to make sense of how the two coexist. The PPP 
subfield has grown rather heterogeneously, because players embrace a mixed environment in 
which private and public activities coexist with independent modes of public administration.  
 
8.3.3 Shift in the dynamics of relationships  
The next impact of this logic evolution process is the changing of relationships between the 
different network actors. One such relationship is that of the World Health Organization with the 
other participants in the GHI field.   
  
While it was claimed that the primary accountability of the WHO was to the participating 
member states, the question was raised about the validity of that claim due to the emergence 
of a new configuration. The field is now populated with non-state actors like the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, large companies, or NGO networks, that hold tremendous 
influence in the allocation of funding, strategy implementation and diffusion of crucial 
activities such as the development and distillation of new drugs and chemical entities. Amidst 
all this uncertainty and questioning, the WHO began losing its grip as an important interstate 
actor; it principally struggled to define its relationship and interaction with these emerging, 
powerful non-state actors. Their grip was further loosened with the formation of the GAVI 
Alliance and the Global Fund, who had a clear structure in place, in terms of their positioning 
with these non-state actors and powerful organisations (Bruen and Brugha,2014).  
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With the World Health Organization losing its grip under distillation of new drugs and 
chemical entities, their relationship in the network with other emerging actors has now 
changed. The World Health Organization is now seen as a normative agency, rather than a 
body which can control and do everything.In a global ecosystem of health innovation, GHI 
partnerships such as PPPs, play the role of system integrators, largely integrating capital, 
experience and the capacity to identify solutions, especially in neglected diseases, among 
different stakeholders of the ecosystem. Many PPPs run on a non-profit basis and lack the 
financial resources and advanced knowledge base to invest in R&D initiatives to produce 
new medicines (Chataway et al., 2007; Munoz et al., 2015).   
  
Given the dynamic relationships between PPPs and the main players in the health innovation 
ecosystem, it is imperative that their effectiveness and sustainability depend on their ability to 
maintain and orientate the partnerships, governance structures and trust. PPPs have been 
working to build and grow a pipeline of new approaches since they came into being. On the 
one hand there are PPPs and their donors and investors, and on the other there are PPPs and 
organisational collaborators. We remember that donors, especially non-state donors, 
frequently take over in their relationships with the PPP, by creating different contexts, and by 
using different methods to assess PPPs' efficiency (power and trust paradigms). The 
partnership between the PPPs and their institutional collaborators, which consist mostly of 
contract research firms, contract manufacturing entities, and various research groups, is in 
comparison biased towards the PPPs.  
In among all these dynamics between PPPs, investors and collaborators, the WHO seems to 
be a mere cog in the machine. The birth of this shift in relations in the global health structure 
began in the 1990s, which is when the WHO started facing questions in terms of its 
accountability in that field. The changing landscape of the global health field now sees the 
presence of NGOs, philanthropic organisations, and for-profit companies. These 
organisations, due to the changing dynamics, have seen their power trickle down to the state 
and inter-state level policies by aligning themselves with Global Health Initiatives (GHIs) 
(Pereira et al., 2020).While in the 1990s, the structure was simpler and clearly defined, with 
organisations that specifically represented the member states such as the WHO, now the 
configuration has morphed into a more complicated web of actor participations, with public-
private partnership becoming the norm (Gilson, et al., 2008).  
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Due to this modification in the relationship, the mandate of the World Health Organization is 
now markedly different. In order to keep their relevance, this change of mandate for 
statecentric bodies such as the World Health Organization is important. In other words, the 
World Health Organization is taking on a more collaborative view, as opposed to be the one 
in the driving seat on all matters regarding drug provision for neglected diseases.  
 
8.4 Logic evolution influencing field change through the lens of macro and meso factors  
The research describes two sets of factors that profoundly affected these processes, which are 
linked to level of society (macro) and level of field (meso). Factors of a social class are the 
ability to crystallise change and the degree of trust in accepting alternative approaches (e.g. 
plurality of identities). Sources of identity and legitimacy are central to the evolution of 
logics; however, in a field there might be various sources of identity and legitimacy that 
might oppose each other. Actors can be more likely to embrace and tolerate several sources 
of identities and legitimacy when it pertains to an overarching logic as opposed to another. In 
this study, actors have embraced to varying degrees the new sources of legitimacy and 
identity under the overarching professional logic. However, this tolerance to new sources 
might not apply to another institutional logic.  
  
In addition, actors may be more or less versatile in embracing these heterogeneities of 
identities and may attempt to relate them to varying degrees. Many critical factors 
influencing the logic evolution process contribute to field level. This concerns the legitimacy 
of proliferation agents in the field and, more generally, their status within society; the 
feasibility of establishing a strategic field nexus where proliferators are based from where 
they can share resources and dedication to their cause; and the process of creating a 
participatory hub. The participatory hub is important to legitimise the identities of the 
professionals in the field.   
  
The magnitude of transition can be linked to the field’s ability to crystallise change, and the 
degree of trust in the field participants to accept different ideologies. More radical change 
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processes will be associated with an improved capacity to crystallise reform. Since actors are 
not comfortable with publicly opposing values and finding solutions to conflicts, they can 
embark on drastic changes to either remove or combine conflicting viewpoints. With less 
drastic change methods, a lower ability to crystallise change can be associated.  
A higher degree of trust in embracing alternate approaches can be related to more radical 
change processes. Since key proliferation agents in the field stress the need to legitimise and 
build a more relevant identity, they seek to share a field in which multiple identities are 
legitimised by association and relation with them in varying ways. Less extreme processes of 
change can be associated with a lower degree of trust to embrace alternative viewpoints or 
pluralistic perspectives. When key proliferation agents are not accepted as a legitimate 
personality, professionals will not participate in deeper processes of theorisation and 
socialisation in those environments.  
The trust in embracing the perspectives, in pluralistic fields such as GHI networks and the 
ability to crystallise change, can be linked to the delegitimisation of the concepts and 
practices in a set paradigm. Where there is a low degree of trust and high ability to crystallise 
change, newly legitimised and institutionalised identities can lead to new control 
mechanisms, relational networks and practices. This will then involve a dismissal of previous 
ideologies or practices in a particular field. Proliferation agents will, however, try to merge 
the new and the old into an integrated synthesis. Despite delegitimising old arguments in a 
specific field, proliferation agents might also allow those who follow old logics to associate 
with them further in other parts of the field.  
  
On the other hand, the degree of trust can be high, but the ability to crystallise change by the 
proliferation agents can be low. In that case, the new and old institutionalised claims of 
legitimised identity might lead to both prior and current networks and practices to exist in the 
field via the blending process. Field actors would have the choice between both arguments 
while feeling no need to explain the linkages between the arguments. Rather than 
delegitimising old arguments, they will be seeking to identify gaps to be filled by the new 
arguments. They would allow the preferred identity and practices to be chosen independently 
and would rely on micro-level processes to redesign relationships between those who 
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implement the different principles. This approach would raise credibility of the new identities 
and practices within the group of actors that select them.  
The degree of trust in accepting pluralistic perspectives and the ability to crystallise change 
can thus influence the nature of a particular institutional setting, increasing its complexity 
level. These features may be relevant when trying to understand how institutional actors and 
organisations react to uncertainty and the nature of plurality in a field such as the global 
health system (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta and Lounsbury, 2011; Pache and 
Santos, 2010,2013; Aalto and Kallio, 2019).  
Legitimate professionals who are likely to support the transition are not necessarily the most 
influential ones. This reflects results from previous research (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006) 
which suggest that key actors function and promote reform as institutional entrepreneurs. The 
examination here indicates that along with the authority gained and retained by those 
proliferation agents in the field, their position and credibility within the broader society may 
also be a significant factor in institutional change processes.  
  
When proliferation agents (both prominent and non-prominent ones) are abundant in a field, 
fundamental changes are likely to occur, as they can create a more cohesive strategy and 
implement resources to their purpose. If such a strategic nexus cannot be identified in the 
field and proliferators are not clustered, reform may still occur, but it is less likely to be 
fundamental. If the agents of proliferation are not clearly focalised, then the systematic 
mobilisation of normative, regulative and cultural capital will not occur. Instead, alternate 
views are more likely to arise, and thus will not make use of the full scope of resources 
available.  
It is via social relationships that new legitimised identities will be recognised and enacted; 
and it is through social relationships built via participatory hubs that this new form of 
legitimacy and identity will be synonymous with particular practices. If this method 
specifically affect groups of people that have already been socialised to another identity, 
social relationships become more likely to be developed. This is because those participants 
are able to view the difference between the old and the new. The old identity is slowly 
eliminated, and the new one will be acquiring growing legitimacy in the field. By primarily 
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approaching groups of people who haven't already been socialised to another legitimised 
identity, new and old practices are more likely to be equally valid and coexist in the field. 
The system will develop gradually and the old identity will probably finally vanish as its 
proponents lose their grip in the field.  
  
This transition could be clarified by current institutional theory literature by suggesting that 
the dominant field logic was being replaced by a new one, or that the merging of the current 
logics is being altered slowly. While this dissertation does not preclude the position of these 
powers, it points out a specific trend, a shift that stems from the inner evolution of one of the 
logics. The two optimal forms, that of assistance and integration, were blended.  
8.5 Implications of the findings and contributions of the research   
This research adds to established evidence of the mechanisms by which institutional reform 
at the field level occurs in a specific context. It queries the existing institutional approach to 
study change which relies on explanations based on shifts in dominant logics or paradigm 
conflicts. This reveals that change can actually happen through the evolution of field-level 
logics which is a process of blending new identities, promulgating new legitimacy, 
developing new relational networks, control mechanisms and practices, and putting them in 
the field within an overarching logic. It also makes a variety of contributions to 
neoinstitutionalist literature.   
By adding an aspect of internal variability and evolution, field-level logics can be retheorised. 
They have been viewed as of now as being somewhat homogenous and rigid. From the 
existing set of studies, these tend to be defined as fixed dimensions (e.g. Thornton and 
Ocasio, 1999, 2008; Durand and Thornton, 2018) that are represented at a wider societal 
level and are replicated in all fields, albeit at different times. However, we do not know if and 
how logics play an important role in all fields. In addition, there needs to be more clarity with 
regards to the factors and methods that allow the application and reshaping of overarching 
logics within fields. This study offers a contribution in that regard by examining the internal 
characteristics of one specific institutional logic in a current relevant context.  
Considering the diversity of fields, we must conclude that some logics are not implemented 
to the same degree in some fields as in others. Furthermore, considering the complexity of 
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settings, we must recognise that there may be contextual differences in the way concepts are 
perceived and behaviours justified, even when they are articulated in the same institutional 
structure, even within the same field (Lounsbury, 2007; Ashraf, Ahmadsimab and Pinkse, 
2017). However, we cannot compensate for such complexity if we follow a static and rigid 
conceptualisation of logics as has been the case so far.  
In order to better understand if and how logics modify and interact in a particular context, we 
need to adopt a more dynamic and evolved conceptual model of logic. The idea of logics as 
ensembles of belief systems (Townley, 1997; Yoshikawa, Witt and Yamada, 2020) or 
cultural tools (Swidler, 1986,2000; Richey and Ravishankar, 2019) could allow such insights 
to be incorporated in this respect. Conceptualising logics as cultural tools from which actors 
can draw new structures to theorise means that logics can be conceived as various pieces and 
tools that can be updated over time. This can help to uncover the process by which logics 
change internally and introduce a flexibility element in logic evolution. It can also allow us to 
evaluate and define its features, including some of its main characteristics such as sources of 
identity and legitimacy, relational networks, control mechanisms and practices more 
accurately.   
Actors at field level are influenced by several logics that are not necessarily at odds, and may 
coexist for a long time (Dunn and Jones, 2010; Bossy et al., 2016). In other words, the 
overarching logic is different. Participants can see the ability to change it as they accept a 
specific logic. They may start to implement new ideas or practices related to an evolved logic 
which they see as consistent with the original and eventually integrate it into the prior 
dominant logic.  
Macro and meso considerations such as the degree of trust in embracing alternative 
approaches, and the ability to crystallise change in identities and practices, are important in 
understanding the importance of agency in these logic evolution processes. It can also 
contribute to a sense of continuity among various paradigms, identities and practices, and to 
the creation of particular organisational responses to alternate institutional activities (Kraatz 
and Block, 2008; Pache and Santos, 2010; Grinevich et al., 2019).  
Previous studies stressed the nature of the institutional setting (Greenwood et al. 2010, 11; 
Durand and Thornton, 2018) and the effect on social behaviour of institutional 
  207  
inconsistencies (Friedland and Alford, 1991). Logic studies have begun to consider pluralism, 
mainly with a view to changing the balance of opposing logics in one field (Reay and 
Hinings, 2009; Andersson and Liff, 2018; Martin et al., 2020). Pluralism can, however, also 
affect internal logic changes. Despite the association of durability to institutions, we need to 
take account of the change in field logic over time. They could be institutionalised and 
dominant in a field, deinstitutionalised and removed from a field, and perhaps restructured 
(Scott 2001; Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2015).   
  
The study builds on the latest theoretical developments. According to earlier empirical 
studies, researchers are moving away from the concept that change stems from shifts in 
dominating logic (Rao, Monin, and Durand, 2003; Scott et al., 2000; Thornton and Ocasio, 
1999; Thornton, 2002). Recently, academics have analysed change as new logics emerge 
through sensemaking (Ocasio, Loewenstein and Nigam, 2015) or as attempts to resolve 
disputes between competing logics (Ivancheva et al., 2020; Shields and Watermeier, 2020). 
Some have highlighted practices related to new logics, including transformation, grafting, 
bridging and exiting (Purdy and Gray 2009; Qiu, Gopal and Hann, 2017).   
  
Others understand that logics do not inherently compete and can exist side by side over 
prolonged periods of time in the same area (Andersson and Liff, 2018; Dunn and Jones, 
2010). This enhances this research body, with greater attention to the complexities that 
change a theory in a field from within. The results indicate how a logic is developed over 
time through blending processes. Nonetheless, this study extends previous work by looking at 
ways in which logic concepts linked to the same institutional order are integrated and 
illustrates the stages of the cycle of logic evolution. The process of blending allowed the 
reconstruction of sources of identity and legitimacy which would then be infiltrated to new 
relational networks strengthened by formal/informal control mechanisms, and implemented 
through practices. In addition, the work examines the macro and meso factors that affect the 
processes by which actors create and recreate legitimised identities, responsibilities, 
networks, control mechanisms and practices with regards to the previous ones.   
This thesis argues that field-level changes can arise through logic evolution via blending. The 
term "blending” or grafting occurs in earlier identity studies (Nag, Corley and Gioia, 2007) 
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and institutional change (Purdy and Gray, 2009), while "coexistence" occurs in the literature 
on logics (Patterson, de Voogt and Sapiains, 2019). These terms are used in this research, 
however, because they are immersed in the data to the extent that they are possible. 
Throughout this research, logic evolution was applied inductively; its significance for the 
change process is extracted from the data analysis rather than from the a priori hypotheses 
developed during the initial study set-up. The logic evolution process can be linked to that of 
conceptualising institutional change (Micelotta, Lounsbury and Greenwood, 2017; Strang 
and Meyer, 1993; Greenwood et al., 2002).   
The two concepts are linked, as they involve the interpretation and justification of 
institutional components. The theorisation process focuses on the development and 
legitimisation of organisations while the process of evolution focuses on integrating new 
concepts into an established system. Logic blending does not define a transition beyond a 
given logic; this is either a change in the prevailing logic (Blaschke et al., 2017), or a shift of 
the balance of the logic (Arman, Liff and Wikström, 2014; Reay and Hinings, 2009).Instead 
they arise as internal characteristics of formulating a logic are reinterpreted. Additionally, 
theorisation emerges as an essential step for creating identities and roles and gaining 
legitimacy. Furthermore, networks, peer-to-peer interactions and everyday activities are 
drivers for solidifying legitimacy and constantly redefining identities and legitimacy, 
particularly through the process of socialisation. Legitimising identities has been rarely 
discussed in previous research, and it is fundamental to logic evolution processes 
(Greenwood et al., 2002; Rao et al., 2003; Zamparini and Lurati, 2017). Research on 
institutional theory and identity is often portrayed as diametrically opposed (Ben-Asher, 
2019); however, a closer integration may benefit them. Logics arise as identity-centred 
statements in empirical studies which are implemented by specific procedures and covered by 
particular networks or structures and mechanisms for control. Therefore, a more attentive 
look at the perspective of sources of identity and legitimacy can enhance our understanding 
of logics. In the context of intra-organisational processes and microlevel analysis, several 
scholars have attempted to apply a systemic viewpoint to identity literature (Goodrick and 
Reay, 2010). Research on sources of social identity and legitimacy, might help institutional 
scholars uncover organisational responses to a variety of queries pertaining to institutional 
theory by showing how resisting change could be derived by claims to identity and 
legitimacy (Geenen and Muehlfeld, 2020). In addition, studies on legitimising identity can 
gain from institutional logic analysis, especially specific to professionals in a field. They may 
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have perspectives into how identities become legitimised and practices may become 
disassociated (Kasperiuniene and Zydziunaite, 2019). ⠀  
 8.6 Fields and Subfields  
Internal logic evolution triggers mechanisms of institutional change in the field, which 
radically reshape the field structure. Logic evolution makes space for a new subfield, 
redefining the objectives of the field and shifting the power dynamics between the actors. 
Since this involves the building of new elements and their connection to existing ones, logic 
evolution gives rise to the introduction of new tenets of legitimised identities, networks and 
practices as new ideas are blended. Such layers are expressed in the field structure, and they 
comprise numerous subfields that are interconnected to the overarching objective of the field. 
The central goal upon which the field operates might not automatically be disputed by field 
actors during logic evolution. Blending only partly updates the underlying and core definition 
of the field goal (Hoffman, 1999; Conran and Thelen, 2016). Across the global health system 
field, for example, people work together to ensure that the public is safe.   
Change occurs as a restructuring process and continuous modification of clustered elements 
creating nested field structures. Particular factors at the field and societal level shape the 
logic evolution process and this allows sources of legitimised identities, relational networks, 
and control mechanisms to emerge. These can be densely or lightly coupled and, as such, 
result in a more or less relatively homogenous configuration and field "sedimentation" 
(Malhotra and Hinings, 2005). More cohesive subfields and more formal and ordered fields 
arise in the blending process. Compatibility among the identities and roles of professionals in 
various subfields ultimately leads to greater field integration with well-defined and organised 
systems, relationships, and distribution of power. More diverse subfields and more unstable 
fields arise if the macro and meso factors are not properly imbued in the blending process. 
Viable alternatives may lead to divergent sources of legitimacy and identity to co-exist, and 
thus lead to increased heterogeneity within networks, relationships, and power dynamics.  
 
This study argues that restructuring of a field through the formation of subfields is a 
consequence of logic evolution. Potential study of developments at the field level will also 
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need to take account of the presence of these subfields. This may be induced by changes in 
the logic mix (e.g. adding a business rationale in a field dominated by state logic).  
Nevertheless, the work shows that subfields can also be generated through the evolution of 
existing logics, and the evolution of concepts pertaining to the old and new paradigms when 
linked to the same institutional order.  
  
8.7 Fields and subfields embracing the same overarching logic   
The structure of a social group and structural relationships between the subgroups are 
influenced by logic evolution. Institutional theory has regarded stakeholders as highly 
centralized groups which maintain relatively similar principles in terms of collective mindset 
and associated practises.   
  
They all have a similar logic that drives them in the field as professionals. Each subgroup 
therefore includes a more unique legitimate identity which determines its own and not the 
other members in other subgroups. This notion illustrates the fragmentation of the 
overarching logic. (Kitchener 2002, p. 414)  
  
In the creation and evolution of subfields, new concepts and practises arise by the evolution 
of an institutional logic. The logic characteristics are then embedded and used in varying 
ways by different groups of individuals, who use these features to form the field, or some 
areas of the field. Each institutional setting consists of many subgroups that share a similar 
overriding logic but retain more complex identities that determine their legitimate 
membership to that subgroup and are connected by the overarching logic in diverse ways. 
This idea is coherent with the conceptualisation of logics as legitimacy and identity sources.  
Acceptance of that vision allows considerations to be given to the way by which multiple 
legitimate identities are embraced and varied within an overarching logic, by the field 
participants related to this logic. Yet, logic as it is perceived in this study, is a collection of 
cultural beliefs and rules that organise cognition in the context of a given institutional field 
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which informs policy making and forming the behaviours and interactions of actors 
(Lounsbury 2002, 2007). The cultural devices are used in the recombination of identity and 
legitimacy by actors (Ben-Asher, 2019). Logics are modes of thinking centred on sources of 
legitimate identity and can facilitate different interpretations of such claims of legitimised 
identities. Collective identities that have been legitimised were described as "groups of actors 
which can be strategically and fluidly built, organised around a shared purpose and seeking 
similar outcomes" (Wry, Lounsbury and Glynn, 2011). Perhaps the principle of logic closely 
explores the higher social orders that form social action; it explores the paradigm of 
collection of legitimate identities which is applicable to a single social context made up of 
different participants.  
Additional studies can highlight the relationship between those tenets to understand why we 
need concepts, of logic, identity and legitimacy in order to understand why and how 
researchers may choose to follow one or the other. The notion of multiple identities which are 
legitimate may describe the collective functions of individuals in order to accomplish a 
certain purpose whereas institutional logic can seem to rely mostly on the common values 
and practices that underlie and endorse certain functions which then lead to the specific 
effects.  
8.7.1 Resource related power  
This section discusses three key impacts of the proliferation of these new health initiatives in 
the global health system.   
The capacity of countries to match their programme objectives with the WHO budget is 
limited. Participating countries agree and plan to use only the part of the budget funded by 
donations from member countries (about 25 per cent of overall budget) while donors choose 
how to use additional-budgetary (voluntary) funding (over 80 per cent of total funding) from 
governmental and non-governmental actors (Sridhar and Clinton,2017). Like in the case of 
PPPs, their authority depends on the success of their actions but is not connected to any 
transparency to governments. Prominent non-state donors are able to impose tremendous 
influence on global health policies through the size of their wealth. The funding from donors 
comes with some conditionalities which demonstrates the resource related power of big 
funders such as the BMGF.  
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PPPs focus, strategy and organisation is driven by the push to hold down R&D and 
operational costs. Munoz et al .( 2015) note that while PPPs have to pay the expense of 
product creation and take into account the cost of product distribution (including the cost of 
registration), PPPs are mindful that they prefer to keep as close as possible to the cost of the 
last unit of production, in order to meet their access targets. Outsourcing of R&D operations 
in this context is a key approach implemented by PPPs to achieve the targets.   
  
Thus, unlike the partnership between the PPP and its funders, where the funders appear to 
have an upper hand, the partnership between the PPP and its collaborators is distorted in 
favour of the PPPs. Two problems are fundamental to the problem of R&D outsourcing. The 
first issue relates to the recognition and selection of a trustworthy partner to perform various 
activities in the field of drug production and, in this context, to the credibility and confidence 
in the partners' expertise and capabilities (Das and Teng, 2001; Villena, Choi and Revilla, 
2019), especially in the case of the use of corporate market testing and market manufacturing 
firms. This feature ultimately supports the hypothesis that the relationship of trust established 
by a prior experience or association between organisations and key boundary spanners affects 
the creation of relationships between organisations (Tatarynowicz, Sytch and Gulati, 2016).  
  
8.7.2 Donor-related power  
  
Viewed from the prism of GHIs, their operation and stability is fundamentally dependent on 
their ability to access financial services from multiple sources and, in that regard, it is crucial 
that the financial capital portfolio strike a balance between unregulated, semi-restricted and 
restricted funding (Boulton et al.,2014; Moran et al., 2010).   
    
Extant literature points out that the power dynamic between GHIs and their donors, especially 
non-state donors, is weighted towards non-state donors. In emphasising the power yield of 
donors, Munoz et al. (2015), especially in adding conditions for PPP, states that, "in PPPs, 
donors decide on target areas for financing, criteria for disbursements of funds, control 
instruments, compliance criteria, etc. These specifications are not harmonised, nor are they 
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made public among PPPs (Munoz et al., 2015: 326). Furthermore, they agree that of the 
numerous donor groups, non-state donors, especially philanthropic organisations, are more 
likely to impose limits on how their funds should be used, and hence implicitly guide PPP 
preferences. This influence is also present over state-centric bodies such as the WHO.  
A good example of this donor related power of the BMGF, the dominant non-state donor in 
the field, is when Bill Gates was invited to host an address in front of the World Health 
Assembly (WHA) in 2011. The important point to underline is the fact that this was the 
second time that Bill Gates was invited to address WHA. This key incident demonstrated the 
amount of influence that non-state donors have over traditional organisations such as WHA 
and WHO.  
  
However, there is also an argument that tends to support the fact that private foundations 
haven’t been more influential than, for instance, the UK government. Nevertheless, a key 
point to underline is that the BMGF tends to be more directive as opposed to the approach of 
governments (UK, Sweden, Norway).  
  
To some extent, it can be interpreted that the single overseeing agency is the BMGF. As a 
funder of many PPPs, the foundation sees the wider picture of R&D ventures by PPPs; still, 
an overview of PPP portfolios or other coordinating initiatives at a broader level is not 
disclosed to the public (Munoz et al., 2015)  
  
  
PPPs may be subject to the problems encountered by pharmaceutical firms in attempting the 
same, leading to dead ends, making futile attempts to duplicate screening, and studies 
previously conducted by others. There may also be a lack of cohesion and cooperation 
between the different GHIs, which results in needless duplication of work, although we do 
not have enough evidence to research how this could impact R&D performance. Competition 
is not always debated in a non-profit economy. In the case of PPPs, it is obvious that PPPs 
can compete for the same selected revenue streams to acquire funds.   
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The interviews did point out that GHIs are not always consistent as to who sets the GHI 
goals. In addition, various interests are associated, be it the major donor (i.e. the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, the largest philanthropic donor), the board, the pharmaceutical 
industry affiliate, or the government of infectious disease countries. Potential problems in the 
board may occur, for instance, when a pharmaceutical corporation representative or a funder 
is on the board; PPPs often do not have a simple plan about how to deal with the problems.  
 
8.7.3 Accountability and initiative  
As mentioned, several PPPs identify the R&D project's product profiles. Many PPPs, though, 
take a more pragmatic method to evaluating drug profiles, e.g. by choosing at a later point to 
identify a price plan for the latest medicinal product (Muñoz, et al., 2015; Pereira, et al., 
2020). PPPs can also differ as to whether they have a specified 'service' policy (protocols for 
ensuring the availability of the latest medical drug to those who need it).  
   
Many GHIs have certain fundamental standards to guarantee access, that drives agreements 
for information sharing (screening compounds), low manufacturing costs for business 
partners, and royalty-free licences, at least for endemic countries. This is accompanied by 
very strict rules and regulations with regards to clinical trials and development of diagnostic 
tools. This sense of increased accountability is key to protecting the public image of these 
new health initiatives and more importantly of the prominent non-state donors that fund 
them.  
Small companies (such as biotechnology firms) can also be extremely creative and show 
initiative. As of 1980, the proportion of NCE related to small pharmaceutical and biotech 
firms has grown to almost 70 per cent (Munoz et al., 2015; Pereira et al., 2020). In addition, 
the large size of R&D investments of major pharmaceutical companies, and growth patterns 
by mergers and acquisitions, did not contribute to increased creativity and innovation with 
respect to newly approved NCE. PPPs with limited portfolios of projects may well have a 
peculiar propensity to stick to projects which would otherwise have been disbanded. 
Earlystage mono-product companies, as opposed to businesses with multi-drugs under 
development, are less inclined to terminate their main and most feasible drug targets (Guedj 
and Scharfstein, 2004).  
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The above can be interpreted through the lens of the impact of proliferation. While increased 
accountability and standards was one, the rise in professional initiatives in the field needs to 
be highlighted.  
  
There are also initiatives at the country level where countries are requesting more integration 
and independence, at the primary health care level. However, donors have shown reluctance 
to give up control of these health programmes.  
 
8.8 Proliferation agents and institutional change   
The study focused on the role played by non-state donors in the mechanisms of logic 
evolution. They are seen as the proliferators of change and the key institutional entrepreneurs 
(DiMaggio, 1988; Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). They do not only construct meanings 
derived from a different model, but also construct models and platforms to socialise those 
who are expected to incorporate them into their different functions and practices.  
  
Institutional research has suggested that change mechanisms may be facilitated and initiated 
by both main and peripheral actors. Some believed that newer and less influential fringe 
players in a particular field had a greater likelihood of innovation as their innovative 
behaviour was unlikely to get them sanctioned (Hardy and Maguire, 2017). Subsequently, 
additional research revealed that in fact it is the most effective and central actors that are 
capable of catalysing change (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006).  
  
In accordance with this work, researchers looked at the players that were perceived to be 
critical to the processes of institutionalisation and the implementation of policies. The main 
focus has mainly been on public entities, such as the State and specialised organisations 
(Kellogg, 2019; Greenwood et al, 2002) and these were perceived to be reform initiators. The 
majority of field logic research in the health sector claimed that the change in the field was 
largely promoted by the state and resisted by the participants (Reay, Goodrick and Hinings, 
2016). This study however, suggests that non-state donors have been the key proliferators in 
enabling the process of transformation. They have moulded new ideas and engaged other 
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stakeholders' interest in a particular cause, thus creating specific identity for field 
professionals who subscribe to the new practices. They are in a position to recognise the 
potential of improvement (Huybrechts et al., 2020) by using targeted and tested approaches 
to build relationships between selected players in the field. These proliferation agents 
transmit to the participants an identity that is viewed as legitimate. Interaction and 
socialisation allow field participants to continue to learn and to develop and strengthen ties 
with other professionals in the field. Socialisation was a critical aspect in the literature of the 
old institutional theory which neo-institutionalist research has nevertheless ignored.   
  
This research illustrates the fact that mechanisms of institutionalisation can be undertaken by 
individuals who have not been studied before. The mechanisms and field developments 
expounded upon in this study, such as the PPP subfield, are largely guided by players outside 
of the conventional political sphere. It is consistent with an increasing number of recent 
research on social initiatives which highlight social change as a vehicle for progress, 
(Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2017) for a synthesis.  
Furthermore, proliferation agents will monitor the implementation and processes of 
socialisation through control mechanisms both formal and informal. This is particularly true 
in highly skilled scientific areas, such as medical product development, where the mechanism 
of social relationships is systematically defined. As such, non-state donors seem to be the 
most important type of institutional entrepreneur and theorisers in the development of 
professional logic. A deeper examination at various forms of theoreticians not previously 
recognised by academics, might show certain mechanisms of transition, distinct from those 
recognised from current literature.  
This study expands the analysis into mechanisms of institutional change to fields which have 
not been included in theoretical models before. Much of the institutional work has, to date 
(e.g. Reay and Hinings, 2005, 2009; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006), been based on mature 
fields. There has been very little research based on other new areas (Maguire et al., 2004; 
Purdy and Grey, 2009). In addition, a variety of experiments centred on describing the 
institutional effects of logic transformation in the global health system is viewed as a 
fundamental work in a complex field (Thornton and Ocasio 1999).   
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CHAPTER 9. Conclusion: contributions of the study and suggestions for future research   
9.1 Contributions of the research to institutional theory   
This work extends the latest research on field-level change in institutional theory, and makes some 
theoretical contributions to this literary source. First, by analysing systemic change in a specific 
context, the analysis explores and develops the principle of logic evolution. Second, the work 
extends our understanding of logic as toolkits, the elements of which can be combined variably in a 
particular area. Third, it identifies the main contextual factors that form and influence change 
trajectory towards logic evolution.  
  
To date, the literature has concentrated on understanding how logics that come from various 
institutional orders change or are mixed in a field. Studies examining the health system arena 
demonstrate how the dominant logic changes from a professional logic to a state logic and to 
a business logic (Gawer and Phillips, 2013). This thesis demonstrates that the emergence of 
concepts belonging to diverse conceptualisations of logic originating from the same 
institutional order, may also cause changes within that field.  
  
The work shows that concepts of such logic can coexist in the same sense and within the 
same arena, and describes the different processes by which they are created.   
Logics tend to be cultural toolkits when tested empirically (Swidler, 2000; Richey and  
Ravishankar, 2019), the elements of which can be combined variably by actors in the field. 
This logic conceptualisation helps to expose the mechanism by which logics shift internally, 
and adds an aspect of versatility and possible congruence in logic characterisation. This also 
helps one to focus on which components of a logic are important and which are incidental, 
thus attempting to create institutional logics.  
  
Various social and field-level considerations help the cycle develop. The ability to crystallise 
change, and degree of trust in embracing pluralistic perspectives, differ across societies.   
The legitimisation and accumulation of proliferators in a field, as well as participants’ 
socialisation to new concepts varies across fields. These variables affect the way different 
model concepts are integrated, thus reconfiguring field structure.  
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Fields and group participants display varying degrees of internal diversity as a result of logic 
evolution. Fields tend to be embedded in subfields, in which participants have unique 
identities. The logic evolution cycle establishes and reconstitutes concepts and practises 
which then become demarcated and embedded. Such ideologies and behaviours are adopted 
in different ways by various individuals who use them to reorganise a particular field or parts 
of it that result in the "normative fragmentation of professional logic" (Shekhar, Manoharan 
and Rakshit, 2020). This conceptualisation helps to explain how actors’ identities are 
legitimised and thus establish relationships inside this field (Hoffman, 2016).  
  
The study points to the role of non-state donors as proliferation agents who promote 
fieldlevel change in a historical and highly institutionalised environment. Previous 
institutional work, centred on healthcare environments has identified improvements in the 
logic that are encouraged by the State and placed on professionals. This study explains that 
institutional change in highly institutionalised sectors is more likely to be facilitated by non-
state players serving as agents of proliferation (Malsch and Gendron, 2013) and institutional 
entrepreneurs (Hardy and Maguire, 2017). The proliferation agents detailed in this study rely 
on their position as business leaders and experts to evolve institutions, and disseminate these 
systems in the sector by regulating the socialisation of professionals to create new legitimate 
identities.  
  
The results of this work indicate that social relationship processes are important to underpin 
field-level change in professionalised sectors. Findings indicate that socialisation, rather than 
focusing on hierarchical networks, is important to construct, explain, validate and 
disseminate new structures (Greenwood et al., 2002; Purdy and Gray, 2009; Zamparini and 
Lurati, 2017 ). This research clarifies that the ability to create a participatory hub in highly 
professionalised fields is a mechanism that causes institutions to be theorised, and identities 
and practises to be communicated to social actors present at the micro level. This correlates 
this social interaction process with the enactment and further development of institutions 
across relational networks.  
 
The result of this thesis prompts us to consider agency as a capability or attribute derived from the 
resources, powers and duties associated with the social roles that actors assume (Abdelnour, 
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Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2017). Institutionalised roles and social statuses are created. Groups of 
people do not enter the social ‘stage' and start exercising agency; rather, social actors as occupiers of 
roles do. Groups of people as meaningful actors are elevated to the forefront of institutional theory, 
simplifying the institutional architecture of organisations, fields, and social structures of 
reproducing institutional identity and of causing change. 
 Furthermore, this thesis investigates several important topics raised by the 2017 paper by 
Abdelnour et al. Individuals and organisations do not directly reflect one another. Institutions are 
best understood as logical patterns, basic principles, and cultural systems that emerge in a variety of 
ways across social situations. Institutions and institutional theories linked to duties, intellectual 
property, organisational forms, strategic planning and incentives, and other topics hold social 
entities like organisations together. 
Institutions are dynamic and diverse by nature with various and possibly conflicting ideologies, 
social practices, and control mechanisms. Individuals, contrary to extant arguments, are extremely 
adaptable when it comes to embracing and coping with the dynamism of organisations and fields. 
Likewise, institutional fields and society provide a never-ending supply of options and possibilities. 
Such shifts seldom deviate from the overall structures of contemporary society as envisioned in 
previous institutional theories, but instead they build on and expand the broad structures of sense 
making and activity (Castoriadis, 1987; Emirbayer & Mische 1998; Giddens, 1990, 1991).  
 
Neo-institutional theory has generated a series of meaningful advances, highlighting the connection 
between organisations and the larger field and social setting. These developments have grown 
progressively inconsistent over time. As highlighted by (Alvesson and Spicer, 2019), this has 
resulted in increased ambiguity, substantial misunderstanding on whether the aim was to use it as a 
theoretical lens or to study it as a phenomenon of interest. Additionally, there are increasing self-
contradictory statements, a limited theoretical purview, and a proclivity to overthink concepts. As 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) so eloquently said, each of these issues 
has a propensity to diminish the insights that institutional theory might bring. Although some 
researchers and publishers manage to avoid circular arguments, misinterpretations, and other issues, 
their audience may have a harder time sifting through the expansive and ambiguous terminologies, 
as well as the plethora of texts that employ the essential sign of "institution" in various ways 
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(Alvesson, Hallett and Spicer, 2019). On a field level, jumbled collections of texts with vague, 
ambiguous, and inconsistent meanings make it impossible to grasp the overarching argument.  
This thesis has proposed some solutions, including articulating fundamental ideas, overcoming a 
restricted theoretical point of reference. The researcher believes that this thesis, can 
make institutional theory more informative and perhaps less perplexing. 
  
This thesis focuses on the description of the GHI field before and after the proliferation of 
non-state actors. It examines institutional processes in contexts that are not commonly 
studied by organisational academics. It stresses the importance of undertaking comparative 
research to analyse comparisons in the evolution of institutional processes premised in 
specific environments. It claims that research environments impacted by non-traditional 
actors offer evidence of more dramatic improvements than those in conventionally studied 
settings. Ultimately, it points out that, given the change in the traditional institutions after the 
proliferation of the non-state donors, and the assimilation of corporate practices, these 
environments are more nuanced than in any other case. Societal and field-level dynamics 
accompanying this transition in these contexts need more evidential and theoretical analysis.   
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9.2 Contributions to Hybridization Theory 
A plethora of literature (Matinheikki, Aaltonen and Walker, 2019) talks about hybrid organisations 
solely from an organisational structure point of view, such as the description of networked 
organisational structures as hybrids (Powell, 1990). This contribution of this thesis diverges from 
this line of research and specifically focuses on the stream which describes a hybrid organisation 
which combines a variety of institutional logics (Battilana and Lee, 2014). In particular, this thesis 
contributes to the definition of organisational hybridisation as a process of change whereby 
an organisation seeks, in their values, structures, goals and processes, to move from one 
organisational settled situation (that is, setup of institutional and standards of organisation) to 
another by introducing more than one rationales in the form of institutional logics (Battilana et al., 
2017; Schildt and Perkmann, 2017). 
 
For organisations that (1) incorporate a wide range of stakeholders, (2) pursue numerous and 
frequently competing goals, and (3) take part in diverse or unpredictable activities, a hybrid style of 
organising can be especially relevant. (Besharov and Smith, 2014; Mair et al., 2015). 
 
To satisfy stakeholder expectations, a hybrid organisation needs the re-configuring and merging 
of diverse structures, practices, and cognitive components such as ideas from different logics into a 
new organisational composition. (Battilana et al., 2017; Schildt and Perkmann, 2017). Selective 
coupling which entails the use of a dynamic blend of selected practices to meet the needs of 
different logics, is one way to do this. (Pache and Santos, 2013). The usage of such methods can 
therefore be regulated by putting in place governance systems that guarantee that various logics are 
assessed. (Mair et al., 2015). Particularly crucial for integration of organisational members and for 
the development of new cognitive systems and ways of thinking,and behaving are also the human 
resources administration practises and active socialisation and awareness about hybridised 
objectives and practises of this organisation; (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Schildt and Perkmann, 
2017). Such attempts can be paired with integrated incentives to recompense actors to achieve 
blended objectives (Wittmer, 1991). 
 
Hybridization is a nonlinear process that will almost certainly generate opposition as well as 
uncertainties and vagueness. (Evers, 2005; Jay, 2013), just like any other significant organisational 
transformation process (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). 
 
  222  
The findings of this thesis contribute to the study of institutional logics and hybridization and 
categorization processes to evaluate how institutions will influence the field and the relationships 
within the setting (Falaster, Zanin and Guerrazzi, 2017). Because there are many logics at work 
here, discourses will need to be hybridised or classified into new definitions to support the balance 
of logics. These processes will define not just the field's image, but perhaps also its approval among 
the diverse actors, as well as its validity among these actors. 
 
9.3 Limitations of the study  
Although the research seeks to make a major impact, there are also some drawbacks to it. 
With this study being a qualitative one, it is not intended to test theory but to elaborate and 
interpret. Henceforth, the goal is to expand theories and generalise them. Thus, the research 
findings that have been put forward will gain from large-scale quantitative studies. A 
collaboration with civil societies or private foundations might be beneficial. Such 
organisations might be interested in understanding how professionals react to radical changes 
in their professional environments. Furthermore, such collaboration might help to understand 
the nuances of legitimising the identity of professionals.     
Health services operate in highly politicised settings. Therefore, analysing specific 
professions and discussing the degree to which the dynamics we have discovered in the 
context exist in particular professions would also be beneficial.  
Although our research offered a comprehensive analysis of a reasonably wide variety of 
organisations, future research might take a longitudinal look into how social innovation in 
global health can evolve. This helps to explain how institutional logics evolve over time amid 
the complexity of policy and organisation.  A larger sample in the study of organisations is 
important to evaluate how the comparative effect of institutional logic on social innovation 
differs across various forms of PPPs.   
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9.4 Alternative explanations of the process of change   
The function of proliferation agents is unquestionably important in the phase of transition in 
the GHI field. In order to understand why such agents both from outside and inside the field 
alter structures (Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997; Lok and Willmott, 2019), institutional 
scholars have contributed to the idea of institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 1988; 
Hardy and Maguire, 2017; Mahzouni, 2019). Institutional entrepreneurs find areas for growth 
and encourage social movements to reform existing institutions. Institutional theory has 
called attention to the study of the pertinence of personalities in promoting transition. 
However, it may be argued that there are relatively few cases of institutional change powered 
exclusively by individual actors. Rather more importantly, it is the collective action of 
entrepreneurship that can generate reform (Hardy and Maguire, 2017). This research 
however, indicates that certain high-status individuals via their leadership and personality, 
are also essential to the development of institutional processes. In fact, in the case studied, the 
legitimacy of the most prominent proliferation agents has allocated a legitimate identity to 
the modern professionals that they have explicitly championed. In transmitting and 
legitimising identity to the professionals, they also enhance their own legitimacy via the 
communication of success stories. Nevertheless, individual human agency alone cannot 
justify the transition and the inconsistencies in the procedures of the case in question. The 
respondents made it apparent that a variety of social and field level variables caused the 
change to take place. While the prominent non-state actors were described as main agents of 
proliferation, they referred to a multitude of key stakeholders- such as academic institutions, 
independent contract organisations, micro businesses, key governmental actors- that led to 
the outcome of the process.  As such, a series of social players influences moulded the 
mechanics of the institutional change process.   
  
An alternate approach to this study could be the use of agency resource dependency theory  
(Zona, Gomez-Mejia and Withers, 2018); it may be argued that the GHI field, specially the 
subfield of PPPs (for the provision of medical products for neglected diseases) has changed 
in divergent directions in the period under review, due to pressure exerted by non-state 
donors such as  the BMGF who provided the necessary resources to facilitate and enforce the 
change. These non-state players varied from philanthropic organisations who provide 
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financial resources; academic and research partners offering expertise, and intellectual 
capital; central governments providing political support; and ultimately, transnational 
institutions, like the WHO, delivering international legitimacy.  
 
9.5 Suggestions for future research   
To conclude, this analysis provides some potential avenues for future work that could expand 
our insight into institutional processes on the basis of the data described in this thesis.   
The involvement of unconventional participants in the promotion of field change can be 
discussed during institutional studies. This thesis indicates that proliferation agents are 
capable of legitimising the identity of professionals, through socialisation owing to their 
connections with the international business community and their ideological drive and 
holistic attitude in tackling the problem at hand.  
  
The use of specific logics provides researchers an opportunity to understand the mechanisms 
by which participants evolve a social context. Hence, a more complex and evolutionary 
conceptualisation of logic will make it easier to better explain the mechanisms of social 
creation, such as logic evolution. The logics are tool boxes (Casasnovas and Ventresca, 2019) 
or social devices (Swidler, 1986), which consist of many characteristics which can be 
updated.  
They may be used to smooth out problems in various setups. Macro and meso level factors 
that affect the logic evolution process may help scholars consider when and how in a certain 
setting, logic might evolve and interact. This would allow the integration of logic variations 
in a specified spatial context to be considered. It may also help to explain clear 
inconsistencies in the activities witnessed across, and throughout institutions.  
  
Logic evolution arises as sources of identity and legitimacy in the field are updated. A more 
thorough analysis of how new identities in a field is legitimised will thus boost our 
understanding of logic. Studies on legitimising identity may help institutional researchers 
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identify organisational responses to a number of institutional challenges, including through 
showing what resistance to change (Castells, 2006; Geenen and Muehlfeld, 2020) might 
arise. Institutional study, viewed through the lens of legitimising the identity of globalised 
professions will benefit from a strong link with the research on professional identity creation 
and legitimisation (Castells, 2006; Chreim et al., 2020).  
In line with hints provided by previous studies (Suddaby, Bitektine and Haack, 2017; 
Thelisson, Géraudel and Missonier, 2018), while this study showed that sources of legitimacy 
and identity may be considered as key factors in the evolution of logics, it may still be 
important to recognise other characteristics. This research stresses, for example, the 
fundamental importance of relational networks, control mechanisms and practices. Logics 
may consist of the core and alternative elements (see Walker, Schaeperkoetter and Darvin, 
2017 on institutionalised practices), and the core elements, while the auxiliary elements are 
usually weakened, seem to improve with time and withstand future modifications. However, 
more theoretical and analytical investigations are required for the internal characteristics of 
logics. This will help academics better interpret institutional logic. In consideration of the 
conceptualisation of logics as tool sets, future research should carefully analyse questions 
pertaining to field and subfield creations. Analysis of changes in field levels has to take into 
account the presence of subfields that emerge due to logic evolution. The configuration of the 
field, the internal makeup of the actors, the values, identities, control structures, governance 
and practices are organised and varyingly related by conceptual frameworks of logic 
evolution. The evolution of logic contributes to the complicated mechanisms under which 
fragmented actors recreate and redefine their links in the field. Comparative research should 
be carried out by researchers to discover the factors behind these discrepancies.  
  
Finally, future studies should concentrate on the exploration of current relevant contexts and 
the creation of new theoretical principles for improvements at the field level. In this respect, 
researchers could investigate the institutional change in the field of neglected diseases 
pertaining to middle-income countries. Extension of the logic study to incorporate this might 
help to define the temporal and spatial boundaries of logic (Thornton and Ocasio,2008) and 
study the different power institutions within or between these contexts which contribute in 
specific fields to unique mechanisms of change (Beckert, 1999).  
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Given the characteristics of institutional systems, a revision of some major theoretical 
constructions of neo-institutional literature may be necessary for insights from these studies. 
In taking this approach, we need to take note of mechanisms and principles emerging from 
systemic research that may be studied in other contexts.   
In addition, researchers may establish concepts that dominate the scholarly discussion, 
namely institutional logics, institutional entrepreneurs and institutional research, by 
expanding theories in order to accommodate this heterogeneity.  
The literature from institutional theory might help to define the particular national variables 
underlying institutional systems by examining these environments by performing 
comparative studies. This may provide perspectives into other literary streams, such as 
international business literature. Multinational organisations which are fundamentally driven 
by domestic contexts face difficulties in working across countries, and implement techniques 
for collaboration across subsidiaries (Holmes Jr, et al., 2018). An awareness of the context 
specific variables underpining institutional processes may lead to the production of more 
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Appendices  
Appendix A: Interview schedule   
Transformation of health initiatives: Redesigning of the medical products field for neglected 
diseases   
  
The purpose of the study is to examine the emergence of health initiatives from the early  
1990s to recent trends, focusing on the macro and meso factors and the role of key 
stakeholders that have led to the transformation of the concepts in the field as well as the 
changes made with regards to the availability of medical products for neglected diseases.  
  
I would like to thank you very much for taking time to help me with my research.   
• Can you outline your background briefly?   
  
• Based on your experience and perspective, can you explain the reform process in health 
initiatives for the provision of medical products for neglected diseases?  
  
o Can you elaborate on the context during which the reform began?  
  
o How has it evolved over time and how has this influenced the development of health 
initiatives?  
  
o To what degree has the cycle of change progressed over time?  
  
o Who were the leaders behind the initiatives?  
  
  III  
o What were the main reasons that made the change process possible, and what were 
the reasons that inhibited it?  
  
o What were the main priorities for change?  
  
o Can you say these were done and to what extent?  
  
o Why? Have they been (not) consistently accomplished in every country?  
  
• What has been modified in the process for the distribution of medical products (and in the 
health initiative process in particular)?   
o Why do you think it was agreed that this should be revised?   
  
o What were the concepts and principles that were behind it?   
   
o Why has it been updated in this unique way?  
  
o How did the health initiative's architecture transform?   
  
o Did the change process, give birth to new networks and processes ( e.g., the 
replacement of conventional healthcare institutions or the development of explicit 
practices; public / private influence on service delivery structures) ?  
  
o Did the management frameworks of the health initiative environment change?   
  
o How have the responsibilities and obligations of the parties’ concerned (e.g.  
organisations, ministries, officials, doctors) changed?   
  
  IV  
  
• Which actors have been the most relevant in the change process? o What symbolism did 
the change have for them?   
  
o How did they help define the values and ideas implemented?   
  
o How did their contributions help influence the reforms?   
  
o How did they change the partnership model over time?  
  
• What is the perception of the changes by the different network participants?   
o What were the most widely recognised aspects of the changes, and which were 
criticised?   
  
o What are the changes' main advantages and disadvantages?  
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Appendix B: DAH contributions by non-state donors (Source: Institute for Health Metric 
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 Appendix D:  
      
   
  A. IDEAL TYPE OF PROFESSIONAL LOGICS AND MODES OF LOGIC EVOLUTION 
First order categories  Second order categories Illustrative quote 
  
A1- Professional 
logic of assistance 
 
Centralisation of 
power Control mechanism 
" The problem for me is that unbalanced 
between the distribution of power, meaning, 
you know if you have now, like who being so 
I don't wanna say but like being so dependent 
on funding from the Gates Foundation from 
other foundations, private foundations, I think 
that's when the problem starts to to happen, 
because the big foundations will start 
dictating what the global health priorities 
should be, and then where the funding should 
go to. And then because of that, because they 
have the pile of money, what would inevitably 
ends up happening is that all of the smaller 
players and the organisations that could be 
doing research that's very, let's say needs 
driven end up changing their focus to to a 
more funding driven kind of research and then 
they de prioritised patient needs " (Non-profit 
Research Institution A) 
Hierarchy and direct 
control   
"With the CDC was simpler to some extent, 
because I mean, it's very similar function in 
terms of monitoring and evaluation of our 
programmes and things like that, in terms of 
the purpose of the function was quite simple. 
But in terms of the actual governance of it, it's 
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very different because it was CDC, your main, 
you are accountable to one entity, which is 
really the US government. And so that's a 
very clear cut, you have only one, you know, I 
used to work in the HIV space. So in the 
global HIV space other PEPFAR, which is a 
big funder, of HIV programmes in the world. 
So they have very, they had a clear guideline 
me they wanted to get by a certain date. So 
that's what we were tasked with. That's what 
we were monitoring. So it's very simple in 
that sense." (US Government Agency, J) 
Formal line of 
guidance   
"WHO, in a way is considered the authority 
on normative guidance. And their 
contribution, potential contribution, I think is 
always respected. But the practices are in 
charge of the normative guidance at 
headquarters. They definitely are the 
authority, because about a country level and 
the input that they could potentially provide, I 
think their skills are strongly recognised, but 
they're often restricted because of their 
resources." (Independent Consulting  Firm K)    
 
"There's a whole host of technical support that 
WHO provides they are the chair of the 
resource mobilisation committee of the CCM 
in Nigeria. There, they are as much a part of 
what we do as the country."(Non-profit PPP 
R) 
 
A2 Professional-Logic of integration 
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Fragmentation Cooperation in Network 
"With regards to these country coordinating 
mechanisms, I think there's great variability, 
actually from country to country. Okay. Do 
you have some example? The context to 
really, it makes a big difference? Well, I 
mean, in a, in a country, like Indonesia, for 
example, where the country is so large, and so 
geographically spread, it can, you know, 
having a CCM based in Jakarta. You know, I 
don't know how representative that might 
always be of all of the regional interests. So 
it's hard to gauge that similarly, with Nigeria, 
you know, it's 36. Many countries within a 
country. And so representation is often 
fraught, and it's political, because a lot of 
money is involved. So it's never a perfect, it's 
never a perfect fit. But I think, 
overwhelmingly, if it hadn't worked, we 
probably would have done away with them. 
And those countries continue to have them 
operating at varying levels of success." (Non-
profit Agency, R)  
 
"You go to any country in Africa, there are 30 
donors, I'd say in Burkina Faso, or in Uganda, 
there's 30 different donors or bank, you 
member states, the UN agencies who each 
fund the multitude of little things in health. 
And then they have those donor coordination 
platforms where they exchange a little bit, but 
you know, everyone has their own political 
ideas. Everyone has their babies, everyone has 
their pilot projects, everyone has their, it's just 
such a mess. And then the government is 
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running behind because they need the money. 
So they're getting the money. And then they 
spend their time doing monitoring and 
reporting to all of the different donor 
agencies. And every three years, the same 
circus, with new project coming in, and 
people not donors, not coordinating their 
approaches." (Philanthropic organisation W)  
 
"Well, as I say they operate in a very 
fragmented way. It's not always coordination 
between country offices in Geneva office, 
even within the Geneva office. They have 
disease specific teams, health systems, 
specific teams, economic specific teams, these 
teams I've found in the past don't 
communicate very well with each other. So 
there's a lot of duplication of effort. And that 
fragmentation causes huge problems for 
beneficiaries of who assistance, as well as 
international experts that are trying to work 
out a coherent strategy from one organisation 
where there are many different threads 
coming out of WHO." (Historic academic 
Research institution F) 
Blurred lines of 
control  Cooperation in Network 
“And it has been an issue many times for 
different reasons, right. I mean, if you look at 
the barriers of data sharing, you do see a lot of 
regulatory arrangements in place that actually 
don't allow things to progress as quickly as 
they should. And at the same time, you have 
national and sub regional or regional 
limitations. And for example, in data sharing, 
you have a lot of things around the Nagoya 
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protocol, that is, you know, it's a big protocol 
days, really Putting some checks and balances 
in place to ensure that if any data or sample 
sharing, if it is to be shared, it is going to 
benefit the places where that data has been 
extracted. At the same time you have the IHR  
the International Health Regulations that say 
you actually need to share data as soon as an 
outbreak or as soon as an outbreak is 
confirmed, so that the international 
community is aware of that and can respond 
accordingly. When you don't have all these 
different instruments well aligned and sort of 
adapted. That's where the problem is created. 
And I know although I haven't worked myself 
on it, I think it's quite clear that's one of the 
biggest problems for sure.” (Philanthropic 
organisation O) 
Integration Core idea 
"I think it's quite difficult to predict, I think 
there's a real sea change in the kind of the 
global health agenda going on, I think, you 
know, we're moving much more towards 
universal healthcare and non communicable 
diseases, diabetes, heart disease, etc, are going 
to be the big agendas going forward. I think 
that the Global Health architecture is not very 
well set up at the moment to address those 
issues." (Historic Academic Institution  Z)  
 
" Another example might be integration. So 
previously, where they could be a device was 
provided that could test for TB and early and 
for diagnosis for HIV parts that were only 
previously used for TB because they procure 
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by the TB programme. So the increasing 
push, so to speak for devices like that Not to 
be right, think not to be siloed, in one 
programme, they're going to be expected to 
work for also for HIV. And if they can do 
like, the Kinect machine can also do other 
diseases, that's the kind of device that's going 
to be more popular because it can meet the 
needs of multiple people with different 
diseases rather than just one group" 
(Independent Consulting  Firm K)  
 
"So but the recent push for UFC, it's changed 
that slightly. So you're seeing more of a kind 
of push towards understanding synergies 
between different.Yeah, understanding 
synergies between different diseases, 
understanding health systems as a whole. And 
I mean, you know that the health systems 
approach is very much focused as with some 
among development partners, as well as 
among kind of across all stakeholders, there is 
a consensus about the idea that vertical 
programmes need to be integrated." 
(Academic Research Institution  B)  
 
"And recognising that you've got to have 
some system strengthening investments to 
happen if you're going to be able to respond to 
epidemics like that when they emerge. Now 
you're seeing things like the Africa, CDC, 
build up its capacity and footprint across the 
continent be able to respond to this. We've 
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seen the same thing with the Nigerian CDC. 
The role of the US CDC, as part of the 
PEPFAR programme has really increased, I 
would say, over the last 10 years, which helps 
to respond to this" (Non-profit PPP R) 
Preventive and 
advisory function Legitimised identity 
"through the London declaration. That was  
one of the classic examples. And if you look 
on the gates are pointed towards the gates site 
or you know, grand challenges and the digital 
summit, a multitude of projects has been 
financed a multitude of projects have been 
finalised in a wide spectrum based on the 
preventative side and the curative side of 
these diseases." (Non-profit organisation Q)  
 
"essentially, what we do is this , I think, 
broadly, that could technical assistance. So 
when governments are setting a strategic plan 
or their priorities moving forward, they tend 
to have the timeframe, like a five year time 
frame, and in that period, before setting what 
the goals, what the sort of targets are going to 
be and priorities moving forward. there's a set 
of processes. So there's kind of wide literature 
that's grown around the idea that you need, 
you know, for effective priority setting with 
decision making, you need to have something 
that's evidence informed. Okay, and 
transparent and systematic. And that has, you 
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know, extensive stakeholder engagement, " 




M.H.P Legitimised identity 
And I also think that, for example, if you go 
and talk with WHO, five years ago with 
Margaret Chan, she would not even consider 
any kind of collaboration with the private 
sector. You know, you see, for example, that 
the title was being very open and say, there's 
only one actor that we're not willing to have a 
conversation with. And that's the tobacco 
industry, because there's the FCC, and 
therefore, there's no way there's a 
collaboration there. But he's very open to 
discuss with, you know, other companies such 
as Nestle Unilever, how to work for example, 
on NCD’s, which I think is a change in itself 
in a narrative into what's coming. 
(Philanthropic organisation O) 
      
Decentralisation Cooperation in Network 
"It does seem that the trend is to actually have 
more private sector involved in in the sort of 
more global health issues. Which comes with 
interesting points, both positive and negatives, 
as you potentially know and have studied. 
You know, I've always worked more on the 
third sector, which is not even public or 
private, right. So they have the governmental 
even into government or being public, then 
you have so they're really private sector profit 
commercial and they have like the third sector 
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with NGOs and, and sort of philanthropies." 
(Philanthropic organisation O).  
 
" Obviously, there is a massive responsibility 
for domestic resource mobilisation for 
countries to organise their own resources. 
And that's another way of, you know, like tax 
systems, how do you make fiscal space to 
collect funding? How do you ensure that 
government allocates enough money for 
health and there you have a whole other level 
of issues when it comes to corruption in a lot 
of places. And when it comes to then, the 
World Bank and the IMF pushing for 
liberalisation, privatisation of services, and 
huge amount of new initiatives, innovative 
ways of financing health, which are putting 
countries into even more debt and pushing top 
down solution global solutions that are 
thought through in Washington and Geneva, 
on countries and that absolutely are disaster at 
the local level, because they're totally not 
thought through within the cultural context, 
like performance based financing and results 
based financing is a nightmare. And so in the 
end, anyway, with corruption and the lack of 
decentralisation policies, in most of these 
countries, the money never even arrives on its 
way. " (Philanthropic organisation W) 
Accountability Control mechanism 
"It does seem that we are progressing in the 
direction of more participation of non 
traditional actors, the public ones, so being 
more efficient, sort of bringing in the 
practices and if that sort of processes of the 
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private sector is so good on, for example, 
programmes are being managed. Way more, 
you know, performance indicators, KPIs, 
timelines, budgets, it's all looking at 
maximum impact and maximum efficiency." 
(Philanthropic organisation O)  
 
"Where they're more negative, I think they're 
either not collaborative. They have very 
different accountability mechanisms, then we 
are used to with governments, they have 
almost zero accountability." (UK Government 
Agency Z).  
 
"Example, I think CIF, is one that is more 
transparent. Yeah. And they have more detail. 
That is also because they're a London based 
institution, they're going to hear more about 
them. But I feel like a bit more sense as to 
what their projects involve how they do it. 
And I know that they, for example, they 
publicly tender their evaluation. Whereas 
Gates contracts institutions directly. And we 
saw competitive process, but it's not a 
publicly  tended piece of work. So if they do 
them, so I guess that again, makes you think, 
well, it might be some more accountability 
with the foundation, such as CIF they willing 
to get more outsiders is in so to speak." 
(Independent Consulting  Firm K) 
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Managerial 
responsibilities Control mechanism 
"basically, I realised that in Brussels, 
everyone works on their fetish, or their little 
topic, and I think that is also in a way, 
purposely done so by donors, I think they are 
truly,  you know, if they mean well, or or not, 
that's the thing, that's another question, but 
purposefully putting us in very fragmented 
lands. And we each defend and try to increase 
funding, improve policies for very specific 
things, which we managed to do, but in very, 
very small, small ways, you know, we 
managed to increase a little bit budgets here 
and there and improve mechanism so that they 
are more geared so that civic societies that are 
better involved here and there, but we're not 
massively changing the root causes of the 
issues.. " (Philanthropic organisation W). 
 
 
 "GAVI oftentimes doesn't work well together 
and on the ground with UNICEF, it shouldn't 
be the primary, you know, partner because 
they're working with children. So because yes, 
again, the management lines are different.  
The, the reporting lines are different. So a lot 
of times I've heard from people who work and 
I've seen that when I was working with MSF 
in the fields, like, you see that they only find 
out about what the other is doing when they 
had the public reports. "  (Non-profit 
International Agency A) 
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Individual 
responsibility Control mechanism 
"So, as part of my current job, yes. Because as  
as you know, snake bites was added to the 
WHO entity list in 2017. So obviously, it's not 
an area that is formally adopted by welcome 
just yet we're going to have a decision. a 
pirate Board of Governors that you For you to 
decide whether or not to make this a priority 
or in through snake bites. I've been learning 
more about entities. There are other parts of 
him that work more directly with entities and 
that is more on the science department or 
innovations department, but then those are 
usually more discrete areas of work. 
"(Philanthropic organisation O).  
 
"So I don't think there are actors missing, I 
think actors should go away and leave people 
alone and develop the way they want to 
develop. And I think if there is something that 
we need to support is community owned 
solution cooperatives"  (Philanthropic 
organisation W) 
Rise in contract based 
independent 
organisation Network 
"So CEPA is an economics and public policy 
consulting firm, and which we have a global 
health practice, the global health practice does 
a variety of work across a number of areas, 
which if you want specific details, you can 
have a look at our brochure on our website. 
And but we do work for a number of 
organisations, which I think it's I would say, 
majority of my work would be the 
organisation which are impacted by private 
foundations such as the Global Fund and Gavi 
and WHO and others who receive funding 
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from them. And then some of our work is also 
directly contracted to some private 
foundations."(Independent Consulting  Firm 
K) 
Separation of research 
and development / 
evaluation Legitimising identity 
"R&D is not an area we work specifically in. 
But in terms of development, we wouldn't be, 
I guess, the closest example might be one 
UNITAID. Okay, if they are trying to bring in 
a new product, we would look at which 
product that was, what the uptake was, like in 
countries where the donors are subsequently 
taking that product forward. What we 
wouldn't do is look at specific process of 
actually developing the product in the first 
place to end at the point of, of trying to get it 
scaled up and countries to stimulate some 
demand to then get it scaled up." (Independent 
Consulting  Firm K) 
Focus on R and D Legitimising  identity 
"Gates is working on a number of different 
malaria innovations, from trying to come up 
with things that are more effective than the 
current market of insecticide treated bed nets, 
they were investing in some interesting 
options where the net actually is treated with a 
chemical that doesn't allow the mosquito to 
fly anymore, they're investing in genetic 
modification of mosquitoes that can try to 
prevent the transmission of malaria. They've 
invested a lot in water and sanitation, and, 
toilets, honestly, which are really critical." 
(Non-profit PPP R) 
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Lack of coordination Network 
"So I think it's potentially more clear and 
easier to spot if you actually have one partner 
that is usually more dynamic and autonomous 
and others more dependent on you know, 
voters, taxpayers, and so on. So, I agree that's, 
that's a huge problem in Global Health, but 
not necessarily only for a PPP."(Philanthropic 
organisation O)  
 
"Eritrea, the government is very strict on and 
also very conscientious of who and how they 
interact with, with the NGO field and and the 
external partners. Yeah, and the counter 
examples, I would say, would be countries 
like the DRC. CIV are, these are countries 
that I used to work with. So that those are 
very much donor driven. There's very much 
you know, the donor comes in and says, we 
want to do this and they do it, and then they 
leave, you know, there's no sustainability, 
there's no coordination, there's, you know, 
there's a lot of issues there from the 
governance governance aspect."(Non-profit 
PPP J) 
A3-Evolution of updated logic and field restructuring 
Enrichment Integrating (blending) 
 "And maybe the change that they're inducing 
on the grassroots level, and the supply chain 
level and the kind of healthcare structures and 
systems that are developing out of this. 
Maybe they will actually then end up 
influencing very, very positively and aspect of 
politics, domestic sovereign politics in these 
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countries." (Non-profit organisation Q.  
Pharmaceutical company Q)  
" realised that basically across in new policies, 
we always have the same, the same problem, 
which is very much system related. So now 
we're working much more we don't even more 
only on health, because we work also known 
access to medicines, or needs driven research, 
on corporate capture of EU regulation, on 
development, a much more on the 
securitization of development, a privatisation 
of development aid and those topics. And 
basically, we realise more and more once you 
go beyond the just mobilising more resource 
for little topics, you basically realise that if 
those topics are marginalised, and if those 
agenda to address or to have pro performances 
are marginalises, because there is another 
agenda, which is much more corporate, which 
is about competitiveness of European 
industries, which is about much, much more 
and more and more growth, which obviously 
is not compatible in our environment. " 
(Philanthropic organisation W) 
Conjunction Attaching (annexing) 
" So if we want to sell the idea of having more 
accessible and affordable research product 
funded by public government, we have to 
show something that works, we have to show 
that according to the model, and this is the 
only model that we have out there, that sort of 
works. Yeah, we have a lot of other ideas of 
alternative models, but they haven't been 
piloted." (Philanthropic organisation W) 
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Changing relationships 
with network actors Relationship modification 
“So I think I know I think for me, it's in my 
mind is very clear that WHO as an 
intergovernmental organisation is bringing 
countries together and sharing best practices. 
That's their normative agency, a convener of 
power. Yeah. I don't think necessarily who 
needs to do everything?” (Philanthropic 
organisation O)  
 
 “So if for example, we're talking about air 
pollution, and NCD’s, nice to have a seat, 
obviously, but it's definitely out of depth for 
them to be Leaning on that one, when we can 
have so many others actually gathering think 
tanks, academia, private sector, really 
gathering and really leading on that, but 
obviously looking at how is that connected to 
the bigger picture that who is helping to put 
together? Do you know what I mean? So I 
think they will continue to be relevant, and 
everybody is going to be irrelevant, as long as 
they are quite clear on what their mandate is 
and how they can collaborate with others, and 
really trying to be less protective on always 
being in the driving seat. And that's I think, 






“I think, if you think about, you know, within 
a framework of sort of the social 
determinants, how political in terms of house 
and commercial terms of health, I think that if 
you think about, from the moment you wake 
up until the moment you go to sleep, anything 
that you consume around you. It's basically a 
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source of industry, the things that you wear, 
your clothes, your specs, the things that you 
eat, the AC that you turn on, the 
transportation that you take to work, if you 
take any work, the biking, all sectors and I 
think is really up for grabs at this point. So for 
example, Global Health now is working a lot 
with construction and architects because you 
realise that the way you build your house not 
only how it looks;how many windows it has; 
the colours inside the house, the air quality, 
it's all going to affect health outcomes. So I 
think that, you know, obviously you have 
NCD’s and food industry and drinking 
industry and AI I mean, those are like 
traditional examples. If you want to go out of 
the mainstream, you can think about anything 
really. Anything from shoes from 
anything.”(Philanthropic organisation O)   
 
 “I was working more at the country level for 
different organisations, so, so, I do have 
some, some experience and yes, I can see that 
there has been a, you know, there's definitely 
something that is shifting and of course, they 
there are differences in how they approach the 
I suppose, how the kind of governance 
structures I would say, of development, how 
they, how they work, when there are actors, 
like, who don't, who are not directly linked to 
governance” (Non-profit PPP, M) 
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                 B-PHASES OF THE PROCESS OF LOGIC EVOLUTION 
First order categories  Second order categories Illustrative quote 
 
  B1- Triggering change                              
 
New practices Provision failure 
“So say I think the UN does have a role to 
play, not in everything. But I think in 
particular, for WHO which is a technical 
body, if they keep their policymaking 
technical body and if they kind of don't go 
into I know for instance, they are sometimes 
involved in emergency sometimes not, you 
know, that they're not the best donors, I think, 
and their administrative processes are a really 
difficult I worked for them for a while and 
they you know, it's a it's a it's a nightmare, 
but, but I think if they can, if they can get 
their admin under control, and if they can 
become a little bit more, you know, agile and 
then stick to their mandate, you know, be the 
policy, you know, the policy, the technical 
kind of go to organisation. Then I think they 
have a great future.”(Non-profit PPP, M) 
Lack of resources Incentive to invest 
"Obviously does continue with its struggles 
when it comes to being too big to actually 
manage, trying to be everywhere and nowhere 
at the same time. I think it still has a 
problems, but it will it will, I think take time 
to get to a place where it needs to 
be."(Philanthropic organisation O).  
 
"So I think everyone says, All we'd love to 
have WHO chose and put on X yandz age, or 
it might be invited to meetings, etc. But in 
reality, they're just not able to contribute as 
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much as they potentially a skill to do, because 
they don't have the resources for salaries, etc, 
to do it. And, and I think the main, the main 
challenges is funding." (Independent 
Consulting  Firm K)     
 
"pharmaceutical companies or universities 
wouldn't really necessarily have money to 
fund for example, I trained at Oxford. Yeah. 
And my vaccine, you know, Institute was a 
kind gift from the Gates Foundation." ( 
Philanthropic Organisation U).    
 
"So how do you design incentives and the 
funding structures to channel that funds, those 
those funds to specific researchers or specific 
organisations to focus on specific issues and 
so at the moment, that's largely driven and 
medical R&D by yet by a combination of 
things. So one, you've got significant public 
and philanthropic funding and which goes 
into medical research, often not really fully 
recognised, and whenever the price of a drug 
become set, because what often happens is 
you have the private sector steps in and 
essentially privatises the publicly funded 
research, takes it through later stage clinical 
trials and then essentially retains all of the 
benefit of the, of the, of the the drug from the 
sales of the medicine or the diagnostic or 
whatever." (Public Global Health Agency R) 
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Institutional void   
"But, you know, like, the malaria vaccines, for 
example, would have never taken ground if 
the if the new resources were not there. The 
level of vaccines even if you think about 
GAVI, priority prior to GAVI entrance, you 
didn't really have most of the low income 
countries didn't really have access to or never 
would even have thought about having 
vaccines like PCV, which are quite expensive. 
But now you do have a lot of countries that 
haven't been able to introduce and scale up 
PCV vaccines, same thing with HPV. So it is 
I think, on the whole It is really does. It really 
did did have a very good impact on on the 
world of development of helping these." 
(Non-profit PPP J)   
 
" And sometimes investing in innovation 
means failure, and so that you can learn and I 
think foundations have done a really good job 
in filling that space and investing in 
innovations that, when working can then be 
funded by agencies like the Global Fund.." 
(Non-profit Agency, R) 
 
 "And if you look at programmes from the 
global fund that happens is specific. It has 
worked from a humanitarian perspective, but 
from a development sustainability 
perspective, it's a disaster. They've created 
parallel structures in a lot of countries. It's 
donors that are funding the provision of drugs. 
And once a country, graduates from its low 
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income country status, and become middle-
income countries no longer eligible for 
international funds, and then there is nothing 
in place to sustain the provision of health 
services." (Philanthropic organisation W)  
 
" I think there is. I think there's a real danger. 
And I think this stems from the way that 
WHO has been funded over the last kind of, 
you know, 10 or 15 years, where they have 
were lots of country governments basically 
member got Member States haven't been 
funding it. Yeah. concert to the its needs. 
Yeah. And they have been ring fencing their 
contributions to specific projects that they 
have particularly interested. Yeah, making it 
much more difficult for the who to do this job 
effectively. You know, , in part creates the 
power vacuum, and, you know, the funding, 
but given the power vacuum, that allows, you 
know, entity that the Gates Foundation to step 
in and have a disproportionate influence over 
the organisation. So I think that's a real 
challenge, like, certainly the the industry has, 
who has got a chance and got a challenge 
around its capacity to deliver things. And but 
having said that, is still like a really critical 
organisation. It is, you know, one of the few 
that has got." (Public Global Health Agency 
R) 
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Interacting on the 
global level 
Acquiring legitimacy on 
the international level 
"So the Global Fund, I think it's very similar 
from GAVI, they don't have a presence for the 
presence in country, they work through 
Alliance members. So you know, their 
programmes were a lot less unified. And the 
vision was a lot less clear on the ground, 
okay. than PEPFAR'S programming was very, 
very centred on, you know, whatever, 
Washington DC wanted to get out of those 
programmes, and it was very unified across 
the board through all the countries, with 
Global Fund a lot more disparate. It was a lot 
more. It was more picking a small initiatives 
everywhere, which did not seem to have a 
unified vision. That's what it seemed to me at 
the time, you know, when I was working on 
the ground? Yeah, so and also their projects, 
you know, they're monitoring evaluation was 
a lot. at the country level, I mean, obviously, 
as far as, you know, PEPFAR, you know, how 
far has facility level data that they collected 
for each facility, they knew how many people 
were getting treatment in each of the facilities 
and you how many people was were getting 
prevention activities and things like that.  
Because they also had a presence in country, 
their their partners, also have, you know, are 
very connected with the country offices in 
country, whereas the Global Fund didn't have 
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B2- Reconstruction of 
legitimised identity 
Use of data and 
knowledge to theorise Legitimising identity 
"You know, people do different things 
different. Yeah. The Gates foundation of the 
return on investment? Yeah. You know, it's 
really publication. Yes. Yes. So where people 
will see our return on investment is going to 
be x, x percentage of your profits? No doubt. 
Yeah, the biggest foundation doesn't do that. 
You know, even though they have some kind 
of strategic investments. where, you know, is 
more or less like for profit? Yeah. Oftentimes, 
you know, your return on investment is really 
publication. Okay. So that people will know, 
you know, the benefits of that research, you 
know, and is publicly available." (Non-profit 
Organisation U)      
 
 "So a lot of them have data managers in the 
fields and they and they outsource Data 
Manager. So we have sometimes a lot of good 
quality data because again, data for them is 
very important, because they want to use this 
data for you know, communicating and for 
for, you know the PR purposes, so they need 
to have the data " (Non-profit International 
Agency A) 
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Communicating new 
practices to the field   
"We have our own communications team 
here. And obviously, again, I think that speaks 
to the previous point we were discussing and 
how it does seem that from your words, 
certain organisations are becoming more 
dominant, I would call them relevant. Yeah. 
Because for example, in what we do, Hear in 
supporting research, one of the big priorities 
we have is to make sure that we communicate 
that research properly, the things that we're 
funding, the outcomes of research, so that not 
only that is used to change policy and 
practice, but actually it's engaging. The person 
was just passing by the street. Do you know 
what I mean? So I think it's really, really 
important not only from a reputational 
perspective, but also to break down our 
mission and vision into things that people 
actually find useful and things that are 
actually going to benefit their lives. So it's 
extremely important. A lot of the companies I 
know and other foundations do that sort of 
model. They outsource that service. We have 
an in house service, but I think it's extremely 
important, especially in the 21st 
century."(Philanthropic organisation O)  
 
"they need to definitely make a lot of noise 
about what they're doing. Because, one, it's 
amazing. And secondly, is inspiring. Yeah. 
Thirdly, it's so impactful. You know, it's 
going to really show which shows a totally 
different engagement with people and these 
issues. And if they don't talk about it, 
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somebody else will talk about it in a very 
negative way.”(Pharmaceutical company Q)  
 
"It's, it's paramount. And it's the reason that 
we release our results report every year. And 
that is driven primarily by the evidence from 
our investments and not and we've moved 
well beyond sort of output, and outcome 
based results recording, and really now 
moving much more solidly into reductions in 
mortality, and impacts love, full recording of 
results. In fact, we are releasing our next 
results report in, I think, next month, if I'm not 
mistaken. And we go through our 
replenishment cycle, which is when our 
donors replenish our funding for the next 
three year period, is this year. And so in the 
year of a replenishment conference, there's 
always a bigger push than in the off years in 
terms of recording of results." (Non-profit 
PPP, R)  
 
"Our strategy in the past, in at least in the past 
four or five years has been placing the 
countries that we're investing in and their 
successes at the centre of our communications 
about our results." (Non-profit Agency, R) 
Legitimising the  new 
functions 
Legitimising identity 
within the field 
"For example, Gates being one of them, who 
come from, you know, corporate experience, 
which is about fundamentally driven by, you 
know, developing clear strategies. Tackling 
specific issues. And, and essentially that 
thinking brought into into the private 
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foundation as well attend to use that kind of 
positioning strategy thinking where you 
know, the position themselves in a certain 
address certain issues. So Clinton Foundation, 
for example, is largely around vaccinations.  
Mission specific.” (Non- profit organisation 
V)  
 
"But there is a constant fight to increase the 
legit and increase the legitimacy and increase 
the voice of the private sector within all of 
those multilateral organisations. And yet, 
that's in the, in the governance architecture of 
the Global Fund. It's also across GAVI and 
the other kind of global health 
multinationals." (Public Global Health 
Agency R) 
                                    
B3-Creation of innovative 
relational networks    
Gap between old and 
new models 
Tangible differentiation of 
the emerging  and exisiting 
models 
So the largest donors DFID, followed by the 
Gates Foundation? Yep. So, so DFID being a 
traditional donor. And the Gates Foundation 
being a non traditional donor. So it's kind of a, 
it's got a very diverse set of funding and and 
model.So yeah, and in terms of those, and and 
then the, in terms of implementing partners, 
you have like, the who, and and, and other 
extended partners? (Non-profit PPP J)  
 
"And I think one thing to share is even at a 
department level, I have been surprised that 
the high degree that is financed by institutions 
such as Gates, which and often that the 
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whatever it's been financed, has been 
earmarked. Yeah. And what I don't know is 
the extent to which Gates funds what who 
wants to be funded anyway, or whether it has 
to be some sort of bending to make it fit with 
what Gates is willing to fund. But I think that 
is a real challenge for who just being quite 
hamstrung by the funding sources as to what 
they can focus on." (Independent Consulting  
Firm K)  
 
"So our Well, the way our board structure 
work, we are a partnership model. So the 
Global Fund was founded in 2002. Basically, 
because all of the world's richer countries 
were funding most of their aids programmes 
bilaterally through their own sort of bilateral 
partners, and the Global Fund was founded to 
bring together all of these different funding 
sources into one central pot for these three 
communicable diseases. So our has a donor 
block and an implementing block. And the 
donor block is made up of most of the donor 
countries to the global funds, but also 
including developed country, NGO, has a 
board seat, private sector has a board see 
private foundations have a board seat. And 
then there's an implementing block, and they 
are equal voting blocks in the implementing 
block is made up of the primarily recipient 
countries. And they also have their own 
developing NGO block. So that's sort of the 
partnership model who you and AIDS, 
rollback malaria Stop TB, each of the 
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multilateral global partnerships also have non 
voting board seats on our board." (Non-profit 
Agency, R) 
Enabling visible 
changes through new 
models   
"They have a foundation based in London, 
Staying Alive Foundation And what they 
actually do is, what is their video production 
and stars and all this kind of stuff, to go out 
into Africa to go to Nigeria and African 
countries and they created a soap opera called 
MTV sugar,they they had this all like local 
actors, all local production, facilities, 
everything. It's like a soap opera setting a high 
school lived experience, you know, girls, boys 
in a whatever. It's like, the drama element 
through, that's the basic, their core was really 
clever about it. The entire foundation is aimed 
at stopping mother to child HIV transmission. 
Right. So they put into this script healthcare 
messaging that they develop on site in the 
country's just not descriptive approaches at a 
very much a, let's get together with the locals 
what's you know, affecting them, they put that 
together, it will extend so well, that the World 
Bank, they put a report independent report out 
on it two years ago for the DIMES report. 
And that was a serious measurement. 
evaluation of the impact of this show may 
have reduced transmission rates of HIV in 
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years, it's shown increased safe sex practices." 
(Non-profit organisation Q) 
Endorsing new roles 
through the models 
Strengthening legitimised 
identity in network 
“And this is this is so pervasive, for example, 
but you know, a lot of these recipients of 
funding, whether it's universities or charities 
that will have processes in place in house, 
how to make sure that maintain that 
relationship with its donors. So for example, 
when I was with Save the Children, you 
know, it was a particular department that was 
a primary beneficial piece of Gates money. 
And they had to have the right people who 
could maintain the relationship they had to 
have the right process. Yeah. cetera. In the 
same goes for university. I mentioned to you 
about lots of interesting earlier, I had some 
engagement with Oxford university last year, 
and some of the things you know, they, there 
was a group of people who run it to approach 
the Gates through university. Existing 
channels, and those people who maintain the 
relationship with Gates, in that they were 
really receiving funding, they said, No, no, 
no, you know, there's a whole process around 
how it works.” (Historic Academic Institution 
V) 
Legitimation of new 
roles    
"There is some level of scepticism in terms of, 
you know, Gates funds. I mean, you know, 
not not mega, but they're starting, you know, 
and other countries are also asking why is a 
foundation having so much influence on on 
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programming and things I got. So, there is 
some little pushback that is coming up. So 
that says there may be so there and I think the 
Gates Foundation also understands that, and 
that's why they are, I think investing in a lot 
of organisations like GAVI and the Global 
Fund, and even who actually they're very 
involved in WHO as well"(Non-profit PPP J)  
 
"So that's, how does they started  gaining 
legitimacy? Yeah, in addition to that,the sort 
of working with governments,you know, 
international partners, who,you know, the 
World Bank, you know, they started making 
donations to those organisations, for example, 
Gates, also the single largest donor  to WHO  
they contribute significantly to the World 
Bank. Those guys, you know, oftentimes don't 
have money to do projects." (Non-profit 
Organisation U) 
Trust on the new 
relational networks   
 "if I take Nigeria, for example, the Gates 
Foundation, who was a huge donor to the 
global phone at the global level, but they 
don't, they don't invest a lot of their money at 
country level in individual HIV, TB or 
malaria programmes, because they give their 
money to the Global Fund for those purposes. 
So they have, I would say, a little bit more 
limited engagement at country level." (Non-
profit PPP  R)  
 
"Yes, often, organisations will have to 
develop their own frameworks in house, they 
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may have to convene what are called working 
groups. So they'll bring technical experts in a 
number of different stakeholders within the 
field to provide their own experience and 
examples. So they're also develop frameworks 
in house and then present them at kind of a 
forum where international stakeholders, 
particularly technical experts, are provided the 
opportunity to give feedback. And then that 
feedback is often taken into account towards 
the final version of whatever that strategy 
document may be." (Historic academic 









"Well, I think it is, to certain extent 
personalities, okay. posts, so to say in an 
organisation and how much they feel that they 
can, they have the authority to, to sort of, they 
need to control or they they are authorised To 
come back a bit. I think it's also with time that 
Gabi has to show that, you know, it's doing its 
thing and it's working. So, so while they're 
doing that, you don't have to be as involved in 
everything. "(Non-profit PPP, M)  
 
"but a priority setting and talking about it sort 
of deciding on which services are going to be 
provided, which services are going to be 
subsidised. And then, and then there's a whole 
flurry of, you know, stages that come after 
that, and it's cyclical, like I was saying, it's not 
really a linear process, not saying one comes 
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before the other. But, you know, usually you 
decide on what services are going to be 
provided, and at the same time, you're 
considering how it will be financed, you 
know, how much of it will be subsidised? If it 
will be subsidised? And how will you pull 
that money? You know, where does provide 
the industry come in, etc. So, how's it going to 
be implemented? comes back down to the 
things you're going to say know what vaccine 
you can use? If Okay, if we are using that 
vaccine, do we have the capacity to maybe 
develop it ourselves? I mean, most of the 
country, we work in our low income, middle 
income countries, so generic drugs, maybe 
that kind of groundbreaking, or 
pharmaceutical innovation is more reserved 
to, you know, the US Japan." (Academic 
Research Institution  B) 
Promoting 
independent decision 
making   
"I mean, depending on what finish you're 
talking about, sometimes you are accountable 
to the governor's that leaving, founder of the 
organisation but the majority of times, we can 
work on a list of priorities that we defined 
based on our own vision and we can align that 
and we can very quickly activate, you know, 
resources, both financial and intellectual 
resources, but we can make that happen very 
quickly without the bureaucracy that you see 
for example, in many multinational 
organisations, or a foreign countries right 
Country governments. So I think it's more that 
you can see a lot of interesting things because 
we have the sort of freedom to look at, okay, 
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what are the men within the mess things that 
we could do? Or are the key things that we 
think there is a big gap? Where is it that we 
can compliment others to kind of see it sort of 
like that kind of presents way more that you 
would you would see in the past and 
obviously, there's a lot more information 
nowadays than there was in the 
past."(Philanthropic organisation O)  
 
 "I've worked  for drugs for neglected diseases 
initiative, which is,  let's say a non-
governmental PPP like a product development 
partnership that still has, let's say, among the 
PPP is some sort of, I would say, Yeah, like 
neutrality or independence, because it has a 
broader let's say, scope of donors and 
foundations and people giving money to it. 
But still, like I've seen, even there, where the 
guidelines are so obvious, so so explicit, in 
terms of we focus on this diseases because 
this disease is received from They carry a 
high burden in developing countries, there is 
no research and development for these, this 
kind of medical conditions." (Non-profit 
Research Institution A) 
Creating incentives for 
increased 
responsiblities   
"For example, in Nigeria, the Minister of 
Health is the chair of their country 
coordinating mechanism, the donor countries 
are represented at the moment by the US 
government. On the CCM, UNAID and WHO 
are also members of the CCM and that body 
is who makes all the decisions on the global 
fund investments for Nigeria. So when they 
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submit a request for funding to us, every three 
years, it is that body that submits the requests 
to so an individual agency or person cannot 
apply for funding to the Global Fund, it has to 
be a country request." (Non-profit Agency, R) 
Connection between 
decision making 




network through control 
mechanisms 
"So in Ethiopia, the government has taken a 
very strong and they have taken a strong, the 
Minister of Health has to I think in a strong 
position whereby they want the money to be 
mostly used through the ministry or through 
the state ministries, because it's a 
decentralised process. So some of that money 
goes to the, to the ministry, to the set of 
decentralise ministry, ministries by by 
region,but they have to hire technical 
assistance and technical assistance is really 
American NGOs that have a presence in 
countries and that provide technical system to 
the Ministries." (US Government Agency, J)  
 
"And that can be strategic reviews, or they can 
be programmatic reviews? So I guess 
examples might be for UNITAID, where they 
might ask us to do a review of one of the 
midterm on interim review of one of their 
projects. And generally we apply the OECD 
debt criteria as looking at relevance or 
efficiency and effectiveness or sustainability 
or the results. That theories, that's just one 
example, but I think it really does depend on 
what specific evaluation is required.And we 
have also done a prospective evaluation" 
(Independent Consulting  Firm K).  
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"I'd also say that you've seen in the WHO, lots 
of examples of the private sector utilising the 
influence of the of, I would argue, like some 
kind of captured institutions and governments. 
So the US government, for example, the 
European Union, often very, very closely 
aligned their talking points with those of the 
pharmaceutical industry, as one example, will 
you have seen the, the use by the USTR, so 
the US trades representatives, body, USTR of 
the 301 watch list, where they try to pressure 
developing in particular country governments, 
but also increasingly other Western 
governments who are trying to take action to 
address a drug races, either through price 
control mechanisms, or through exploration of 
reform of the RD model? Or exploring the use 




mechanisms   
"So Gates Foundation has its so broad 
strategic objectives. And if you're the charities 
or another agencies that have to try to build a 
private company, if the interests align with the 
Gates interests, then more likely than not, if 
you put a good proposal, you will get the 
money. So in that respect, again, you know, 
because it Gates has its own of strategy. 
People who get the money need to align with 
a strategy." (Non- profit organisation V)  
 
"And then Gates has a much more, I would 
say, a very close collaborative process in the 
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sense that they're really involved on our day 
to day activities. So they know exactly what 
we're doing exactly what we're doing things. 
It's a very close and very intricate process. So 
yes, it's and so you, you're basically, it's much 
more disparate? And, you know, it can be 
somewhat, at some, at some level, it can be 
also contradictory,sometimes." (Non-profit 
PPP J)  
 
"I mean, it's not private foundations, the only 
one that is considering really putting money 
into organisations like that is Gates. And that's 
the only significant player at the moment. 
And so they set up all these they work with 
who closely but they set up separate 
organisations like ROLL BACK MALARIA 
and stop Tb etc, that they are happy to put 
money into, and then they sit on the board, 
and they can exercise greater control over 
what the organisations do and how they use 
their money." (UK Government Agency Z)  
 
"And one of our requests requirements of 
countries to access Global Fund funding is to 
set up at the country level, a country level 
mechanism that mirrors our board 
mechanism. So countries have what are called 
country coordinating mechanisms, we call 
them CCM is for sure. And please Are these 
basically mirrors the membership of our 
board, but at a local country level and 
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chairmanship changes by country. " (Non-
profit Agency, R) 
  
B5- Evidence of new 
practices 
 
New roles through 
new practices Transmission of practices 
"So it means that they have to partner with 
academia to produce the research, they have 
to partner with foundations to support 
programmes have to partner with private 
sector, but at the same time, I agree, it would 
become too much for WHO to actually 
manage all of it. And it's not that they're not 
relevant. They are relevant, but they don't 
necessarily to drive this. They don't need to be 
on the driving seat in every single scene that 
is health related. "(Philanthropic organisation 
O)  
 
" An increasing focus on non communicable 
diseases and less of a focus on communicable 
diseases. I think it's also going to be an 
increasing focus on aspects that specifically 
relate to the sustainable sustainability 
development goals. Example of that might be, 
for example, an institution such as the Global 
Fund, which is set up for HIV, TB, and 
Malaria is closely linked to the NDG's, but 
increasingly, they're going to have to prove 
how they also linked to universal health 
coverage, strengthening is going to be much 
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bigger focus towards those broader ideals and 
ideals with border and goals." (Independent 
Consulting  Firm K)  
 
 
"they don't receive an enormous amount of 
money, like, let's be honest. So they they 
produce a lot of policy guidance. And they 
are, you know, they are collaborating with the 
World Bank, which has far more clout in 
terms of policy implementation and 
translation. And actually, kind of having some 
say in, in, in how money spent, but WHO I 
cannot see having that power. Yeah. They 
don't provide grants to countries they don't 
you know, they're there for four assists. And 
they do have a country office in every single 
country." (Academic Research Institution  B) 
Promulgating experts 
identity 
Redefining the limits of 
professions 
"Well, I worked with them, you know, as a 
fellow, in addition to that, based on my 
experience, you know, working in a field of 
vaccines in Africa, and also did a PhD. You 
know, also working on vaccines." (Non- profit 
Global Health Organisation U) 
Peer legitimation   
"I mean, at least in the capital settings, they 
have poured a lot of resources in these 
settings. And they have created jobs and 
things like that within those settings. So 
people do have a fair understanding. In capital 
settings, again, I'm caveating and would have 
a better understanding of what these people 
do, essentially, you know, whether it's Gates 
or, you know, the big ones, I'm talking about 
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Gates and PEPFAR. So again, it's within, it's 
the siloed thing"(US Government Agency, J) 
Practice differentiation 
Link of new practices to 
new network 
"I mean, it's changing as in like, you know, 
with the new leadership, they're implementing 
quite a bit of changes. So, I mean, it's a good 
space to watch just because. And they also 
and they're adopting, you know, like 
fundraising methods that are very similar to 
what GAVI and the Global Fund have done in 
the past. Yes. So it is, it's a, it's a good space 
to watch, just to see how successful they will 
be." (Non-profit PPP J) 
Reflection of new 
approach in practices   
"Cola life was a design engineer , Simon 
Ferry. And what he did was he you know, you 
have a palette of six bottles of coke or 12 
bottles of coke in a distribution hub, you 
know, you have a point of wouldn't Allah and 
it's got plastic all over it, and they send it out 
to the villages, right? He looked, he took a 
CAD CAM design approach and looked at the 
space between the bottles at the plastic insert, 
and the shape of it with the shape that's 
between the bottles and create the plastic kind 
of thing. In one part of it that anti diarrheal 
tablets, one's a mosquito net, one has a clean 
water tablets that I kind of think, well, they 
were the deal was done with them, " (Non-
profit organisation Q).  
 
" So an example that I can give you as 
illustrations be the cholera vaccine that is 
provided. So gates supported the rollout of 
that, of which there is there is a role for it. 
  XLVI  
And that it's not, it doesn't solve all the 
problems. And obviously, the much bigger 
issue is water and sanitation more broadly. 
And that is something that very few donors 
want to support. Because it's complicated. It's 
a long term, it requires multi sectoral 
engagement. And it's a health issue is the 
consequence. But the sectors that are required 
to introduce it in the water sector, or the 
planning sector depends on on which country. 
And so I think that was a situation where, 
within relatively limited resources for cholera, 
a lot of focus, being on a vaccine, whereas 
actually, if you really wanted to, to cure 
cholea , we should be addressing the larger 
water and sanitation issues. But you can see 
why gates, which is more about innovation, 
etc. But we're working to fund that." 
(Independent Consulting  Firm K) 
 
 "And I think that is also very much the issue 
with donors, because donors, we fund you to 
work on very specific things with very 
specific guideline, and people just, it's the 
same with science and academics, right? 
People working in very, very specific fields. 
And they produce very interesting technical 
material. But But basically, they missed the 
point. Because if they don't look at the 
interaction of this with that, and that, " 
(Philanthropic organisation W) 
      
C- CONTEXTUAL FACTORS AFFECTING LOGIC EVOLUTION 
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" So in terms of the structure itself, GAVI is 
interesting. So you know, I'm at the 
Secretariat and as a sectarian, but it is an 
alliance of Alliance members include WHO 
UNICEF, CDC and and others, partners. So 
they're part of the GAVI Alliance, essentially. 
So the role of the sector is to coordinate these 
Alliance members. So when we work in 
countries, for example, so where we invest in 
vaccines, this is done through the alliance 
members, and other partners." (Non-profit 
PPPJ).   
 
"I think that's another  challenge. Again, some 
of them have very specific agendas and very 
specific objectives. And oftentimes, if they 
are not 100% aligned with other 
organisations, objectives, they will separate 
you they will work separately. " (Non-profit 
Research Institution A) 
Dynamic approach   
"Artificial Intelligence is another example. It's 
very difficult to look at, for example, any kind 
of big investments in Artificial Intelligence 
Amr if you don't really have the private sector 
investing of that, but also being sort of led by 
a public health agenda, if that makes 
sense.(Philanthropic organisation O) But at 
the same time you have these different actors 
such as foundations and has different lines of 
accountability, different missions and visions, 
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and they're usually way more dynamic and 
they can move so much more quickly and 
flexibly than other actors can,.."(Philanthropic 
organisation O).   
 
" And I think they really want to say like, we 
have best people with a corporate background, 
to make sure we have a corporate approach to 
a public health problem" (Non-profit 
Research Institution A Non-profit 
International Agency A) 
Ideological drivers   
"So we know that anything that we are going 
to be interested in is with the basis of 
supporting great ideas to thrive through 
research. If you go to Rockefeller, some of the 
programmes they do have similar interests. 
Others are more programmatic if you go to 
gain so much more programmatic than 
necessarily research focused. So I think, I 
think it's, it's, it's a question of, of how much 
all of our contributions have been contributing 
to a bigger, a bigger agenda" (Philanthropic 
organisation O).  
 
"I think one of WHO's has problems is that 
they, they're kind of invited by the country, so 
they can't be too critical. You know, you can't 
say to us, you cannot do that, because, you 
know, the country will say, well, you go home 
then. And then they want they asked for 
another WR, you know, the representative. 
And I think that sort of relationship, which is 
normally quite  between the WHO 
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representative and the, and the country, the 
Minister of Health. "(Non-profit PPP, M)  
 
" I think they're also very pragmatic. I think 
they're definitely ideology ideologically 
oriented. But this is, I mean, most foundations 
in the US, I mean, in the US, or the political 
spectrum is, I mean, I don't know, Democrats 
is definitely not the equivalent of the left in 
Europe, the democrat is much more like the 
right here or most than the Republican. So 
that the the ideological director directions in 
the US is also very different from from here. 
So definitely the work of foundation. And it's 
the same for the open society Foundation, 
which, which is very ideologically oriented, 
but in a very interesting way, and much, much 
more progressive. So that is definitely 
something to that that can be an easily also 
with the project that Gates is funding in geo 
engineering and GMOs in education. I mean, 
it's very obvious that there is an ideological 
tribe. I mean, I guess everyone has their own 
ideological visions. So that's fine. Yeah, so 
that is definitely but but the thing is that what 
they're funding us in doing it has shouldn't 
have if, if we just do what they're asking us to 
do, should have anything to do with ideology. 
" (Philanthropic organisation W).  
 
 " Targeting diseases that primarily they 
wouldn't be targeting. And I think that the 
rigidity, as you say, where is it in their, in 
  L  
their approaches because of that, just because 
they you know, they probably have a big 
board of people with a lot of knowledge, on, 
on, on on global health issues, but also a lot of 
pressure by, you know, shareholders and the 
public, also to the public is starving for big, 
big story, you know, eradication story of an 
elimination storey. And I think that's also 
something that drives a lot of the, of the force 
behind that, you know, so if we, if we want to 
be that big in that scenario in that role, I think 
we should put all of our efforts into that. And 
the problem is that again, it's fine if this 
happens, that I think the big issue for me here 
is the fact that this might cause this this lack 
of balance," (Non-profit Research Institution 
A) 
Entrepreneurial 
attitude   
"And in that we have people that do modular 
photovoltaics, their engineers looking to, you 
know, if you're going to clean water pump in 
rural Africa, there's no distributed electricity 
going to it, it's got you've got to have its own 
power source. And so they look to make 
partnerships in this. " (Pharmaceutical 
company Q) 
Conservative attitude   
"They do have less flexibility than the other 
than then the new type of organisations and 
GAVI and things like that. Because they are, 
you know, part of the UN system they do, 
they can't just, you know, they, they they have 
big, you know, they have staff that have been 
there for a long time. So, it's a much more 
traditional organisation. And it's going to 
require it and it doesn't have as much 
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flexibility to move around. And of course, the 
big thing is, you know, they have country 
members, they have to agree on everything, 
right. Yes. Yes. So, which is not necessarily 
the case with things like, GAVI."(Non-profit 
PPP J) 
Monitoring   
"Yes, it's mostly like your mission indicators, 
like how many children have been immunised 
with Gabby support? What is the impact in 
terms of deaths subverted in terms of 
strategies? Like in the future? What would be 
the most impactful? If? What space? Would 
we be more impactful? and things like that, 
basically? "(Non-profit PPP J)  
 
" in terms of we, you know, because it's 
important for us to have independent  
assessors, essentially. So I mean, a lot of it's 
done through external partners and Alliance 
members. So higher, like research centres, and 
and, yeah, and monitors also. So in terms of 
looking backwards, we look at, you know, 
impact evaluations, that kind of stuff. 
Independently  assessed, as well as looking at 
the future." (US Government Agency, J)  
 
"For us, it's actually limited to the Ministry of 
Health, who then go to minister of finance, 
etc. But for, you know, you kind of everyone 
gets together tries to understand what the 
problem is, and how best to allocate those 
resources. And where we come in is, we 
essentially provide an analysis. So it's kind of 
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modelling analysis with a number of scenarios 
of IK, what are you considering? What do you 
value is it health maximisation protection is 
that whatever. So you kind of establish 
criteria that are nationally that are a national 
priority. Ministry of Health is usually going to 
be about health maximisation, right? So 
sometimes you get an equity and not the 
criteria as well. And based on that, you run an 
analysis and you go kind of, okay, is your first 
scenario where you propose this second 
scenario? " (Academic Research Institution  
B) 
Dynamic change Rate of change   
Slow change   
Sometimes when those expectations are not 
met, I think at some point you find some 
frustrations, because what sometimes there is 
a great idea of having public and private 
collaborating. If you don't see then all the 
changes happening in the surroundings and 
environment, for example, where these pdbs 
are supposed to be benefiting, for example, in 
some low middle income countries. I think 
there there is some risk of actually 
questioning the the sort of long term 
sustainability of this partnerships. 
(Philanthropic organisation O) 
Rapid implementation   
So for example, the private sector Thing tends 
to be way more quick and reactive and 
dynamic. (Philanthropic organisation O) 
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Slow implementation   
"Whereas the public sector tend to be a little 
bit more slow and a little bit more like you 
have to move things very slowly." 
(Philanthropic organisation O)  
 
"The World Health Assembly, which is made 
up of ministers of health? Yeah, from every 
country in the world. And then they and that 
makes decisions at the global level. And then 
they have all these regional organisations as 
well, which have their own independent 
governance structures. Okay. And I think it's 
very difficult, because they have separate 
governance structures. It's difficult. It doesn't 
operate like UNICEF or UNDP, which has 
much more authority over it's  not they're 
more of a kind of vertical programme 
structure, where whatever the centre says that 
the region's kind of have to do it. But WHO 
doesn't operate like that at all" (Historic 
Academic Institution, Z)  
 
"I think that private foundations rightly or 
rather suspicious of who has ability to ever 
get anything done. And say that one of the 
reasons they set up all these independent 
initiatives is to get around the Who?" (UK 
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C2- Degree of trust in 
accepting alternate 
perspectives 
Creation of monitoring 
guidelines 
Ability to accept different 
viewpoints 
"And I think, the same way you could talk 
about Gates Foundation, we talk about 
Rockefeller, about, you know, many other 
foundations and I think, you know, all of 
those have their own internal priority setting 
and really good idea of what their remit and 
mandate is, for example, if you're talking 
about Welcome, our specific approach is 
improving health through 
research."(Philanthropic organisation O)  
 
"I think there's a there's been a strong 
technical oversight and independent technical 
review mechanism at the global fund that has, 
has tried to ensure that there's a balance 
between sort of evidence based interventions 
they're invested in by the Global Fund with it, 
those are really determined by local country 
contacts. " (Non-profit PPP R)  
 
"But it's true that the PPP have not been super 
cooperative, because it's not, it's not in their 
mandate to do policy and advocacy on Yeah, 
they're very interested in doing politician 
advocacy, to get more funds from the EU to 
do their work. But not to ultimately change 
EU policies so that they are more 
conditionality to getting public funding, 
which is our interest to getting public funding, 
we would like to you, for instance, to make 
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sure that whenever someone applies for funds, 
that there is an access plan that they have to 
fill in that they have to, and that is a criteria of 
how the money should be allocated. And then 
there is also monitoring and evaluation, you 
have to show like, what would be the impact? 
They make this product accessible, etc?" 
(Philanthropic organisation W) 
Alternate perspectives   
"an example is one donor a piece of work for 
which was selling, so that they were 
introducing a commodity, which would be 
really well placed to be supplied from private 
pharmacies in developing countries. But 
because the donor just always worked with 
the Ministry of Health, work through the 
health, clinics, etc, that it just wasn't presented 
as an option to even discuss it with, with 
pharmacies, who actually, I think we're better 
placed." (Independent Consulting  Firm K).  
 
 
"Yeah, so I think the primary reason is always 
under political influence, okay. And 
overstepping boundaries, so pushing. So, you 
know, the Gates Foundation funds Non-profit 
PPP, Mlliance, different countries have 
different perceptions about the utility and cost 
effectiveness of vaccines. Some countries 
don't believe in vaccination, even though we 
have a policy and evidence level vaccinations 
are the most cost effective and highly 
clinically effective intervention you can give 
in a health system. So there have been seem to 
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be instances where international organisations 
are pushing vaccines on countries through 
GAVI, including Gates Foundation, as well as 
others, and that local countries have really 
pushed back because they felt that their 
population was was having vaccines or drugs 
pushed upon them by international 
organisations. So really, that kind of under 
political influence from an international 
organisation on a local country population is 
where the difficulty lies." (UK Government 
Agency F) 
Convergence to a 
different model   
"And I've been also a part of different 
organisations. So at some point, I was 
representing academia. And another point I 
was representing medical doctors and health 
professionals in the field, then went on to do 




 "Yes, so the the way it works is your seat on 
the board is more or less determined, in some 
sense by what kind of donor you are. So the 
US government, for example, is our biggest 
donor, and they have their own board seat. 
The UK is similar they have they are the 
second or third biggest donor, depending on 
the foreign exchange rate at the time. And 
they also have their own seat. The private 
foundations has a board seat. And then within 
that constituency, they determine who their 
representative is. But our biggest private 
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foundation donor is by far the Gates 
Foundation." (Non-profit Agency, R) 
Ability to link 
theorisation to new 
practices 
Alignment between 
discourse and practices 
"So GATES has spent a lot of money to the 
Institute for Health metrics. Okay. Yeah. And 
for in vaccination to try to get some national 
data. Yeah. Which principles, great. But the 
approach that IHME has taken is really just 
trying to, it's very removed from it's, it's based 
on surveys that were done, you know, years 
ago, on DHS surveys were done, you know, 
like, at a very disparate intervals. And the US, 
basically, the use a lot of, you know, 
regression methods to get to once a one metre 
by one metre type of coverage questions. But 
if you really delve into that, and you think 
about what's happening on the ground, it's 
very, very far from that." (Non-profit PPP J)  
 
"I think some of some of the objectives are 
very clear, but at the same time, I think we 
also have to, to, to keep in mind that they are 
also driven by a lot of media and 
communication and publicist.And I don't want 
to say that this is the driving force behind it. 
But of course, they would like to work on 
something that they can, you know, publicise 
widely and broadly, if something happens, 
you know, so it's much more interesting to, I 
don't know, to focus on something that will 
give a big return in terms of attention, media 
attention, that's something that's, you know.." 
(Non-profit Research Institution A) 
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Facilitation in 
engaging into new 
roles   
"Yeah, in terms of them impacting priority 
setting, I wouldn't say so. They're not they're 
not policy makers, you know, yeah, they're 
not policy makers are not policy focused 
institutions, they're more around generating 
evidence, they can actually feed into policy 
processes and kind of better ones rather than 
ad hoc decision making" (Academic Research 
Institution  B).  
 
"Yeah, that's more or less my role. Yet, 
though. I acted as advisors, I forget the 
number of their programmes. And I do the 
same with WHO done some work with the 
World Bank. So generally, what happens is 
that these organisations look for technical 
expertise in a given area, whether that be from 
a strategic perspective. So health systems 
strengthening and innovation programmes can 
be gathered to work together to support those 
aims, or whether it's specifically a given area 
like improving value for money or control of 
non communicable disease. So often, I mean, 
what again, what specifically, do you want to 
know?" (UK Government Agency F).  
 
"So I was reading once about Bolivia, so we'll 
leave has a very small HIV prevalence very 
small, but then it has a lot of child as and 
other diseases that are very prevalent. But if 
you look at the funding for each one of this 
condition, so HIV receives like 10 to 15 times 
more funding, then chagas disease or any 
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other disease like more emerging viral 
diseases, etc. Because, you know, the problem 
with there's very poor data sharing because 
there's very good data collection. So I think 
that if there is one main thing that needs to be 
addressed to make the Global Health" (Non-
profit Research Institution A) 
  
C3- Legitimacy of 
theorisers 
 
History of institutions Societal status 
"So yeah, they're involved in in policy change, 
but the policy change that interest them, they 
are very good at policy analysis, they have 
very good contacts at the highest level. So 
they're very influential in terms of sometimes 
we wonder why they fund this, because when 
bill comes in town or someone else that it's 
very easy for them to, you know, they put 
new funds into a new fund, and then the 
commission matches the funds. And it's they 
can change things, not very much in the sense 
that I would like things to be changed, but 
they can. They're quite, they're quite 
powerful. And that has pissed off quite a lot 
of members of parliament when they started 
doing memorandum of understanding with 
here with the director general for research. 
And yeah, the weight that they have in in 
certain institution definitely is. But I mean, 
this is also because of the legislature that we 
have now on the political system we have in 
place in the EU, which is very much on the 
right, which is very much pro growth, pro 
competition, pro neoliberal economic models 
  LX  





"we put a science communication festival via 
the Wellcome Trust every year, when the 
fourth year of it at this year's one, just now, 
we get a lot of awards in that as well. And I 
always get the impression that for a while, it 
has been peer to peer. Okay. Yeah. And 
maybe that's because of the stakeholders 
involved. That's what I think they're starting 
to reach out now that we've seen a turning in 
that over the last four years of this festival that 
we've run. It's starting to turn outside of that, 
what do you think, and I think this is, this is 
also part of the realisation process, and that 
they are this, the, the communication that they 
do, can actually bring in civic society, you 
know, different actors image. " (Non-profit 
organisation Q)   
 
" I think was two years ago was in Geneva for 
a big meeting, I worked a lot of neglected 
tropical diseases. So, this meeting was the 
entity forum was a big big meeting and the 
you know, that there is this there was this 
London Declaration on on neglected diseases 
was signed in 2012. And basically it was 
driven by Gates and you know, the Gates 
Foundation brought together a lot of 
institutions, primarily private institutions, 
private, big farmers, and, and, and some 
NGOs and some some other smaller private 
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foundations that were they were working on, 
on on neglected diseases and they made 
basically they built this roadmap with very 
ambitious goals" (Non-profit International 
Agency A) 
Personalities   
"So, because of his clout of his high profile, 
he's able to use that to leverage to influence 
policymakers to give them a money to 
specific cause, as opposed to another. All 
right. Okay. So again, there's an element of, 
you know, one person's agenda or one 
agencies agenda, to move funding towards 
that?" (Historic Academic Institution V).      
 
"And then the CEO is also this woman who 
was very successful in registering and 
bringing to the market, I think biological 
drugs for cancer. Sue Desmond, and she was 
very successful. You know, being the medical 
director of I think it's Genetech, the company, 
and, you know, highly successful, very 
ambitious, and, again, with a lot of legitimacy 
by the opinion majors, yeah. And have that 
beyond the beneficiaries, as also this is, you 
know, have that, that difference between the, 
and I think that they might also invest in, in 
the communications for the potential 
beneficiaries, but also for it for the opinion 
makers, like key opinion leaders in the world 
and people who will be looking at those kind 
of legitimacy and say, okay, who do I trust? 
You know, when when somebody said, I trust 
this guy who comes from a big industry with 
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with a track record of something, I would not 
necessarily trust someone with a public health 
background, because he can't communicate 
properly with the wider audience. So I think 
that's that's an interesting". (Non-profit 
Research Institution A) 
Leadership   
"And I think they're I think there was an 
interesting period when the Margaret Chan, 
that the previous eg finish her term and Dr. 
Tedros started, and I think there was a period 
where no one really knew what was going to 
happen. I think Dr. Tedros says, you know, 
leadership has been quite interesting to to, to 
witness, I think he's taking who to the next to 
the next stage. "(Philanthropic organisation O)  
 
"And I really appreciate that Dr. Tedros in his 
office is really looking at a strategy and the 
global programme of work that is actually 
quite strategic and clear, looking at the 3 
billion target, looking at prioritising certain 
areas for the next five to 10 years. And I think 
that's the way to go, sort of providing really 
strong leadership, a lot of charisma to make 
sure that countries and partners come together 
and are able to sing to at least play different 
songs, but really being mastered by the same 
agenda, I think has been quite successful with 
that." (Philanthropic organisation O)  
 
"I think Gates has shown extraordinary 
leadership, really, in the global health field. I 
know, I know that he's been critiqued in other 
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fields, but I think it's amazing what he's done. 
I don't think he's an easy, day to day kind of 
management type leader. I think he's 
struggles. You know, sort of internal 
management, I think he's quite a tricky 
question on a personal basis. But I think he's 
shown extraordinary leadership. And it may 
be that it takes people that are more tricky to 
sort of put their head above the parapet and do 
that kind of thing." (Historic Academic 
Institution, Z).  
 
" I think they've been able to, I think they can 
do things that sometimes multilateral 
organisations that are governed by member 
states are restricted to do okay. You know, 
Gates Foundation has been really key, and I 
go back to Gates, so often, because there's 
such a big partner, and they, you know, they 
are such a massive foundation. But they've 
really been able to invest in innovations that 
are harder for other institutions to invest in 
with public money" (Non-profit PPP R).  
 
" FENSA, which is basically designed to kind 
of manage conflict of interest, okay, we say, 
yeah, within and approaches to how the 
private actor is engaged, was one important 
piece of work, which was done at the global 
health level, to try and determine how and 
when these private entities should engage 
with and how they should engage with WHO 
processes again, worryingly that looks like it 
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could be being reinterpreted at the moment by 
Tedros the new leadership at WHO " (Public 
Global Health Agency R) 
Legitimation link to 
academia   
"And then you have universities, you know, 
so who also tried to capitalise on this? I mean, 
if you looked at the what the university stock 
public health school store 1520 years ago, you 
wouldn't see global health so much on that 
agenda with exceptional, maybe look, you 
know, Liverpool University, Leeds 
University, or Howard University, Johns 
Hopkins. Now, almost every university will 
teach something along the lines of global 
health(Non- profit organisation V.  Historic 
Academic Institution V).I think was last year, 
about a year ago at Oxford University, and 
possibly rest along receive, you know, 
millions and millions of Gates money to do 
research "(Non- profit organisation V) 
 
 "a lot of the money I mean, you know, not to 
be, you know, at least 50% goes back to, you 
know, whoever is no, yeah, yeah, the US 
entity essential. Yeah. Yeah. So that's, that's 
part of it. In other countries, I used to work on 
CIV are quite a bit. And they basically the 
money goes directly to us based NGO, the US 
based NGO sets up in CIV, and they run the 
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programmes from there. So again, a lot of the 
money goes back to us NGOs, you know, 
things like ICAP, which is a Columbia 
University. They also have quite a bit of what 
is that one from John Hopkins has also an 
offshoot organisation that has a presence 
there. So a lot of the money goes back to 
them. And they, they administer the 
programmes."(US Government Agency, J)  
 
"So normally its a government is considering 
to change up its strategic priorities, they might 
get in touch with the development agencies 
such as, you know, the World Bank, and the 
World Bank, then commissions, essentially, 
consultants or partner organisations, which 
tend to be universities, okay. And then they'll 
say, look, you know, there's, there's this kind 
of policy process going on in the country, and 
they're looking for some evidence to inform 
what it is that they'll end up going for. Okay. 
Whether that, you know, the role of us at this 
sort of universities and at producing and 
analysis, there is no policy engagement, that's 
more policy engagement." (Academic 
Research Institution  B)  
  
  C4- Field Nexus 
Identification                  
 
Mission synchronicity 
Density of like-minded 
ideologues   
  LXVI  
Participation of 
practitioners   
 "So, you see also a lot of people joining 
organisations who you didn't see in the past 
before who are private foundations, you 
know, doctors doing working in, in, in 
organisations like welcome like myself, I even 
see potential in the past or I think that creates 
sort of a, an interest in in in organisations like 
welcome gates that I think that was not there 
before."(Philanthropic organisation O) 
 
 "What the critique of the gates approach is 
that they are quite embedded with the private 
sector approach. They like the kind of private 
sector business model, yep, they will always 
play in play the game on international, 
international intellectual property rules, etc, 
etc. So some people would argue that they are 
too embedded with the, with pharmaceutical 
companies. I think that the Gates Foundation 
would argue that they are using the capacity 
and the skills of the pharmaceutical industry. 
And they prefer because of their own heritage 
within the private sector, to play by those 
game play by those rules." (UK Government 
Agency Z).  
 
"But what we've started doing realised, okay, 
if research is not needs driven, because the 
research budget, which is a massive budget in 
EU is under a budget heading called Jobs 
Broken Competitiveness. So basically, 
research and innovation is seen as a way to 
put closer together academics and research 
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tuition so that it can really do a lot of research 
and spur innovation that then can help the 
private sector grow and create jobs, and can 
ultimately maybe wants to trickle down the 
line benefit citizens with innovative 
technologies that we can use." (Philanthropic 
organisation W) 
Political support Ability to ensure support 
"but the notion of power relations becomes 
important here because of, if you look at the 
profile of people who are recruited as senior 
executives, yes, chief executives of the large 
organisations like STC, yeah. Who was the 
chief executive?Chief exec until recently. 
Well, it was the former prime minister of 
Denmark. OY, Prime Minister, which is a bit 
unusual role for prime minister to become a 
chief exec to begin with, but also chief 
executive for charity. You don't often hear 
Prime Minister's doing that. But she did. And, 
and part of the indication towards is because, 
well, a lot of the money that STC derives 
comes from government agencies. Yeah. And 
having somebody who has those political 
connections really helps. And so. So politics, 
and power and mighty kind of really get it 
really integral here” (Non- profit organisation 
V) 
 
"Where was I? Yes. So they, I mean, they 
exert a lot of power, through their funding of 
advocacy, and also through the world of the 
CO chairs and the best sort of privates. The 
kind of public, the government relations, I 
think they call it elements of their work. But 
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they,you know, they, in the end, governments 
will I mean, I wouldn't say that they 
necessarily changed DFID funding plans. 
They might have encouraged if it along that 
particular path. Yep. But DFID was pretty 
much a willing player." (UK Government 
Agency Z).  
 
"So for example, in India, the media had a 
very strong voice against the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation, created an environment or 
an ecosystem, it was difficult for the Gates 
Foundation to operate. And any Gates 
Foundation grantee found it very difficult to 
work with government partners, knowing that 
their funding came from a foundation." (UK 
Government Agency F)  
 
" so the government, as we said, health 
systems, very poor, fragmented, low funding, 
know, human resources, brain, drain turnover, 
etc. And then, you know, then, this big, big 
foundations come with cash, people, you 
know, pre programmed approaches, and then 
for the government, it's great to me, okay, 
that's whatever you want, we don't mind like 
you putting another fridge in our, our help 
centre, as long as you put a generator, you 
know, if you should put a person a liaison 
officer in our, in our ministry of health," 
(Non-profit International Agency A) 
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Responding to local 
fluctuations   
"So even just concentrating it like, within, so 
having, you know, whoever's coming 
externally coming and working hand to hand 
with the people from the ministry, and during, 
you know, trade learning by doing kind of 
things, you know, that say, if, if it's a course, 
on health economics, it will be like, you 
know, having high making decisions with the 
people at the city, you know, with for six 
months are not using that framework, to do 
their actual job to show, you know, to show 
how this can be used in terms of making 
decisions and how this could be used to get 
resources, get gain traction with the finance 
ministry, and things like that" (Non-profit 
PPP J)  
 
"These micro industries, I mean, you know, 
look at the Grameen Foundation, the 
microcredit stuff that they set up, you know, 
in Bangladesh, where they allow women to 
make buttons make soap, this money coming 
into their household has a direct effect on the 
clean water, they're going to drink on the on 
the, you know, so these things have to be 
linked, and they can't be linked to the spoken 
about. And people. That's why they have to 
widen the net in terms of speaking to 
definitely I think it's starting to happen, 
starting to happen." (Pharmaceutical company 
Q) 
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"And ultimately, the issue number one issue 
that I see is that people who are suffering the 
most are never consulted, in terms of, you 
know, the people who think about the 
solutions, but like me know, and are not the 
people who are affected by the issues that 
we're trying to solve. And so ultimately, we're 
constantly devising solutions that are not fit 
for purpose, because the people are not have 
not been consulted, there should be the one 
implementing and not someone else from 
another country. And they should be the one 
monitoring it. And as soon as we don't respect 
this principle, which if we were to respect it 
would mean that we would be totally 
disinterested, and that we would have only 
solidarity and ethical values at our heart, 
which is different" (Philanthropic organisation 
W) 
C5-Ability to create a participatory hub 





 But obviously was gradually because I was 
back then still studying or doing my medical 
degree and It started with doing a lot of 
national policy and sort of working with the 
Minister of Health and Education, Science 
and Technology and sort of evolved with 
global health interests. (Philanthropic 
organisation O) 
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Creation of a hub for 
professionals   
"I mean, the Gates Foundation in particular, I 
wouldn't say that other foundations have been 
particularly influential. But gates in particular 
has been very influential, particularly in terms 
of of setting up a lot of new organisations, and 
triggering the establishment of a hugely 
complex web of initiatives and some of the 
organisations, some of which are trying to do 
research and welcome global public goods, 
and others of which are trying to deliver 
deliver grants and money and programmatic 
activities." (UK Government Agency Z)  
 
 
" We put a hackathon out about three years 
ago. Okay, for Dengue yeah. Our the rationale 
behind it was all these mad hackers and 
coders they are a resource, but they don't 
really know about this particular disease. 
Yeah. So we wanted to do, we wanted them to 
develop patient, long shooting location 
recording app, that doctors could use it field. 
There are seven strongest layers to the prizes 
that we will get now mobile came out military 
was actually and we were shocked at the 
amount of in how to put it submissions we 
had. Not just in dangly, we were swamped, 
we will have this swamped. Right across 
different diseases, are you people out there 
want to engage, you just don't know where 
they're made aware that they know you're 
driving in judgement and responsibility that 
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this is our problem as well" (Non-profit 
organisation Q) 
Use of models   
"we invest based on WHO six building blocks 
of,sustainable systems for health. And there 
are six of us clear building blocks that they 
have, that they have outlined, that are critical 
to invest in, in order to build a health system. 
And with the Sustainable Development Goals, 
sort of, as the NDG are merged into this one 
SDG related to health, we're seeing a lot more 
of an emphasis on those those building blocks 
along the path to UHC." (Non-profit PPP R) 
 
 "  governance is one of them. financing is one 
of them, supply chains is one of them. There's 
there's actually an enormous body of literature 
on them. And who has an entire department, I 
believe, dedicated to it. And I'm not sure since 
Tetris has restructured and exactly where it 
sits within their current current management 
structure. But yeah, it's a huge and important 
piece of work that they do in that and our 
investments in in health systems are within 
that those building blocks" (Non-profit PPP 
R)  
 
"What was what was very interesting about 
this models was that it was needs driven, and 
it was product driven. So it was very concrete 
and the access condition, and it's just, it's 
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something that we studied or so very much 
have been addressed. From the beginning, 
we've actually studied all the PPPs and all the 
models and how they made sure that there 
was acceptable access condition that could 
work also for the private sector. And we're 
trying to actually replicate that in public 
funding from governments and institutions 
and hasn't worked anywhere. It hasn't been 
done before" (Philanthropic organisation W) 




“And I have to say that the majority of 
experiences that I had, as a worker here, 
welcome with Gates has been really good, 
really, really gets very constructive, very, you 
know, a lot of sharing of expertise, which is 
useful for everybody.”(Philanthropic 
organisation O)  
 
 "they really have to put their money where 
their mouth is essentially, you know, and they 
also have very clear ideas of what they want 
us to see. Yeah. So in that sense, I think, you 
know, they've managed if you look at their, 
the way they've hired to, they really hired at 
their senior positions they did they have hired 
people who were in the traditional industries, 
you know, they do have quite a bit of breath, a 
presentation from the World Bank, and, and, 
you know, USAID and things like that, that 
have, so this people with you who had deep 
connections to the field that went to Gates." 
(US Government Agency, J) 
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 "So the Gates Foundation was he started 
funding, you know, those organisations, then 
they started gaining legitimacy. You know, so 
it is really around funding. And in addition to 
that, also recruiting experts. Okay. Yeah. 
Yeah, yeah. Recruiting foundation. 
Yeah.credibility and knowledge to advance 
the work with the Gates Foundation" 
(Philanthropic organisation W).  
 
" So I think that's something good that I think 
we should not neglect. And then you know, 
because it's easy to say all that there, there's 
kind of like, strict in that way, in that way. 
But I think this is something that stems out of 
working with them, that's quite positive, 
because this really ensures that, you know, 
you can't, you can't do something something 
bad because the the regulations and the 
accountability mechanisms are very, very 
strict, which sometimes might, you know, 
make the, the, the NGOs or this this 
partnerships,quite angry, because they have 
to, you know, add another layer of layer of 
documentation. But still, I think it's good for 




practitioners   
"I suppose probably depends on the cause. 
Right. Okay. So this alignment, for example, 
between Clinton Foundation's interests and 
Gates Foundation. So alignment, the lines in 
terms of trying to reduce child mortality, 
particularly through vaccination, they're both 
interested in pushing as much vaccination as 
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possible. Now, do they work hand in hand?I 
don't think so. At least not in the way they 
fund because because of these agencies also 
interested in in certain outcomes related to 
measure. So they both fund one agency 
working in the same place that kind of dilutes, 
whose mind is really making a difference. 
Okay, so it doesn't really work that way. 
Yeah. But they could be working together 
more on the political level, on the policy 
level, so you know, they could be for 
example, lobbying government departments 
within the US, UK or in the European Union, 
towards driving have more money. “(Historic 
Academic Institution V)  
 
"instrumental in the setting up of GAVI of the 
Global Fund, those are the big ones, but also a 
whole slew of much smaller organisations, 
have done a lot of work in product 
development, a huge number there, a lot of 
which have initiated by Gates, or, you know, 
the idea comes and they seem to like this will 
public private partnership approach as a way 
of using their money to seed and attract public 
funding?" (UK Government Agency Z)  
 
"And say, GAVI, GAVI is a big one, the 
Global Fund, and UNITAID and then WHO 
and different departments within it. Some 
we've had to engage with for a number of 
years, some just for short period, but 
obviously, there's multiple departments within 
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WHO, and then partnership for maternal child 
health PMNCH be another one." (Independent 
Consulting  Firm K) 






"So the vaccine itself wouldn't necessarily sell 
for shilling, you know, in India or in Europe, 
please, just because. So support from The 
Gates Foundation they work with vaccine 
manufacturers,  reduce cost of vaccine 
manufacturing. So for example,malaria, TB, 
HIV, they are not necessarily disease for 
developed countries.They are disease for the 
poor and because the return on investment for 
these big pharmaceutical companies, you 
know, isnt high for them because it's not a 
disease you know, for the West, you know, 
research and development for those types of 
diseases who don't get funding from 
pharmaceutical companies.Because you 
know, it takes even for medicines it takes 15 
to 20 years for this to be commercially 
available.So all the Gates Foundation, does it 
now start funding those, you know, initiatives 
that's wouldnt get traction from either 
pharmaceutical companies or university." ( 
Philanthropic Organisation U)   
 
 
"And still, they were sometimes,you know, 
staring the the whole institution to be able to 
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respond to some funding requirements in 
terms of, you know, let's say if they, they, 
they ended up working on on a certain disease 
because there was some sort of negotiation 
being done between a big big foundation 
private foundation American Foundation, and 
say, Okay, we'll fund this disease for you. But 
in exchange, you will have to fund research 
for this as a condition because this is 
important for us even though it wasn't the 
kind of disease that the  organisation would be 
looking at normally, because there is enough 
research and work being done." (Non-profit 
International Agency A) 
Donor-related power   
"And the same goes, you know, for example, 
one of the influences Gates has is on the 
World Health Organisation, yes. Again, this is 
one of the largest funder. So who, which 
means, you know, there is, if not explicit, was 
implicit influence on his agenda and actions. 
Yeah. Okay. And it can kind of, but what 
happened was, I think around 2011, there was 
there was a World Health Assembly, which 
happens every year around this time. Yeah. So 
actually, could have been a good opportunity 
for you, with your research to go to the World 
Health Assembly in Geneva, you probably 
don't even have to subscribe to you know, 
because you have to get a special permission 
to join. But you know, even if you just go to 
the place where the assembly takes place, you 
can talk to people outside of the Yeah, yeah. 
But attracts all kinds of people. Okay, so 
ministers, private foundations, and NGO's, 
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etc, etc. And, and what happened in 2011? Is 
Gates was invited to address because they 
have kind of every assembly, they have the 
keynote address. Yeah, I guess was my for the 
second time. And that made a lot of people 
uncomfortable" (Non- profit organisation V).  
 
"But so are to be fair, so, you know, some of 
the big donors, so it's, I wouldn't say that 
they've been more influential and influential 
than, let's say, the UK Government. They're 
probably at par with each other but, but I 
think in general donors like, like, , UK, 
Sweden, Norway, don't tend to not give as 
many instructions or be too prescriptive, you 
know, you give them funding and you're kind 
of buying into the mission of the organisation 
and you sort of let the governance structures 
the board, etc, if they're on the board, but they 
kind of let let the organisation do its work and 
then report back on it. Whereas I think for the 
Gates Foundation at the beginning, they were 
very, they were much keener to be in. Yeah, 
involved in in sort of the details and had more 
kind of, you know, more active, almost not 
not implementation roles, but but you know, 
what I mean, there was sort of more 
directive."(Non-profit PPP, M) 
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Increase in service 
quality   
"the London School of Economics right now 
called LEAP. Professor Tim Allen, Georgina 
Pearson, is the person leading if they're 
actually using AI to remodel outcomes, and 
decision making when it comes to mass Drug 
Administration programmes. Yeah, what 
works, what doesn't work, then you got 
blockchain, watch out for blockchain." (Non-
profit organisation Q)  
 
"And I think that in some ways, countries are 
leading the way ahead of donors. And they're 
actually requesting things like more 
integration and what works best for them, the 
primary health care level, etc. But in other 
ways, some of the push will come from 
donors, because to be some programmes, such 
as the HIV programmes in the past have 
benefited from more narrow siloed funding. 
So it might take a little time for them to,  sort 
of give up control of as much of the budget so 
to speak, it's not nice to be shared across 
multiple diseases or, the budget goes towards 
houses and strengthening more broadly, etc." 
(Independent Consulting  Firm K).  
 
"I think, in a very positive way, that comes 
from, you know, working with this 
foundations is that a lot of times some of 
these organisations, I think they, some of 
them might have lacked in the past of some 
sort of, let's say, accountability, or, you know, 
complying with very strict rules and 
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regulations in terms of, especially when 
you're thinking clinical trials and, and 
development of tools like diagnostics and 
drugs. And and if you work for such 
foundations, because they're so worried about 
their public image, they are very strict on that. 
And I think that's, I mean, that I will tell you 
that as something positive, that they're raising 
the bar in terms of the, you know, compliance 
of good practices, good clinical practices, and 
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Appendix E 
                               A- IDEAL TYPES OF PROFESSIONAL LOGIC AND MODES OF LOGIC EVOLUTION 
First order categories  
Second order 
categories Theoretical categories 
Centralisation Control mechanism 
Professional logic of 
assistance 
Hierarchy and direct control   
Professional logic of 
assistance 
Formal line of guidance   
Professional logic of 
assistance 
Centrality of relationship 
Cooperation in 
Network 





Professional logic of 
integration 
Blurred lines of control  
Cooperation in 
Network 
Professional logic of 
integration 
Integration Core idea 
Professional logic of 
integration 
Preventive and adivsory function 
Identity and 
legitimacy 
Professional logic of 
integration 
Expanded relations and increased 
attractiveness of M.H.P 
Identity and 
legitimacy 





Professional logic of 
integration 
Accountability Control mechanism 
Professional logic of 
integration 
Managerial responsibilities Control mechanism 
Professional logic of 
integration 
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Individual responsibility Control mechanism 
Professional logic of 
integration 
Rise in contract based independent 
organisation Network 
Professional logic of 
integration 
Separation of research and development 
Identity and 
legitimacy 
Professional logic of 
integration 
Focus on R&D 
Identity and 
legitimacy 
Professional logic of 
integration 
Lack of coordination Network 
Professional logic of 
integration 
      
Enrichment Integrating (blending) Logic evolution 
Conjunction Attaching (annexing)   
Changing relationships with network actors 
Relationship 
modification Field re-structuring 
Rethinking global health  
Field obective 
















B- PHASES OF THE PROCESS OF LOGIC EVOLUTION 
First order categories  Second order categories 
Theoretical 
categories 
New practices Provision failure Stimulating change 
Lack of resources Incentive to invest   
Institutional void     
Interacting on the global level 
Acquiring legitimacy on the 
international level   
      
Use of data and knowledge to 
theorise Constructing identity -legitimacy  
Reconstruction of 
identity-legitimacy 
Communicating new practices to 
the field     
Legitimising the  new functions 
Restructuring identity-legitimacy 
within the field   
      
Gap between old and new 
models 
Tangible differentiation of the 
emerging  and existing models 
Creation of innovative 
relational networks 
Enabling visible changes through 
new models     
Endorsing new roles through the 
models 
Strengthening identity-legitimacy in 
network   
Legitimation of new roles      
Trust on the new relational 
networks     
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Decentralisation of 
responsibilities Reconfiguration of responsibilities 
Restructuring control 
mechanism 
Promoting independent decision 
making     
Creating incentives for increased 
responsiblities     
Connection between decision 
making models and new network 
Supporting identities legitimacy and 
network through control mechanisms   
Strengthening identity through 
control mechanisms     
      
New roles through new practices Transmission of practices 
Evidence of new 
practices 
Promulgating experts identity Redefining the limits of professions   
Peer legitimation     
Practice differentiation Link of new practices to new network   
Reflection of new approach in 
practices     
      
Resource-related power Informal power contestation Proliferation 
Donor-related power     
Increase in quality Amelioration of professional standards   
      
Enrichment Integrating/attaching 
Evolution of updated 
logic 
Conjunction     
Changing relationships with 
network actors Relationship modifications Field re-structuring 
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Rethinking global health Field objective modifications   
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Appendix G 
C- CONTEXTUAL FACTORS AFFECTING LOGIC EVOLUTION 
First order categories  Second order categories Theoretical categories 
Cooperation and coordination 
Efficiency of decision-making 
model Ability to crystallise change 
Dynamic approach     
Ideological drivers     
Entrepreneurial attitude     
Conservative attitude     
Monitoring     
Dynamic change Rate of change   
Slow change     
Rapid implementation     
Slow implementation     
      
Creation of monitoring 
guidelines 
Ability to accept different 
viewpoints 
Trustability in accepting 
pluralistic perspectives 
Alternate perspectives     
Convergence to a different 
model     
Ability to link theorisation to 
new practices 
Alignment between discourse 
and practices   
Facilitation in engaging into new 
roles     
      
History of institutions Societal status Legitimacy of theorisers 
Socialisation platform Recognition and prominence   
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Personalities     
Leadership     
Legitimation link to academia     
      
Mission synchronicity 
Density of like-minded 
ideologues 
Saturation of ideologues in the 
field 
Participation of practitioners     
Political support Ability to ensure support   
Responding to local fluctuations     
      
Combining technical aspects 
Transmission of identity- 
legitimacy Socialisation process 
Creation of a hub for 
professionals     
Use of models     
Gaining trust and legitimacy Reconfiguration of relations   
Stimulating cooperation 
between practitioners     
      
Resource related power Informal power contestation Counter-theorisation 
Donor-related power     
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